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This dissertation deals with the efforts of the British forces 
to regain control of northern Natal from the Boers, during the 
second quarter of 1900. In March Boer forces had dug themselves 
in along the Biggarsberg. 
In early May a British force advanced on the Biggarsberg. 
Exploiting their numerical superiority and with a turning 
movement to their right, the British army forced the Boers to 
retire to the Drakensberg in the Majuba area. 
There followed a period of re-organisation and preparation during 
which General Buller attempted to persuade the Boers to lay down 
their arms. When this failed he launched another attack on the 
Boer defence line. In quick succession the British force gained 
success at Botha's Pass (8 June) and at Alleman's Nek (11 June). 
These reverses forced the Boers to retire from their Drakensberg 
positions and they thereby relinquished all control of Natal to 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1902 a great many 
publications and academic studies have been published on that 
subject. Certain themes, personalities and periods of the war 
have been analysed in detail. Yet, some remain obscured and even 
in recent publications tend to be glossed over. One such aspect 
concerns the period after the relief of Ladysmith, when the Boers 
in Natal retired to the Drakensberg and Biggarsberg and the 
British force initially remained in and around Ladysmith. 
Subsequently, when the British force was ready, it moved 
northwards and forced the Boers to vacate the Biggarsberg and 
eventually also the Drakensberg. This campaign lasted from the 
beginning of March 1900 to approximately 12 June 1900. It is this 
campaign and the significant implications for both parties, 
regarding the conduct of the war, that forms the core of this 
dissertation. Despite the significant implications this campaign 
had, and the tens of thousands of men involved, even a recent 
publication such as Thomas Pakenham' s The Boer War ( 1979), 
devotes only three quarters of a page to it. 
I hope to achieve more in this dissertation than merely filling 
a gap in the literature on the war. It is my intention to 
illustrate that General Sir Redvers Buller adapted his tactics 
by this stage of the war and attempt to understand why he became 
more adventurous as opposed to much of his earlier campaign in 
the war fought in the Thukela valley. This aspect of the 
dissertation will, however, not be a detailed comparative study, 
although in terms of future research, there is scope for such a 
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project in order to understand Buller more fully in the wider 
context of the Second Anglo-Boer War. As regards the Boers, their 
dramatic decline in morale and discipline will be focused on, the 
implications this held at a variety of levels discussed, and an 
attempt will be made to understand why there was this change 
compared to their earlier campaign fought in the Thukela River 
valley. Again it will not be a detailed comparative study. 
Although this period has not been closely analysed in any one 
study, significant and varied sources do exist on it. The most 
detailed descriptions on this period appear in F.M. Maurice and 
M.H. Grant, History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 and L.S. 
Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902. 
Both publications have their strengths and weaknesses. As they 
were written soon after the events, the authors had access to 
eyewitnesses. However, these individuals are seldom identified. 
Maurice and Grant's so called Official History was written by 
fellow officers and this inhibited a thorough criticism of their 
colleagues' strategic and tactical errors. This is a major 
weakness of the publication. The maps that accompany the text are 
generally, as regards topographical features and positions of the 
British forces, very accurate. The positions of Boer forces 
shown, need to be treated with caution though, as detailed 
documentary research and fieldwork have on occasion revealed 
these to be less reliable. 
It is probable that Leo Amery, a reporter for The Times, felt 
himself less constrained than Maurice, a senior officer in the 
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military establishment, and his work is indeed more critical of 
British strategy and tactics. He was none the less writing from 
a particular standpoint, and states in his preface to volume two 
of his work that he wished to reveal the underlying story . 
. . . the real and deeper causes of success or failure, to 
trace the influence of national characteristics and 
national organisation for war in the seemingly fortuitous 
sequence of events, and in the almost incomprehensible 
actions of generals and politicians. It is in realisation 
of those more deeply rooted causes of our past failures, 
quite as much as the indiscriminate adoption of methods 
found useful on the South African veld, that the best hopes 
of the reforms required to insure the safety and the full 
development of that which is already in part a great living 
reality{ but in part remains a precious ideal - the British 
Empire. 
In the sixth volume Amery asserts that the war was a test of 
Imperial unity. 2 Imperial idealism, coupled to military reform 
to ensure the survival of the Empire, are thus of crucial 
importance to Amery. The greatest weakness of both Maurice and 
Grant's and Amery's publications, are that they had few Boer 
sources, official or private, available to them. 
Other valuable British sources are the reports and telegrams 
contained in the Lord Roberts Papers and the Staff Diaries. 
Regrettably the latter only covered the month of May 1900; the 
June ones appear to have been destroyed - probably during World 
War II. The Lord Roberts Papers are useful regarding overall 
strategy and tactics. They also provide a detailed insight into 
1 L.S. Amery, ed., The Times History of the War in South 
Africa, II, pp. v-vi. 
2 Amery, VI, p.vi. 
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General Sir Redvers Buller's vacillations, concerning plans of 
future action. They do also provide some useful details of day 
to day activities, but are not helpful in terms of understanding 
the lower ranks' hardships and toiling. The Staff Diaries provide 
a more detailed record of individual units. Some diarists are 
much more detailed than others. These Diaries were of particular 
value in reconstructing the battle of Helpmekaar. Some of them 
also provide a relatively comprehensive insight into the demands 
made of the lower ranks. Further significant official sources are 
to be found in the British Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books). The 
reports provide a useful overview of events, they do highlight 
the successes of the British forces and particular individuals, 
such as Lieutenant-General H.J.T. Hildyard. Despite being written 
a few days after the events have occurred, they hardly reflect 
any self-criticism. 
There are several other publications and documents which were of 
significant use in trying to piece together and flesh out 
specific events or the roles of certain elements or individuals 
in the army. C.R.N. Burne, With the Naval Brigade in Natal and 
T.T. Jeans, ed., Naval Brigades in the South African War 1899-
1902 are most useful in piecing together the role of the naval 
guns. They are most detailed in places, allowing one to gain a 
good insight into the hardships they had to overcome in order to 
perform their duty. Valuable regimental histories of key units 
at Botha's Pass and Alleman's Nek are C.T. Atkinson, The 
Dorsetshire Regiment, II, A.H.C. Kearsey, War Record of the York 
and Lancaster Regiment 1900-1902 and H.W. Pearce, History of the 
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East Surrey Regiment I 1702-1914. Each provide useful minute 
detail, particularly Atkinson's account of the Dorsets critical 
role at Alleman's Nek. This account is further supplemented by 
a map and hand drawn sketches of the topography by Captain 
Rowley, who was present in the battle. As with the naval gun 
accounts, so too with the regimental histories, one is struck by 
their lack of self-criticism. This has to be borne in mind when 
utilizing these sources. 
Lord Dundonald' s My Army Life and the Dundonald Papers are 
valuable sources on the 3rd Mounted Brigade, which played a 
critical role at Helpmekaar and Botha's Pass and a valuable one 
at Alleman's Nek. But again, it is necessary to bear the lack of 
self-criticism in mind. E.B. Knox's Buller's Campaign with the 
Natal Field Force of 1900 has significant military information 
and is valuable in the sense that Knox, as an army surgeon, was 
not attached to any one of the fighting units and is therefore 
more likely to give credit where it is due. He too, however, does 
not in detail critically analyse the military engagements. My 
greatest regret concerning sources is that I was unable to 
uncover a detailed diary concerning the activities of the South 
African Light Horse. This unit played an important role at 
various stages and Dundonald's autobiography, as well as the 
Dundonald Papers, make mention of this. However, the detail is 
tantalisingly scanty. 
Without doubt the most important Boer sources are the telegrams 
in the Leyds Collection. Falling into much the same category as 
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the Leyds Collection, are the Kommandant-Generaal telegrams. Not 
only are these telegrams a fairly detailed record of day to day 
events but they also give a significant insight into the inner 
emotions and stresses the Boer forces were undergoing. In this 
latter respect they are far more revealing than the official 
British sources of their own emotions and stresses. This in 
itself is possibly a comment on the operation of a professional, 
as opposed to an unprofessional army. Regrettably very few 
telegrams exist for the period from the end of May to early June 
1900. This is possibly the result of one or two circumstances. 
It was at this time that the South African Republican government 
left Pretoria and moved to the eastern Transvaal because Lord 
Roberts's forces were on the point of taking possession of the 
capital. The likelihood therefore exists that there was no one 
to receive the telegrams, or they may not have been stored. At 
the same time, on the Natal front, events occurred with great 
rapidity, with the British breaking through at Botha's Pass (8 
June) and Alleman' s Nek ( 11 June). All this occurred some 
distance away from telegraph stations and it is possible that 
only few telegrams were sent or the very rapidity of events may 
have dictated other priorities, such as ensuring that arms, 
ammunition and provisions did not fall into enemy hands rather 
than communicating with headquarters. As a result of this paucity 
of source material, it is necessary to rely quite heavily on 
British sources in an effort to reconstruct Boer actions. A most 
regrettable shortfall that the Boer telegrams, and in fact their 
primary sources in general have, is that they invariably fail to 
describe precisely where individual units and artillery pieces 
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were. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish with some 
precision how many men and artillery pieces were present in 
particular engagements. 
The archive of the Carolina Historiese Komitee has several useful 
sources, and in particular the diary of J.H. Janson. This source 
helps fill some gaps left by the telegrams and reveals conditions 
of individuals, especially as regards the Botha' s Pass and 
Alleman's Nek engagements. 
The as yet incomplete multi-volumed, 
Anglo-Boer War by state historian 
general history of the 
J.H. Breytenbach, Die 
Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Suid-Afrika, 1899-
1902, is a valuable contribution to the literature on the war. 
In a sense it is a complementary companion to Maurice and Grant's 
and Amery's works, in that it draws heavily on Boer primary 
sources. Therefore, for the first time, researchers have ready 
access to the Boer side of the story. One of its weaknesses is 
that it is written to some degree from a Boer point of view, in 
counter-balance to the Maurice and Grant and Amery works, which 
are written from the British point of view. Breytenbach, in 
criticising British tactics, at times makes use of dubious 
sources such as W.B. Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War and 0. 
Ransford, The Battle of Spion Kop, to sustain an argument. 
C.J. Barnard's Generaal Louis Botha op die Natalse Front 1899-
1900 is a well researched and balanced publication which covers 
the build-up to the core of this dissertation. It illustrates the 
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key role Louis Botha played in the Thukela campaigns. Another 
useful publication is the dissertation by F. J. Grabler, 'Die 
Carolina-Kommando in die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899-1902'. It is 
of particular value as the Carolina commando, along with the 
Lydenburg commando, which is frequently mentioned in it, were the 
main Boer units involved in the battles at Botha' s Pass and 
Alleman's Nek. Regrettably, however, the descriptions and 
analysis of these two engagements is very brief. 
Other sources which provide limited information from the Boer 
viewpoint are E.C. Anderssen, Die Verlede Herleef, C.H. Muller, 
Oorlogsherinneringe, R.W. Schikkerling, Commando Courageous, B. 
Viljoen, My Reminiscances of the Anglo-Boer War and E.J. Weeber, 
Op die Natalse Front. Generally only the occasional snippet can 
be gleaned from these books. 
Another important source to a study of military events such as 
this one is an inspection of the actual terrain itself. Indeed 
to understand more fully, appreciate, interpret written records 
of military actions and be able to comment on events, it is 
necessary to study the topography and locate the remains of 
trenches, gun emplacements and such like. To this end careful 
personal inspections were made of the sites at Helpmekaar, 
Scheepers ' Nek, Van Wykskop, the Botha' s Pass area and the 
Versamelberg near Alleman's and Joubert's Neks. More superficial 
inspections were made of the intervening, less significant 
features. Fortuitously most of the important sites have not been 
adversely affected by human activity. Many of the trenches and 
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gun emplacements described in the literature were located and 
this made the reconstruction of events so much easier. Only at 
Helpmekaar has a Boer trench become overgrown by wattle trees. 
The information gleaned from the field trips, together with that 
from documents, has enabled me to compile the maps which are 
included. 
A slightly flexible approach has been adopted to the spelling of 
names. As a general rule, the most recent spelling utilised on 
the state's Survey and Mapping 1:50 000 maps has been adopted. 
Thus for instance Mafeking becomes Maf ikeng and Laing' s Nek 
becomes Lang's Nek. The latter of these names was altered as the 
result of descendants of the person after whom the nek was named 
drawing attention to the fact that it was incorrect. Where the 
name used to describe a topographical feature is completely 
different in historical literature to that appearing on the map, 
then the one used in the books and documents is adopted. The 
spelling of the river Thukela ( Tugela) presents a slight problem. 
On the maps it is spelt as given in brackets. However, in most 
academic historical literature the former form has been adopted, 
which spelling has been followed in this dissertation as well. 
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Chapter 2. REST AND RE-ORGANIZATION 
At 17:00 on 11 October 1899 the ultimatum handed by the South 
African Republic's Secretary of State, F.W. Reitz, to the British 
Resident in Pretoria, expired. Consequently the two Boer 
republics were formally at war with Great Britain. Prior to this 
diplomatic breakdown, all parties concerned were already 
preparing for this eventuality. As a result, according to 
Breytenbach, the Boers were able to mobilize 32 000 to 35 000 
men at short notice. 1 At this stage the British forces in South 
Africa were smaller, consisting of only 27 054 men of all ranks, 
including both imperial and colonial soldiers. The majority of 
these - 15 811 men - were in Natal, while the Cape had 9 795 and 
southern Rhodesia 1 448. 2 Prior to the outbreak of war, the War 
Office had been of the opinion that as in 1881, the Boer 
offensive would consist merely of raids made by between 2 000 and 
3 000 burghers at a time and that these would easily be repulsed. 
This however, was not the case, as the military aims of the Boers 
were to neutralize those forces threatening their sovereignty, 3 
and therefore to strike with significantly greater numbers in 
certain areas. 
As the Boer leadership expected the largest attacks by their 
opponents to come from Natal, the biggest concentration of 
J.H. Breytenbach, 
Vryheidsoorlog, I, p. 153. 
Geskiedenis van die Tweede 
2 F. Maurice, History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 
I, p. 2. 
3 Breytenbach, I, pp. 154-155 and 408-409. 
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commandos was centred around the northern triangle of that 
colony. At various Drakensberg passes, mainly opposite Ladysmith, 
there were between 6 000 and 8 000 Orange Free State burghers. 
A little further north, at Botha's Pass, were the German Corps 
and Johannesburg commando, numbering approximately 1 200 men. 
Still further north, near Volksrust, was the South African 
Republic's Commandant-General P.J. Joubert with 10 000 to 12 000 
burghers. At Wakkerstroom were the local commando and that from 
Ermelo, totalling 1 800 to 2 000 burghers and at Doringkop, 
opposite Dundee, lay the Utrecht, Vryheid and Piet Retief 
commandos, numbering between 1 500 and 2 000 burghers. The Boer 
force poised to enter northern Natal thus numbered between 20 500 
and 25 200. 4 
Guarding the northern borders of the South African Republic were 
the Waterberg and Soutpansberg commandos, while on the western 
front the Boers had concentrations of burghers at Bultfontein 
(Marica and Rustenburg commandos) and a little further south were 
the Potchefstroom and Wolmaransstad commandos, near Schweitzer-
Reneke (Bloemhof commando) and at Polfontein was General P.A. 
Cronje' s force (precise numbers unknown). 5 Maurice gives the 
Boer total strength on the western front as 7 500 men. 6 This is 
probably a little high as there is a general tendency by Maurice 
to give slightly inflated Boer numbers. At Belmont there were a 
4 Breytenbach, I, pp. 156 and 158-159; L.S. Amery (ed.), The 
Times History of the War in South Africa, II, pp. 123-124. 
5 Breytenbach, I, pp. 386-392 and 408-409. 
6 Maurice, I, p. 50. 
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few hundred burghers, while along the southern Free State border 
there were only approximately 2 500 burghers, positioned to guard 
the river crossings at Aliwal North, Bethulie and Norval's Pont. 
The border was sparsely held, as the Boers did not expect an 
attack from the south. 7 The Boers were therefore trying to hold 
a very long line, with approximately 35 000 men. 
None the less, by 2 November 1899 their initial objective had, 
in part, been achi·eved. After a series of skirmishes and battles 
the Boers had laid siege to Mafikeng (Mafeking), Kimberley and 
Ladysmith. As a result, approximately half the British forces 
stationed in southern Africa at the outbreak of the war were 
partially neutralized. It was now essential to force their 
capitulation in order that the burghers surrounding the towns 
could take the necessary steps to resist anticipated British 
reinforcements. 8 But this proved easier said than done for the 
individual burgher who, although innovative, tenacious and 
elusive in his fighting methods against an enemy on the move, 
proved more reluctant to confront him in well prepared positions. 
Therefore one drawback of the sieges on Boer strategy was to tie 
down valuable burghers. This gave the British authorities much 
needed breathing space, allowing them time to send out massive 
reinforcements which would soon tilt the numerical balance in 
their favour. 
The Boer leadership was anxious to bring about the surrender of 
7 Breytenbach, r, p. 437. 
8 Breytenbach, I, p. 408. 
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the besieged towns, so that as many burghers as possible would 
be free to take further appropriate action against the British. 
This anxiety was well founded, for as soon as war was formally 
declared, the War Office took immediate steps, according to 
previously formulated plans, to send a large Expeditionary Force 
to South Africa. It took the British a few days to organize the 
transport and make all other necessary arrangements. Despite 
this, troopships were departing from mid-October 1899, and by the 
end of November, most of the Expeditionary Force had landed in 
South Africa. By the end of December no fewer than 45 655 men had 
arrived together with guns, horses and other supplies. 9 The man 
already appointed in June 1899 to command the British forces in 
South Africa was the shy, but experienced General Sir Redvers 
Buller, V.C. His military career spanned 41 of his sixty years, 
during which time he had been in Canada, West Africa, Egypt, 
Sudan and South Africa and spent some years in the War Office. 
Because of his shyness he tended to be aloof - a trait that made 
him enemies in high places. Despite his apparent aloofness, he 
was very much a soldiers' general, caring for his men's needs and 
grieving over casualties in battle. Buller himself believed that 
he was not suited to be commander-in-chief, but should rather 
serve as second-in-command. In fact initially he had tried to 
resist his appointment. 1 o He did eventually accept and, upon 
his arrival in Cape Town at the end of October, it soon became 
all too obvious that the Boers had already grasped the 
9 Maurice, I, pp. 2, 4-10 and 471-476. 
10 T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 113-114, 156-157 and 240; 
C.H. Melville, Sir Redvers Buller, II, pp. 1-2. 
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initiative. 
As he familiarised himself with the precise circumstances and 
with the threats posed to Kimberley, Ladysmith, Mafikeng and to 
the north-eastern Cape, he formulated an appropriate plan of 
action. His initial plan was to advance, from Cape Town, along 
the railway line to Bloemfontein and further north. In the 
circumstances then prevailing he decided however to delay this 
scheme. Instead, his army was to be divided into three parts. The 
largest - approximately 20 000 men - which he himself was to 
accompany, would travel via Durban and relieve Ladysmith. It was 
evident that in Natal, invaded as it was by the largest Boer 
force, lay the greatest difficulty and danger. A second force was 
to land at Port Elizabeth and East London, and under Lieutenant-
General Sir W. Gatacre and Lieutenant-General J.D.P. French, deal 
with the threat to the north-eastern Cape. The third force, under 
Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen's command, was to relieve 
Kimberley. 11 The effect of this decision was that, like the 
Boers, the British would be fighting a war over a large area and 
that for both, maintaining adequate supplies where required, 
would be difficult. For a while Buller had to be patient while 
his troops and supplies arrived and then despatched to their 
assigned destinations. As the weeks passed, the Boers failed to 
make any concerted effort to exploit their initial successes. 
Breytenbach also stresses that they failed to respond adequately 
to the potential threat from the Cape Colony, underlining this 
view by maintaining that they should have had at least 10 000, 
11 M · aurice, I, pp. 196-204. 
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in place of the 3 200 men, in position and should also have left 
Belmont and Colesberg and rather captured De Aar and Noupoort. 
This, along with control of Stormberg station, which they already 
occupied, would have made a British advance northwards 
significantly more difficult. 12 
During November, French and Gatacre advanced north, along the 
rail lines. French strove to limit Boer incursions into the 
Colesberg district, by means of reconnaissances rather than by 
actual engagements. He continued this strategy for three months. 
Gatacre, meanwhile, decided to enhance British prestige by 
driving the Boers out of Stormberg. This was a disaster, however, 
for a poorly planned and executed engagement on 10 December 1899, 
saw his men repulsed and over 600 taken prisoner. From then on 
he played a somewhat passive role from his base at Queenstown. 
In this he was aided by the Boers' own lack of aggression from 
in and around Stormberg. 13 
Initially Methuen met with slightly better success, the Boers 
being engaged at Belmont and Graspan on 23 and 25 November 
respectively, and being forced to vacate both positions. However, 
at the Riet River the Boers offered sterner resistance ( 28 
November), resulting in 500 British troops being either wounded 
or killed. From here too the Boers eventually withdrew, and 
Methuen continued his advance up the railway line. On 11 December 
12 Breytenbach, I, pp. 458-462. 
13 H. Bailes, 'Military Aspects of the War' in P. Warwick 
and S.B. Spies (eds.), The South African War, pp. 76-77. 
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he launched another attack at Magersfontein, on a Boer force now 
considerably enlarged and was repulsed with significant 
casualties 968 killed or wounded. On orders from Buller, 
Methuen remained on the defensive from then on, until the arrival 
of Field Marshal Lord F.S. Roberts, in February 1900. 14 
In Natal the British efforts were repulsed with even heavier 
losses. The Boers, after a foray with about 2 000 burghers to 
Mooi River, withdrew to defensive positions just north of the 
Thukela River and Colenso. They dug in here and were reinforced 
until they numbered 4 500. In command was the young, 
inexperienced Louis Botha, determined to prevent the relief of 
Ladysmith or at least make this as costly an exercise as 
possible. When, on 15 December, Buller's troops attacked these 
Boers they were unceremoniously repulsed, suffering over 1 100 
casualties. Boer casualties were only 38. 15 The Boers had, in 
quick succession, repulsed the British in three theatres of the 
war, despite the large reinforcements which had been shipped in. 
In retrospect, this achievement represented the highwater mark 
of the Boers' endeavours. 
Buller was shaken by the succession of reverses and became quite 
pessimistic. In a telegraph to the Secretary of State for War he 
reported: "My failure to-day raises a serious question. I do not 
14 Amery, II, p. 419; Bailes in Warwick and Spies (eds.), 
S.A. War, pp. 78-82; Maurice, I, pp. 211-260 and 304-331. 
15 Maurice, I, pp. 332-375; Bailes in Warwick and Spies 
(eds.), S.A. War, pp. 82-85; C.J. Barnard, Generaal Louis Botha 
op die Natalse Front 1899-1900, pp. 42-58; Breytenbach, II, p. 
323. 
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think I am now strong enough to relieve White." 16 The War 
Office and British cabinet responded swiftly to the crisis by 
appointing Field Marshal Lord F.S. Roberts as the new commander-
in-chief in South Africa and General Lord H.H. Kitchener as his 
Chief of Staff, with the relegated Buller henceforth responsible 
only for the Natal campaign, which carried on under considerable 
difficulties and required his full attention. 17 Buller accepted 
this move with good grace and, for a while, went on the defensive 
with his forces. 18 
After Buller was reinforced by the 5th Division, which arrived 
in early January 1900, he decided to continue the efforts to 
relieve Ladysmith, being spurred on by the concerted Boer 
attempts on 6 January to smash the defensive perimeter around the 
town. He moved up the Thukela River to try and cross at 
Potgieter's Drift. The Boers, noting this move, also moved 
upstream. They had already dug in on the heights opposite 
Potgieter's Drift by the time Buller arrived in the area, he 
therefore ordered Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren, who had 
joined him with the reinforcements and was his second-in-command, 
to move even further upstream and attempt to outflank the Boer 
right. Warren duly crossed the Thukela, but was repulsed in an 
engagement on Ntabamanyama (20 and 21 January) and with heavy 
losses at Spioenkop (24 January). Buller was prompted to unify 
his force again and on 5 to 7 February made a new attempt to 
16 Maurice, I, p. 377. 
17 Maurice, I, p.381. 
18 Pakenham, p.241. 
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break through Botha's defence line at Vaalkrans, but was again 
repulsed. He then returned to the Colenso area and after almost 
continuous fighting, from 14 to 27 February 1900, he eventually 
managed to break through the Boer defence line and finally 
relieved Ladysmith the following day. As a result of this 
breakthrough the Boers decided to retire and made for either the 
Drakensberg or the Biggarsberg. 19 For much of the time Buller's 
strategy along the Thukela was unimaginative. With little 
reconnaissance work done, generally, only limited objectives were 
attacked. As a result Botha, despite limitations in both men and 
artillery, never had his resources stretched beyond their 
capabilities. Buller's numerical superiority was not fully 
exploited until 27 February, when he attacked three major Boer 
positions at once, most of his artillery being so placed that it 
could for once, lend real support. The result was immediate 
success. 
Along the western front there had also been developments. Roberts 
arrived in Cape Town on 10 January 1900. After appraising himself 
of the precise situation he set about implementing a relatively 
simple plan he had devised. It was in fact similar to that which 
Buller had initially intended to implement. By the end of January 
he had concentrated approximately 40 000 men and 108 guns between 
the Modder and Orange Rivers, utilising mainly the western 
railway. 20 Roberts's first major objective was to relieve 
19 Maurice, II, pp.334-530; Bailes in Warwick and Spies 
(eds.), S.A. War, pp. 85-90; Barnard, pp. 74-147. 
20 Maurice, I, pp. 408 and 428-438. 
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Kimberley, and this he achieved with French's cavalry on 1 5 
February. French then swung east, and by moving in north of 
Cronje' s wagon train, cut him off on the Madder River, at 
Paardeberg. Kitchener, (in command in the absence of the ill 
Roberts), approached from the west and south with the infantry 
and artillery. The initial attempts to force Cronje' s 
capitulation, failed. But with Roberts again in command and after 
days of heavy shelling, Cronje, along with 4 000 burghers, was 
forced to surrender on 27 February. 21 This opened the way for 
an advance on Bloemfontein and a mere two weeks later, on 13 
March, Roberts entered the Orange Free State capital. 22 The 
British had taken the initiative in both major theatres of the 
war, but had as yet not achieved complete dominance. The Boer 
leadership was now confronted with a deep crisis, more serious 
than that which Buller had had to contend with when he first 
arrived in South Africa. The pressures the burghers had had to 
contend with resulted in widespread demoralisation and some 
desertions. Also, positions controlled by them for some time such 
as those in the north-eastern Cape were relinquished, thus 
opening up yet more supply routes for Roberts's force. 23 
It was under these difficult circumstances that the Boers 
operating in Natal had to make quick reassessments of strategy. 
In general, the Free Staters retired to the Drakensberg from the 
21 Bailes in Warwick and Spies (eds.), S.A. War, pp. 90-93; 
Maurice, II, pp.1-179. 
22 Maurice, II, pp. 237-238. 
23 Breytenbach, V, pp. 1-16. 
19 
Thukela line and to Ladysmith on 28 February, while the Transvaal 
commandos made for the Biggarsberg. 24 Fortunately for them, 
while they were in disarray during the retreat, Buller, failing 
to capitalize on a great opportunity, did not follow up to 
inflict further losses. 25 It is probable that Buller's cautious 
nature and the traps set by the Boers into which he had already 
fallen while trying to relieve Ladysmith, prompted him not to 
take any risks by pressing with a pursuit. 
Topographical configurations in which those Boers who had been 
around Ladysmith and along the Thukela now found themselves, 
certainly favoured a continued defensive action. In a line from 
south to north-west of Ladysmith was the Drakensberg range 
forming a formidable barrier which could only be crossed at 
specific passes. At a right angle to the Drakensberg, 
approximately 40 kilometres north of Ladysmith, there emerged the 
Biggarsberg range, running on a line from west to east. This 
range ends just south-east of Helpmekaar and could only be 
crossed at a few passes. Despite these passes, it still presented 
a formidable defensive barrier. 
In spite of Buller's failure to follow the Boers to the 
Biggarsberg, the demoralisation that set in amongst them, further 
compounded by Cronje's capture, resulted in a very real 
likelihood of these men deserting and leaving Natal altogether. 
24 Amery, III, p. 546. No statistics are available as to how 
many burghers went in the two directions. 
25 D. Reitz, Commando, pp. 88-91; Barnard, pp.144-145; B. 
Viljoen, My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 73-74. 
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In an effort to persuade the burghers to continue the struggle, 
President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic, hastened to 
the Natal front, where on 2 March he addressed a throng of men 
at Glencoe. Initially he berated them for retreating, but then 
strove to instill a new determination and fire into them, urging 
them to hold off the British from their countries. His speech had 
the desired effect - but only for a few days! 26 
Joubert, commander-in-chief of forces in the Biggarsberg, was of 
the opinion that peace talks should be initiated. To facilitate 
such a peace initiative he believed the Boers should retire to 
Lang's Nek, arguing that while they were in British territory, 
they would not be amenable to talks. Both Kruger and President 
M.T. Steyn of the Orange Free State rejected this, maintaining 
that the deeper in British territory they were, the stronger 
their bargaining position would be. Kruger did, however, send a 
message to the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, on 5 
March, proposing peace on condition that the republics' 
independence as sovereign states be recognised. This, as 
expected, was rejected on 12 March. 27 
At a council-of-war held on 5 March at Glencoe and attended by 
a large number of Boer officers, it was decided to dig in along 
the Biggarsberg. Very probably, Kruger's address at Glencoe 
urging everyone to resist, influenced the officers' decision 
26 Breytenbach, v, pp. 17-21; Barnard, p.131. Breytenbach 
states the throng of burghers gathered around Kruger numbered a 
few thousand. 
27 Barnard, pp. 148-149; Breytenbach, V, pp. 23-24. 
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considerably. Botha had, on the previous day, already ridden 
along the range to determine where to position his men. At the 
same meeting Botha was appointed Joubert's second-in-command, as 
the Commandant-General was seriously ill. Soon afterwards, on 27 
March, Joubert died and Botha was appointed Acting Commandant-
General. 28 
Shortly after the council-of-war of 5 March, Botha set about 
creating order and organization out of the existing chaos. Once 
it had been determined which positions were to be occupied, 
orders were issued to give effect to the decision. The 
Biggarsberg from the Drakensberg in the west to just south-east 
of Helpmekaar was to be held, with the commandos concentrating 
their men at the various passes. The Biggarsberg provided an 
excellent natural fortress with few weaknesses. From the 
Drakensberg to Mkupe Pass the Soutpansberg, Heidelberg, Boksburg, 
Germiston and Standerton commandos were stationed. From Mkupe 
Pass to approximately just south of Dundee were placed the 
Carolina, Lydenburg, Bethal, portion of the Pretoria, Krugersdorp 
and Middelburg commandos. The next sector, from south-east of 
Dundee to just south-east of Helpmekaar, was held by the 
Johannesburg, Swaziland, Utrecht and Piet Retief commandos. Also 
near Helpmekaar were elements of the German Corps and Irish 
Brigade. 
The Wakkerstroom and Ermelo commandos were not allocated specific 
positions but acted as a roving force. The Vryheid commando was 
28 Barnard, pp. 148-153. 
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sent to its home district to do patrol work. At the same time, 
some of the Free State commandos held a number of the Drakensberg 
passes to the west of Ladysmith. Once the commandos were 
allocated their positions, dug their trenches and built their 
breastworks, in which tasks they were assisted by 600 blacks, 
there followed a period of relative inactivity. The use of blacks 
was not unusual. Both the Boers and British depended upon them 
from the very beginning of the war for ancillary·duties, such as 
providing intelligence, the digging of trenches, driving wagons 
and attending to the horses. Warwick in his book Black People and 
the South African War 1899-1902 states that a system of forced 
labour for the commandos was introduced. However, by 
February/March 1900 some blacks were refusing to work for the 
commandos due to ill treatment. 29 
To alleviate boredom during the period of relative inactivity 
that now set in, games were played. Some burghers built a church 
consisting of stone walls approximately 1 , 5 m tall with a 
tarpaulin roof. It is possible that this structure was in the 
Boksburg sector as a Boksburg dominee held services in it. Some 
wives also joined their men during this quiet period, despite the 
fact that the presence of women in the laagers, except in 
29 Ibid., pp. 149-153; W. van Everdingen, De Oorlog in Zuid-
Afrika, p. 133; F.J. Grabler, Die Carolina-Commando in die Tweede 
Vryheidsoorlog 1899-1902, pp. 79-80; C.H. Muller, 
Oorlogsherinneringe, p. 65; J.F. Naude, Vechten en Vluchten van 
Beyers en Kemp, pp. 95-98; A. Lynch, My Life Story, p. 186; L. 
Penning, De Oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, II, p. 730; Viljoen, pp. 80-
82; Journal of Principal Events Connected with South Africa, III, 
p. 68; K.G. 884, Letters by L. Meyer to Vechtgeneraal S. 
Oosthuizen, Cmdt Middelburg, Cmdt Vryheid, Cmdt Piet Retief, Cmdt 
Swaziland, Cmdt Johannesburg, 5 March 1900, T.A.; P. Warwick, 
Black People and the South African War 1899-1902. pp. 80-82. 
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hospitals or ambulances, was forbidden by the Boer high command. 
This ruling, however, was not always strictly enforced during the 
early part of the war.30 
It is difficult to establish the exact size of the Boer force 
that initially entrenched itself on the Biggarsberg in early 
March - it may have been as large as 10 000 men. However, by mid-
March it appears to have dwindled to 6 000. This was the result 
of the Wakkerstroom and Ermelo commandos being transferred to the 
Orange Free State and a large percentage of each commando were 
granted leave. 31 Buller's own information was that he was 
confronted by 7 000 men.3 2 
Assisting Botha were Generals Schalk Burger, D.J.E. Erasmus and 
Lucas J. Meyer. They had each been ordered to command a sector 
of the defence line. Burger was responsible for the section from 
the Drakensberg to east of Mkupe's Pass, from Mkupe's Pass to 
near the railway line fell under Erasmus and the rest to the east 
and south was the responsibility of Meyer. In mid-March Burger 
moved to Pretoria so that he could pay proper attention to his 
duties as a member of the Executive Council. General J.C. Fourie 
was elected to replace him on the Biggarsberg. 33 
30 Grabler, pp. 79-80; Muller, p. 65; Naude, p. 98; S.B. 
Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, pp. 18 and 312. 
31 Barnard, p. 150. 
32 Principal Events, III, p. 12. 
33 K.G. 886, p.4; Leyds 719(d), Tel.no. 11, Burger to L. 
Botha, 19 March 1900; Leyds 721(a), Tel.no. 63, Botha to Burger, 
6 April 1900, T.A. 
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As further news of Cronje's capitulation at Paardeberg and the 
resulting critical situation in the Orange Free State became 
available, it destroyed the effects of Kruger's speech. Burghers 
began leaving the Biggarsberg. Joubert feared that his whole line 
would give way. The sudden collapse of Boer morale and lack of 
discipline is a recurrent theme throughout much of this 
dissertation. These manifestations became particularly prevalent 
as the pressure on the Boers as a whole increased. In his book 
Kommandolewe Tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899-1902, F. Pretorius 
identifies several reasons, which are also pertinent to this 
study, resulting in a lack of discipline. He points out that the 
commando laws and regulations of 1898 for the South African 
Republic and 1899 for the Orange Free State stipulated that legal 
orders by officers were to be obeyed and where burghers failed 
to do so specific punishments were provided for. Although the 
laws and regulations were sometimes applied, they to a large 
extent remained a dead letter. Burghers were not used to being 
disciplined and having their individualism curbed and therefore 
often objected so vigorously to punitive action, to make its 
application impossible. Officers were generally loath to apply 
the law strictly because they were elected by their burghers and 
held their positions because of the goodwill of their fellow men. 
Furthermore officers and men were known to one another socially. 
European armies, through the drill system learnt to obey orders, 
the commandos did not undergo such training. The granting of 
leave was another problem issue. The commando laws did not make 
provision for leave, some officers were consequently more lenient 
than others in allowing burghers to go home as the war dragged 
25 
on. Several leave regulations were made during the war, but never 
strictly adhered to. Furthermore, men better known to officers 
or whose fathers held prominent positions in society, tended to 
obtain leave more easily. Many of these difficulties came down 
to the Boers being a volunteer army made up largely of farmers 
who had their own lives to lead.3 4 
One may question why the Boers, apart from an attack launched on 
10 April at Elandslaagte, remained essentially inactive, allowing 
the British to prepare themselves at leisure for the next 
campaign. While the low morale, already mentioned, did play a 
role, it was hardly the only reason. Seen in the context of Boer 
strategy in the Thukela valley, the commandos fought almost 
exclusively a defensive campaign. It was not generally their 
style to go on the offensive. In order to do so they would have 
had to be suitably trained, to be psychologically prepared to 
leave the safety of their trenches and confront an enemy in the 
open. This kind of preparation they most certainly did not have. 
They were probably further psychologically disadvantaged in the 
knowledge that the force before them had driven them from a 
powerful defensive position, because of its numerical 
preponderance. 
Botha was not the only commander kept busy since the collapse of 
the Boer defence line on the Thukela. Having relieved Ladysmith 
Buller was immediately confronted by new tasks. These were 
34 Breytenbach, V, p.21; F. Pretorius, Kommandolewe Tydens 
die Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899-1902, pp. 203-227. 
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numerous, extensive in scope and varied. The first and most 
urgent one was to bring supplies into Ladysmith, to the force 
that had defended the town and to move most people out of the 
disease ridden town, for them to recuperate in healthier 
surroundings. For him to mount a future campaign, it was 
essential that all damages caused by the Boers to the railway 
line between Colenso and Ladysmith and beyond to Elandslaagte be 
repaired, that his own force which had just endured two weeks of 
almost continuous fighting be re-equipped, to obtain fresh mounts 
as only about 200 useless horses remained and to re-organise the 
British forces in Natal. 
Once Ladysmith was relieved it was necessary to integrate 
Lieutenant-General Sir George White's defending force with that 
of the relieving one. This posed problems, particularly as 
suitable appointments had to be found for various senior 
officers. By April, 1900 Buller's re-organised force had taken 
shape. It consisted of the 2nd, 4th and 5th Divisions (Infantry) 
commanded by Lieutenants-General C.F. Clery, N.G. Lyttelton and 
H.J.T. Hildyard respectively and also the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
Cavalry Brigades commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Burn-
Murdoch, Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst, Major-General Lord 
Dundonald respectively. In addition there were approximately 110 
pieces of artillery attached to the force. 35 
In the process of re-organising the Natal Field Force, a number 
35 F.M. Maurice and M.H. Grant, Official History of the War 
in South Africa, III, pp. 249-251. 
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of battalions that were involved in either the defence or relief 
of Ladysmith, were transferred to Roberts's forces. Along with 
this shifting of uni ts Lieutenants-General White, Hunter and 
Warren also departed from the Natal front. 36 
The one major decision Buller was faced with, was to determine 
the route to be followed beyond Ladysmith. Once the town was 
relieved, the Natal Field Force no longer had an immediate and 
clear objective. As a result, this force' s further role and 
strategy became the subject of numerous telegrams between Buller 
and Roberts. During this exchange Buller vacillated between plans 
to at tack towards the Drakensberg or advance over the Biggarsberg 
towards Volksrust. If he opted for the former he would link up 
with Roberts, while the latter would assist in his securing the 
railway line towards the South African Republic. 37 
Just as Buller vacillated over what strategy to pursue, so his 
mood swung from one of extreme optimism to pessimism. Thus for 
instance, on 2 March, Buller in the first excitement after 
relieving Ladysmith, proposed occupying Northern Natal with three 
brigades while forcing the Drakensberg passes with his remaining 
two divisions, thereby joining hands with Roberts. Roberts 
opposed this plan, for in his view the Boers' Drakensberg 
position was too strong and therefore Buller's advance on Van 
36 Amery, IV, pp. 165-166; Maurice and Grant, III, p.258. 
37 Amery, IV, pp. 165-167; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 265-
267; Roberts Papers, XVI T.A., W.O. 105/13, Buller to Roberts and 
Roberts to Buller, 2 to 21March1900 and XVII T.A., W.O. 105/13, 
Roberts to Buller and Buller to Roberts, 19 March 1900 to 9 April 
1900. 
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Reenen's Pass should be strictly defensive. 38 On 5 March Buller 
reported a plan to head for Dundee and possibly Newcastle. This 
had been prompted by a report, from an unidentified source, 
maintaining that the Boers were in full retreat. Roberts agreed 
to this plan of action.39 
However, two days later Buller, believing that the Drakensberg 
would be easier to cross than the Biggarsberg, changed his mind 
again, intending to head for Harrismith. In response, Roberts 
cautioned that the Drakensberg was not to be crossed until he 
himself was able to assist on the other side of the mountain, but 
he had no objection to active operations being carried out in 
Natal. 40 By 14 March Buller was once again confidently 
proposing an advance on the Biggarsberg. 41 Yet, a mere five 
days later, he was reporting that the force holding the 
Biggarsberg had been reinforced and that the Boers were trying 
to work their way around his right. In consequence he requested 
Roberts to clear the Drakensberg passes for him. 42 This 
exchange of telegrams continued for a number of weeks dragging 
38 Roberts Papers, XVI T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel. nos. 214 and 
315, Buller to Roberts and Roberts to Buller, 2 and 3 March, 
1900. 
39 Roberts Papers, XVI T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel. nos. 216 and 
349, Buller to Roberts and Roberts to Buller, 5 and 6 March, 
1900. 
40 Roberts Papers, XVI T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel. nos. 219 and 
403, Buller to Roberts and Roberts to Buller, 7 March 1900 and 
10 March 1900. 
41 Roberts Papers, XVI T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel.no. 221, 
Buller to Roberts, 14 March 1900. 
42 Roberts Papers, XVII T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 223, 
Buller to Roberts, 19 March 1900. 
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on through March and April. Despite all the messages that passed 
to and fro, no plan of action was agreed upon. Roberts exercised 
considerable tact and patience, offering advice and assistance 
whenever he was able to do so. 43 
Buller's activities during March-April 1900, or his apparent lack 
thereof, have been criticised. Amery wrote, "The two months that 
followed the relief of Ladysmith were ... a time of complete 
inaction for the Natal Army. 1144 
Buller' s apparent lack of activity should, however, be considered 
in the light of the tasks already mentioned, which confronted 
him. To then speak of "a time of complete inaction", is neither 
accurate nor fair. That numbers of troops were not particularly 
active, was due to their recuperating from the effects of the 
siege and prolonged campaign. As late as 31 March, it was 
reported that there was much sickness in the Second Division, 
while the Fourth Division had 2 300 men unfit for marching. 45 
On 22 March the Medical Officer reported that he did not think 
that the men who had assisted in the defence of Ladysmith would 
be fit for the field for another month. 46 Furthermore, to have 
rushed on to the Drakensberg and Biggarsberg before repairing the 
rail lines and building up a stockpile of supplies in Ladysmith 
43 Amery, IV, pp. 165-166; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 256-
258. 
44 Amery, IV, p. 168. 
45 Principal Events, III, p. 53. 
46 Roberts Papers, XVII T.A., W.O. 105/13, Tel no. 224, 
Buller to Roberts, 22 March 1900. 
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or further along the line, would have been shortsighted. Without 
adequate supplies to draw on, an advancing force would sooner or 
later have to halt, to enable essential supplies to be provided. 
During this period in which the Boers and British were re-
organising and preparing themselves in Natal, for the next phase 
of the campaign, there was little contact between the respective 
forces except for occasional skirmishes between scouting parties. 
The most extensive skirmish occurred when, on 10 April, the Boers 
launched an attack on the British encamped near Elandslaagte. As 
early as 4 April Schalk Burger, from the safety of Pretoria, was 
urging Louis Botha to attack the British force. 47 However, the 
success of such an attack was highly unlikely. As Lucas Meyer, 
in a telegram to President Kruger mentioned, the British force 
on the Elandslaagte plain was, to judge by the number of its 
tents, very large. It was also well fortified and allegedly 
surrounded by dozens of pieces of artillery. 48 None the less, 
on the evening of 9 April, two days after Meyer's pessimistic 
report to Pretoria, a Boer force comprising the Krugersdorp, 
Middelburg, Swaziland and Utrecht commandos, departed from their 
camps with the intention of attacking the British force near 
Elandslaagte. Early the following morning they arrived at the 
Sunday's River, with Meyer commanding the left flank, Louis Botha 
and General D.J.E. Erasmus the centre and General C.E. Fourie the 
right flank. It soon became apparent that the strength of the 
47 Leyds 720(g), Tel. no. 37, Burger to L. Botha, 4 April 
1900, T.A. 
48 Leyds 721 (a), Tel. no. 38, Meyer to Kruger, 7 April 1900, 
T.A. 
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British force, its careful positioning in the plain and its 
fortification, would prevent the Boers from advancing within 
rifle range. It was therefore decided merely to bombard the 
encampment with artillery. There is no record of how many pieces 
of artillery the Boers had with them. The British artillery 
replied to the barrage with their 18 pieces of artillery. The 
duel continued all day, but little significant damage was caused. 
However, the Boer action prompted Buller to withdraw his force 
a little further south. 49 If the Boers were to attack again, 
they would then have to cover more open ground before coming into 
range. Buller was obviously being wary, ensuring that the Boers 
could not, under cover, advance to within rifle range. Several 
engagements, and particularly the first at Colenso in December 
1 899, had taught him the salutary lesson that a Boer with a 
rifle, was a most effective fighter. 
In order to understand the relevance and significance of Buller's 
activities in May-June 1900, they should be seen in the context 
of Roberts's movements in the Orange Free State and periodic 
reference will therefore be made to what was taking place to the 
west of the Drakensberg. By the same token Boer strategies, 
activities and difficulties in Natal must be viewed in the 
context of events on other fronts in South Africa. 
After the capture of Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900, Roberts, for 
various reasons remained there for several weeks. These reasons 
49 Leyds 721 (d), Tel.no. 21, Meyer to Kruger, 12 April 1900, 
T.A.; Amery, IV, p. 169; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 253-254; D. 
Reitz, Commando, pp. 92-93. 
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included securing his lines of communication and building up a 
stockpile of supplies. Also, his campaign-weary troops were 
allowed to recuperate. It was essential too, to secure adequately 
his position against Boer forces active to both west and south-
west and east and south-east of Bloemfontein. The burghers to the 
east and south-east posed a very real threat to his supply 
lines. 50 While the reasons why both Roberts and Buller did not 
attempt to advance for some time were, therefore, somewhat 
similar, Roberts had the additional burden of trying to subdue 
forces posing a threat to his rear and flanks. The March-April 
period was thus a time of preparation and consolidation for 
Roberts and Buller. By the end of April-early May, Buller's 2nd 
Division was encamped near Surprise Hill just west of Ladysmith, 
while the 1st Cavalry Brigade was stationed further west, towards 
Bluebank. The eastern side of the town was covered by the 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade and, encamped north-east of the town at 
Modderspruit, was the 4th Division. Based at Buys's farm south 
of Elandslaagte was the 3rd Mounted Brigade, and the 5th Division 
held a line from Jonono's Kop to the Elandslaagte battlefield. 
Portion of the 2nd Division was stationed with the 4th 
Division. 51 As a result of the re-organization and transfer of 
certain units from Natal to other fronts, there was a good deal 
of shifting of men in and around Ladysmith, during March and 
April. 
so Amery, IV, pp. 11-77; Breytenbach, V, pp. 129-316. 
51 Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 255 and 259; Principal 
Events, IV, p. 54. 
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It is difficult to establish the exact size and strength of the 
Natal Field Force on 1 May 1900. Figures do show that on 1 June 
this force comprised 45 715 officers and men. Of this force a 
total of 5 576 officers and men guarded the lines of 
communication and 4 658 kept watch on the Drakensberg passes. 
With the Natal Field Force were 119 pieces of artillery, three 
Vickers-Maxim guns and 48 machine guns; of these 23 guns and 
seven machine guns were employed along the lines of communication 
or by the Drakensberg defence force. As there were no significant 
additions to, transfers from or losses suffered by Buller's Natal 
Field Force during May, one can, with reasonable assurance, 
assume that the force would have been of similar strength at the 
beginning of May 1900.52 
At the same time the Biggarsberg was held by 2 494 burghers in 
Fourie's sector, 53 2 000 in Erasmus's sector, 54 and 
approximately 2 000 in Meyer's sector. 55 It is therefore 
52 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 539; Principal Events, IV, p. 
54. 
53 Leyds 722(f), Tel. no. 2, Fourie to KG Dept., 1 May 1900, 
T.A. 
54 Leyds 722(d), Tel. no. 65, Erasmus to KG, 27 April 1900, 
T.A. 
55 Leyds 721(a), Tel. no. 38, Meyer to President, 7 April 
1900, T.A. The figure of 2 000 burghers for Meyers's sector is 
an adjusted one. On 7 April he reported having 3 000 men. 
However, of these the majority of the Krugersdorp and Irish 
Brigade were transferred out of Natal on 14 April. As partial 
compensation he received the Soutpansberg commando from Fourie's 
sector. They were however transferred after the date on which 
Fourie reported the strength of his sector, and therefore no 
deduction has to be made from his figure of 2 494 men. Lastly, 
Meyer included the Vryheid commando into his figure, despite 
their being based in their home district. 
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probable that between 6 000 and 6 500 burghers lined the 
Biggarsberg. Regarding artillery, Captain Pretorius reported to 
Major Wolmarans, "Hier is aanwezig drie Fransche kanonnen vier 
Krupp twee Armstrongs twee Howitzers twee snelvuur zeven groot 
maxims en kleine. 11 56 
A serious blow to the Boer cause in Natal, was the departure of 
Louis Botha from that front on 3 May 1900. He was now the 
Commandant-General and, with the passage of time, it became 
evident that it was in the Orange Free State that the most 
serious crisis existed. Botha had, during the Thukela campaign, 
proved that he had an outstanding military brain and his 
successes had won him the respect of fellow officers and men. 
This respect played a vital role when morale wavered under 
pressure. This exceptional officer would henceforth no longer 
have a direct influence on the Natal front. As from 7 May it was 
Meyer who was in overall command along the Biggarsberg. He was 
somewhat older and did not command as much respect as Botha 
did. 57 
By early May 1900, Roberts was ready to resume his northward 
advance from Bloemfontein. The grand strategy he had devised for 
the British forces was that they should advance, within several 
56 Leyds 721(e), Tel. no. 31, L. Botha to Meyer, 14 April 
1900; Leyds 721 (f), Tel. no. 11, Engelbrecht to Meyer, 30 April 
1900. (Although this telegram is dated 30 April it should 
probably be 20 April.); Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 107, Erasmus to 
President, 17 May 1900; Leyds 725(b), Tel.no. 91, Meyer to 
L.Botha, 19 May 1900, T.A.; Breytenbach, I, p. 161 and V, pp. 
388-389. 
57 Grabler, pp. 86-87; Barnard, pp. 154-157. 
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columns, on a front stretching over approximately 600 kilometres, 
from Kimberley to Ladysmith. The columns were to converge upon 
one another, with Pretoria as the ultimate goal. 58 With this 
strategy in mind Roberts telegraphed the following message to 
Buller on 2 May. 
A force under command of General Ian Hamilton successfully 
cleared large numbers of the enemy out of the Houet Nek ten 
miles north of Thaba-'Nchu yesterday. This force will now 
advance on Winberg, and another, which I accompany, will 
move simultaneously along the line of the Railway. You 
should occupy the enemy's attention on the Biggarsberg, and 
as their numbers decrease, which they assuredly will, move 
your troops towards the Transvaal, repairing the railway as 
you advance. Please let me know what you hope to be able to 
do in this respect. 59 
Hamilton commanded a force of approximately 14 500 men with 38 
guns and was supported by Lieutenant-General Sir H.E. Colvile's 
force of 4 000 men and 14 guns. A Boer force occupying Toba 
Mountain and Houtnek blocked Hamilton's proposed route to 
Winburg. After a fierce fight, marked at times by lack of co-
ordinated action among the Boers, Hamilton eventually was able 
to drive the Boers off. This placed him in a position to march, 
in tandem with Roberts's force, north to Winburg and then on to 
Kroonstad. 60 The instruction that Buller repair the railway 
line was probably prompted by two factors. It would mean that the 
British would have another supply line and, probably more 
important, it was a much shorter one than any of the others. 
58 Amery, IV, pp. 80-84. 
59 I FK 1792 T.A., w.o. 32 861, Tel. no. 1 41 9, Roberts to 
Buller, 2 May 1900. 
60 Breytenbach, V, pp. 402-412; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 
41-42; Amery, IV, pp. 96-100. 
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This order finally settled the route Buller was to follow. The 
order is almost diffident and does not go into much detail; nor 
does it require much decisive action from Buller. Amery suggests 
that this was so, because Buller would better be able to 
appreciate the difficulties in Natal and, "partly from a 
chivalrous disinclination (by Roberts) to treat a general who had 
once been commander-in-chief in South Africa in the same way as 
he treated his other subordinates. 1161 It is quite possible that 
other factors influencing the relationship between Buller and 
Roberts also affected the manner in which these two men related 
to each other. Roberts' s only son Frederick was killed at 
Colenso, while serving under Buller, who had permitted him to 
assist in an attempt to save the guns although it was not his 
duty. Roberts junior was mortally wounded in the attempt and his 
father had felt the loss most grievously. On a less personal 
level, Buller and Roberts belonged to rival groups within the 
military establishment. Pakenham suggests that the army was 
divided into the 'Indians' and 'Africans', the former headed by 
Roberts, with a powerful ally in Lord Lansdowne, Secretary for 
War, and the latter led by Wolseley and Buller. 62 
On 3 May Buller reported to Roberts that he would be ready to 
begin moving in four days time, as soon as the transport animals 
were gathered. Due to the presence of lung sickness and scarcity 
of grazing, these animals had been scattered far and wide over 
61 Amery, IV, p. 85. 
62 Pakenham, pp. xv-xvi, 235, 241 and 246. 
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the countryside. 63 In a fairly detailed response to Roberts he 
described conditions and the overall situation in Natal as 
follows, 
The enemy during the last seven weeks have prepared all 
passes in the Biggarsberg for defence with many (gun 
emplacements) and double line of entrenchments, these are 
now held by about 6 000 men with first rate lateral 
communications, and there are about 1 000 more within reach 
in Zululand and Vryheid. I do not think I should be 
justified in trying to force either Cundycleugh, Newcastle, 
or Dundee roads. The weak point on the defence is that 
portion of the berg between Dundee and Helpmekaar. To 
attack that a force from Elandslaagte will have to make a 
flank march of 25 miles exposed to attack by the Waschbank 
Valley and then to force (the) pass, when I shall probably 
find from two to 3 000 men in a strong position, possibly 
more. To do this I think it ought to be of a strength of 
two Divisions.64 
Buller's message continued, describing other tasks confronting 
him, and difficulties to be dealt with. He mentioned that closing 
the Dundee-Newcastle roads would require six battalions, as there 
were nine miles (fourteen kilometres) of front, offering the 
Boers excellent terrain from which to attack. In addition it 
would be necessary to cover the Cundycleugh roads, guard Zululand 
and the roads to Estcourt and Greytown. In order to carry out all 
this, he requested that he be sent another two brigades in order 
to make certain the operation was successful. He disagreed with 
Roberts regarding the effects of the Orange Free State advance 
on the number of Boers in Natal, believing that the movement 
63 FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/861, Tel. (no number), Buller to 
Roberts, 3 May 1900. 
64 FK 1792 T.A., w.o. 32/861, Tel (no number), Buller to 
Roberts, 3 May 1900. 
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would, in fact, cause Boer numbers to increase in Natal. 65 
The pessimism evident in this report and the exaggeration of 
difficulties and troop requirements was typical of Buller, as 
already revealed during his campaign to relieve Ladysmith. To 
state that the Wasbank valley offered good attacking positions 
was true, but once out of the valley one moves onto open plains 
to the south, which did not suit the Boers' tactics, as was 
apparent during the 10 April attack, near Elandslaagte. 66 Time 
and events were to illustrate that Roberts's logical prediction 
of the Boer response to his continued advance in the Free State 
was correct, rather than Buller's forecast of their reaction. 
The Biggarsberg, with its passes which lay to the north of 
Buller, rose approximately 400 metres above the plain on which 
he was located. It stretched from the Drakensberg in the west to 
beyond Helpmekaar, and could with a relative possibility of 
success, only be crossed somewhere east of Dundee. The other 
passes, namely Mkupe, Cundycleugh and Dundee were too long and 
steep. While this terrain did, in consequence, pose something of 
a problem to Buller, the plains he was on were possibly even more 
problematic to the Boers, minimising the element of surprise so 
essential for a successful action against a numerically superior 
enemy. 
65 FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/861, Tel. (no number), Buller to 
Roberts, 3 May 1900. 
66 Leyds 721(c), Tel. no. 12, Meyer to President, 11 April 
1900; Leyds 721(d), Tel. no. 21, Meyer to President, 12 April 
1900, T.A. 
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During the few days following Roberts's order to Buller, there 
was a flurry of activity as orders were issued and the necessary 
preparations carried out to ready a force for an eastward 
advance. On 4 May confidential orders were issued for a column 
to move at the shortest notice. The column was to consist of the 
2nd Division, with divisional cavalry to be augmented with two 
squadrons, the 3rd Mounted Brigade with "A" Battery Royal Horse 
Artillery, corps troops, 61st Howitzer Battery, two 4.7" naval 
guns, three Vickers Maxims and the 4th Mountain Battery. In 
addition, detailed instructions were issued regarding supplies 
being carried in wagons.67 
On further orders, the 2nd Division marched to Madder Spruit on 
7 May and the 3rd Mounted Brigade advanced to Cornelius Pieters's 
farm. 68 Buller, quoting an undisclosed source, reported to 
Roberts that Kruger had ordered an attack. At much the same time, 
Hildyard reported the Boers gathering in some numbers near 
KwaSondoda, while black spies informed the British that an attack 
on their force at Elandslaagte could be expected. All this 
information caused Buller to delay his advance, 69 but in 
response to the information about the impending Boer attack, 
orders were issued for everyone to be on the alert. On 8 May 
67 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 2 Div., 4 May 1900. 
68 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and 2 Div., 7 
May 1900. 
69 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 7 May 1900; 
Roberts Papers, XVIII T.A., W.O. 105/18, Tel. no. 253, Buller to 
Roberts, 6 May 1900. 
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strong parties of the 3rd Mounted Brigade were sent to the north-
east flank of Elandslaagte, while two battalions of the 2nd 
Division were brought forward and pushed out to the west of 
Elandslaagte. 70 Buller was still in no mood to take risks. 
Little came of the anticipated Boer attack. Assistant Commandant-
General Chris Botha, brother of Louis, decided not to attack with 
his men, as the British had not yet advanced beyond Elandslaagte. 
However he did report that his force was ready to strike as soon 
as the British reached the Sunday's River. A small unit of twenty 
men led by Commandant c. Ricchiardi, commander of an Italian 
Corps with the Boers, did in fact launch an attack towards the 
coal mines near the Elandslaagte station at 05:45 on 8 May, but 
were easily repulsed by numerically superior British forces. 
Ricchiardi's casualties were one killed and one wounded. British 
casualties were one man wounded in the knee. 71 
Before the British advance commenced a number of changes in the 
composition of the Boer force along the Biggarsberg, brought 
about by greater and more urgent needs in other theatres of the 
war, had taken place. At a council-of-war, probably held on 30 
April or 1 May at Glencoe, it was decided to transfer 4 Krupps, 
one large and two small maxims from Natal along with 39 boxes of 
7o FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 7 May 1900. 
71 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and 3 Cav. 
Bde., 8 May 1900; Roberts Papers XVIII T.A., w.o. 105/13, Tel. 
no. 3567, Buller to Roberts, 8 May 1900; Leyds 723(e), Tel. no. 
46, C. Botha to L. Meyer, Tel. no. 98, Edwards to Meyer and Tel. 
no. 104, Erasmus to Sts Seers, 8 May 1900, T.A.; C.R.N. Burne, 
With the Naval Brigade in Natal, p. 59. 
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ammunition. Instructions were also issued for the transfer of the 
Standerton and Bethal commandos, comprising approximately 1 200 
burghers. 72 To supplement his considerably reduced force, 
Erasmus requested that Field-Cornet P.F. Zeederberg be ordered 
to recruit as many burghers in Pretoria as possible and bring 
them to Natal. Within a short time Zeederberg was reporting that, 
as soon as he had sufficient men, he would depart for Natal. 73 
The Standerton commando strongly resisted their pending transfer 
to the Orange Free State. When President Kruger heard of this, 
he made it clear that they were to proceed immediately to 
Brandfort, which they eventually did. 74 The Standerton commando 
were probably loath to leave the front closest to their district. 
Furthermore, on the Natal front they would encounter the force 
most likely to try to move into their district. 
The Boers were experiencing other discipline problems as well. 
During April, with little activity taking place in Natal, the 
officers, by a narrow majority had voted that 12% of all burghers 
be given permission to return home to attend to farming matters 
72 Leyds 722(f), Tel. no. 41, Pretorius to Wolmarans, 1 May 
1900 and Tel. no. 39, L. Botha to Burger, 2 May 1900, T.A. No 
documents detailing discussions held at a council-of-war could 
be found. However, in Leyds 722(f), Tel. no. 41, 1 May 1900 there 
is a specific reference to a council-of-war taking place and 
orders being issued on land 2 May bringing about considerable 
changes in the composition of the Boer forces along the 
Biggarsberg. 
73 Leyds 722(f), Tel. no. 21, Erasmus to Landdrost, 
Pretoria, 2 May 1900; Leyds 723(b), Tel. no. 31, Zeederberg to 
Erasmus, 4 May 1900, T.A. 
74 Leyds 722(f), Tel. no. 49, Wd. Cmdt. Boshoff to Burger, 
1 May 1900; Leyds 723(a), Tel. no. 59, Kruger to Landdrost 
Standerton and Tel. no. 67, L. Botha to Kruger, 3 May 1900, T.A. 
42 
and another 10% be granted leave. This concession meant that 
almost a quarter of the entire force was in fact legitimately 
away from the front. 75 Then, on the expiry of their leave many 
men failed to return to the front, simply alighting from trains 
before they reached their destinations. Chris Botha requested 
that police on duty at railway stations put an end to this 
practice. 76 On the same day that Chris Botha made this request, 
the leave regulations affecting all burghers were amended by the 
government. They stated that as a result of the seriousness of 
the situation in the Orange Free State and at Fourteen Streams, 
it had been decided to grant no further leave in May, that all 
granted leave was cancelled and that only 6% of burghers were 
permitted to attend to farming activities. Furthermore, orders 
were issued that all burghers liable for military service were 
to join their commandos immediately. In the telegram in which L. 
Botha announced these amendments, he lamented the fact that 
wherever the Boers were forced to retreat, it was because they 
were numerically too weak. He appealed to the commandants and 
veld-cornets to do their duty and to ensure that everyone was 
present and urged, 
75 Leyds 721(f), Tel. no. 4, Meyer to Sts Seers, 19 April 
1900, T.A. 
76 Leyds 723(b), Tel. no. 60, c. Botha to Sts Seers, 4 May 
1900, T.A. 
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Die off icieren hebben toch de wet in hunne handen en onze 
onafhankelykheid hebben zy nu in hunne handen. Daarom draag 
ik u hierby op om allen die de wapenen kunnen opnemen op te 
roepen en zich onmiddelyk te doen aansluiten zonder eenige 
verdere verzuim of vertraging. 77 
The situation in the Orange Free State and at Fourteen Streams 
was even more serious for the Boers; it was critical. Roberts's 
forces advancing jointly along the Bloemfontein-Kroonstad and 
Winburg-Kroonstad roads totalled 44 380 men - of whom 23 500 were 
mounted - with 142 guns, 20 Vickers-Maxims and 82 machine guns. 
Opposing them were a mere 6 000 burghers with a very limited 
number of guns. Louis Botha soon realised that the conventional 
set piece defence which they had previously employed, would never 
stop this massive force on the open Orange Free State plains. 
Alternative tactics were discussed including the scorched earth 
one, but no consensus could be reached and so no major tactical 
changes were introduced. By 10 May Roberts's forces, although 
hindered at some points such as at the vet River and the Sand 
River, was poised to capture Kroonstad, the town the Boers were 
using as their Orange Free State capital. Roberts had advanced 
some 100 kilometres in a mere seven days. On the western flank, 
at Fourteen Streams, the British were also successfully 
progressing, having secured the important crossing over the Vaal 
River on 7 May. This would enable Methuen's Xth Di vision to 
advance on Mafikeng and forge into the western part of the South 
African Republic. 78 
77 Leyds 723(b), Tel. no. 122, Wd KG to Erasmus, C. Botha, 
Fourie, 4 May 1900, T.A. 
78 Breytenbach, V, pp. 416-475 and 488-497; Maurice and 
Grant, III, pp. 41-42 and 107-112. 
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Buller's initial advance on 7 May to Madder Spruit and 
Elandslaagte with the 2nd Di vision and 3rd Mounted Brigade 
respectively was carried out in that direction, partly to deceive 
the Boers and partly to meet an expected attack on his right 
flank. 79 On 8 May the 2nd Division remained stationary, while 
elements of Dundonald's 3rd Mounted Brigade did some 
patrolling. 80 The following day, with the threat of a major 
Boer counter-offensive failing to materialise, the columns 
changed direction and headed in a south-easterly direction. 
Dundonald's men proceeded to the drift where the main Ladysmith-
Helpmekaar road crossed the Sunday's River. Encountering no 
opposition, they bivouacked there. Koppies immediately east of 
the river were also occupied. Clery, with the rest of the column, 
joined Dundonald there the following day. Within two days Clery's 
men had covered 27 kilometres. Some of the roads were very dusty, 
but the cool and fine weather was ideal for marching. 
While awaiting Clery' s arrival, some of Dundonald' s men were 
profitably employed in reconnaissance work. The Natal Carbineers 
scouted the terrain east of the Wasbank River, reporting on fords 
over that river towards Helpmekaar. At the same time two 
companies of Thorneycroft' s Mounted Infantry probed northward and 
were able to report that KwaSondoda was not occupied by Boers. 
While the 2nd Division and 3rd Mounted Brigade were on the move, 
a force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel E.C. Bethune which held 
79 FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/855, Report by Buller to Sec State 
for War, 24 May 1900. 
BO FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 8 May 1900. 
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Greytown, was ordered to advance on Helpmekaar via Tugela Ferry 
and via Pomeroy from the south. Bethune's force of 1 500 men 
comprised the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Imperial Light Infantry, 
Bethune's Mounted Infantry, the Natal Hotchkiss Battery and two 
naval guns. 81 
Buller's initial attempt to deceive the Boers by moving in a 
north-easterly direction rather than directly east was 
successful. As the Boers noted the large scale movement of 
British forces conflicting reports were submitted about them. 
Erasmus reported approximately 200 wagons heading towards the 
Sunday's River on 7 May. 82 Later in the day he mentioned 
considerable movement around Elandslaagte, but was unsure of the 
route the British intended following. Sometime later he reported 
that their manoeuvre was possibly only a feint or shifting of a 
camp. 83 When no significant move was made on the following day, 
the Boers were convinced this was the case. 84 
Once Buller's advance continued, it prompted a flood of reports, 
but still with no real clarity on the exact route the British 
81 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 2 Div. and 
2 Bde., 9 and 10 May 1900; Roberts Papers XVIII T.A., W.O. 
105/13, Tel. no. 0852, Buller to Roberts, 13 May 1900; J. 
Stirling, The Colonials in South Africa 1899-1902, p. 64. 
82 Leyds 723(d), Tel. no. 57, Erasmus to Sts Seers, 7 May 
1900, T.A. 
83 Leyds 723(d), Tel. no. 52, Edwards to L. Botha; Tel. no. 
82, Edwards to L. Meyer; Tel. nos. 92 and 105, Erasmus to Sts 
Seers; Tel. no. 106, C. Botha to Meyer, 7 May 1900, T.A. 
84 Leyds 723(e), Tel. no. 23, Fourie to Meyer; Tel. no. 39, 
Erasmus to Meyer; Tel. no. 64, C. Botha to Meyer; Tel. no. 98, 
Edwards to Meyer, 8 May 1900, T.A. 
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force intended taking. The movement from Elandslaagte battlefield 
by some of Hildyard's men in an east-south-easterly direction, 
rather than the south-easterly one taken by Dundonald' s men added 
to the Boers' confusion even further. Hildyard's men had orders 
to occupy a bluff overlooking the Sunday's River, dig 
entrenchments there and make improvements to the road. This force 
was supported by two guns. As the general consensus of opinion 
among the Boers apparently was that the British force was making 
for either Van Tonder's Nek or Helpmekaar, C. Botha was ordered 
to reinforce the Van Tonder's Nek area with 500 men, a 75mm 
Creusot and 37mm Maxim Nordenfeldt. 85 
As the British force congregated on the Sunday's River on 10 May 
and the cavalry scouted east and north of the crossing point, 
alarmist Boer reports began coming in including accounts of 
fighting in the Helpmekaar and Pomeroy area. Later it became 
clear that these accounts were exaggerations. What had probably 
taken place were skirmishes between Boer and British patrols or 
contact had been made with Bethune's force. The total reported 
casual ties for the day was one wounded of Bethune' s force. 
Clearly, no heavy fighting had taken place that day, but none the 
less, the alarmist reports resulted in the despatch of 
reinforcements to the Helpmekaar area, accompanied by Fourie and 
Chris Botha. Once the true situation became known however, some 
85 Leyds 723(d), Tel. no. 49, Tel Kantoor (Glencoe) to HTD; 
Tel. no. 57, Erasmus to Meyer; Tel. nos. 60 and 64, Erasmus to 
C. Botha; Tel. no. 78, Wd Cmdt Viljoen (Van Tonder's Nek) to Cmdt 
Viljoen; Tel. nos. 79 and 112, Erasmus to President; Tel. no. 
115, C. Botha to Cmdt Vryheid; Tel. no. 116, C. Botha to (no 
name); Tel. no. 117, Erasmus to Meyer, 9 May 1900, T.A.; FK 1777 
T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 10 Bde., 9 May 1900. 
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of the reinforcements seem to have been withdrawn from the 
Helpmekaar area.86 
By the evening of 10 May the British force that was gathered on 
the Sunday's River, south-east of Elandslaagte, consisted of the 
3rd Mounted Brigade, 'A' Battery R.H.A., 2nd Infantry Division, 
7th, 63rd and 64th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, 61st Howitzer 
Battery, two 4.7 guns, four 12 pound naval guns, 3 Vickers-Maxims 
(porn-porns), No. 4 Mountain Battery and a supply column with 10 
days' provisions. 87 Buller, along with his head-quarters staff, 
that day rode out from Ladysmith to join them. From then Buller 
took personal command of this flanking force. 88 
Later that day orders were issued for this force to proceed 
towards the Wasbank River the following morning. The left flank 
and rear of Buller's force were to be covered by one of 
Hildyard's battalions occupying KwaSondoda. The occupation of 
this hill would also ensure the maintenance of communication with 
Ladysmith. All was now ready for the next phase of Buller' s 
86 Leyds 723(g), Tel. no. 15, Wd Asst Gen Schoeman to Meyer; 
Tel. no. 28, Edwards to Meyer; Tel. no. 29, Wd Cmdt to Viljoen; 
Tel. no. 45, C. Botha to Viljoen; Tel. no. 46, C. Botha to Mrs 
C. Uys; Tel. no. 57, Erasmus to Meyer; Tel. no. 58, V.C. Dercksen 
to L . Botha; Tel . no. 7 3, c. Botha to Meyer; Tel . no. 9 8, 
Landdrost to Cmdt Vryheid; Tel. no. 110, Erasmus to President, 
10 May 1900, T.A .. 
87 Amery, IV, p. 171; E.B. Knox, Buller's Campaign, p. 246; 
FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/861, Report Buller to Lansdowne, 24 May 
1900. 
88 I FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32 855, S.D. Natal Army, 10 May 1900. 
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advance. 89 
At 06:00, with Dundonald's cavalry leading the way and covering 
the flanks, Buller' s force set off from the Sunday's River, 
heading in a north-easterly direction, towards the Wasbank River. 
The first ten kilometres they traversed were hilly and broken, 
making progress slow and very tiring, but the last four 
kilometres, on entering the broad Wasbank valley, were easier. 
As ordered, Hilyard's Dorsetshire Regiment, assisted by a small 
mounted force, occupied KwaSondoda without incident. 90 
The Boers soon noticed the advance of these two forces, while in 
the Helpmekaar-Pomeroy area, Commandant C.L. Engelbrecht and his 
Piet Retiefers had Bethune's force threatening them. As early as 
7 May a party of 25 Natal Volunteers were reportedly seen at 
Pomeroy. 91 To the Boers it appeared that the major British 
advance was headed for Van Tender's Nek. As a result C. Botha 
decided to reinforce that pass with 500 Middelburgers. At the 
same time he requested Meyer to ask Fourie to despatch a force 
with the utmost urgency and Erasmus was ordered to be prepared 
89 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, Orders issued by Clery, 10 May 
1900; FK 1777 T.A., W.O. 32/855, Orders issued by G.O.C. 10 Bde, 
10 May 1900. 
9o FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 10 May 1900; 
S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 10 May 1900; S.D. 2nd Division, 10 May 1900; 
FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/861, Report Buller to Lansdowne, 24 May 
1 9 0 0; Burne, pp. 5 9-6 0; Cd. 142, p. 21 ; C. T. Atkinson, The 
Dorsetshire Regiment, II, p. 74. 
91 Leyds 723(h), Tel. no. 38, Wd Cmdt Swaziland to C. Botha; 
Tel. no. 50, Cmdt Engelbrecht to Landdrost Piet Retief, 11 May 
1900; Leyds 723(d), C. Botha to Meyer, 11 May 1900, T.A. 
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to reinforce any area where fighting might begin. 92 
Although the Boer and British forces came relatively close to one 
another, it was only when Dundonald's men crossed the Wasbank 
River that contact was made. In a small skirmish one Natal 
Carbineer was wounded and a burgher, Herculaas Nel, was wounded 
and taken prisoner. The small party of burghers was driven 
off. 93 
By nightfall some of the British soldiers were encamped just east 
of the Wasbank River. That night the end of the British column 
entered camp only at about 03:00, having been delayed by the poor 
quality roads. 94 Although this large force was very close to 
Commandant Ben Viljoen's Johannesburg commando at Van Tender's 
Nek, he confidently stated that with God's help he would hold 
them off. 95 During the day Viljoen had noticed strong British 
scouting parties east of the Wasbank River. These activities led 
him to believe that the British had no intention of attacking at 
Van Tender's Nek, but would make for Helpmekaar. 96 
Early on the following morning (12 May) Viljoen's predictions 
92 Leyds 723(h), Tel. nos. 55 and 56, C. Botha to Meyer; 
Tel. no. 61, Meyer to Fourie, 11 May 1900, T.A. 
93 Leyds 723(h), Tel.no. 56, C. Botha to Meyer, 11 May 1900, 
T.A.; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 3 Cav. 
Bde., 11 May 1900. 
94 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 2 Div., 11 May 1900. 
95 Leyds 723 (h), Tel. no. 96, Viljoen to Wd Spec Cmdt JHB, 
11 May 1900. 
96 Viljoen, p. 80. 
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regarding the direction of the British advance were confirmed 
when Buller's column was sited continuing in an easterly 
direction. 97 Their route took them ever closer to the lofty 
heights of the Biggarsberg from which the Boers had a grandstand 
view of the column of approximately 10 000 infantry and 
cavalrymen. Meyer estimated the force at 20 000 'voetgangers en 
paarden ruiters' . 98 This may, however, have included Hildyard's 
division which, from where it was positioned, also posed a threat 
to the Boer defence line and was therefore possibly included in 
the estimate. 
As on the previous day, Dundonald's cavalry acted as a screen, 
covering the front and both flanks of the advancing column. 99 
It was the 2nd East Surrey Regiment, supported by two guns, that 
formed the advance guard of the infantry. 100 The column 
proceeded over the open veld, as the road would have taken them 
too close to the Boer positions. As it was, their left flank was 
very exposed to any surprise attacks the Boers might have 
launched, and during the course of the day they had to contend 
with considerable sniping. 101 Yet, other than the sniping and 
an occasional skirmish with the cavalry, the Boers inexplicably 
T.A. 
414. 
97 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 12 May 1900. 
98 Leyds 724(a), Tel. no. 123, Meyer to Fourie, 12 May 1900, 
99 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, 3 Cav. Bde., 12 May 1900. 
100 H.W. Pearse, History of the East Surrey Regiment, I, p. 
101 P. Todd and D. Fordham (eds.), Private Tucker's Boer War 
Diary, p. 101; Cd. 458, p. 81. 
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failed to exploit the opportunities so conveniently offered by 
having the British strung out in the open in front of them. 
During one of the skirmishes three or four troopers of the South 
African Light Horse were taken prisoner by the Johannesburg 
commando. 102 · 
By midday the British advance guard had reached its destination, 
a farmstead known as Vermaak's Kraal. There they settled to rest, 
being joined during the afternoon by the rest of the column which 
had departed from the Wasbank River that morning. Most of the 
column settled on a low ridge overlooking the farmstead and 
facing the Biggarsberg, where, on the skyline, they could see 
burghers and entrenchments. 103 During the afternoon the British 
force noticed that the Boers were mounting a gun in a menacing 
position on the spur nearest their camp. The British force 
promptly responded by preparing two 4. 7" guns in emplacements and 
training them on the spur, hoping to be able to protect their 
bivouac if need be.104 
Vermaak's Kraal, situated as it was, a mere 6 700 metres from the 
Biggarsberg crestline, was not an ideal encampment ground, but 
it was the only place in the vicinity where water was available. 
This supply was not sufficient and the oxen had to be driven a 
102 Leyds 724(b), Tel. no. 19, Meyer to President, 13 May 
1900, T.A.; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 12 May 
1900; Viljoen, p. 81. 
103 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 2 
Bde., 12 May 1900. 
104 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 81. 
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further five kilometres. 105 If water was in short supply, the 
soldiers did find a fine orange orchard, whose fruits they were 
soon consuming with relish. 106 As Buller was heading east for 
Vermaak' s Kraal, so Bethune' s column was advancing from the south 
and on the same evening was encamped approximately 6 kilometres 
from Pomeroy. 107 
Noting all these British activities, the Boer officers ordered 
more reinforcements to be sent towards the threatened sector. 
Erasmus despatched another 200 men, while 400 Boksburgers also 
went across to join Lucas Meyer who was already there with 500 
Middelburgers. It is quite evident that once the British began 
their advance, a considerable number of Boer reinforcements were 
ordered to move eastwards along the Biggarsberg. What is 
extremely difficult to establish, is whether commandos ordered 
to move to certain positions, actually did so and also precisely 
where they moved to. Erasmus mentions sending reinforcements to 
Helpmekaar on 12 May and that Meyer, with 500 Middelburgers, was 
already there. Yet some hours later Meyer sent a telegram to 
Fourie from Van Tonder's Nek and not from Helpmekaar1 108 
Where Buller had crossed the Wasbank River two field guns, two 
naval twelve pounders, the 2nd Scottish Rifles and a detachment 
105 Ibid., p. 81. 
106 Todd and Fordham, p. 101. 
107 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 260; C. Boscawen-Wright, With 
the Imperial Light Infantry Through Natal, p. 67. 
108 Leyds 724(a), Tel. no. 63, Erasmus to President; Tel. 
no. 123, Meyer to Fourie, 12 May 1900, T.A. 
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of the 3rd Mounted Brigade were stationed to protect the drift 
and supply park left behind there. Leaving the supply park there, 
would eventually save it a long journey via Helpmekaar, as once 
the Boers were forced to vacate the Biggarsberg, it would be able 
to cross the hills at Van Tonder's Nek. 109 
By the evening of 12 May, Buller' s Natal Field Force held 
positions from Jonono in the west, through Elandslaagte, 
KwaSondoda, Wasbank Drift to Vermaak's Kraal in the east and to 
Pomeroy in the south-east. It is therefore not surprising that 
Meyer, anticipating that the British would attack at two or more 
places between Van Tonder's Nek and Helpmekaar, urged Fourie to 
keep a strong commando on Knight's Hill, thereby covering the 
Mkupe Pass road.110 
After weeks of relative inactivity, the British force had, within 
the space of six days, radically altered the state of affairs in 
Natal. Buller was poised to strike at the Boer left flank, hoping 
to gain a foothold on the Biggarsberg and then roll up their 
entire defence line. Also, as noted above, the situation for the 
Boers in the Orange Free State and at Fourteen Streams, was 
critical. Their resources were being stretched to, or beyond, the 
limit. 
109 I FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32 855, S.D. Natal Army, 12 May 1900. 
110 Leyds 724(a), Tel. no. 123, Meyer to Fourie, 12 May 
1900, T.A. 
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Chapter 3. HELPMEKAAR 
On 11 and 12 May Buller's force had proceeded in an easterly 
direction, with neither the Boers, nor natural features providing 
much of an obstacle. Now, however, the man who preferred to be 
second-in-command, was faced with decisions on how to proceed 
further. He was also confronted by the Biggarsberg which rose 
sharply before him to both north and east, with its summits 
towering all of 400 metres above the valley in which he was 
encamped. Atop the Biggarsberg range lay the Boer commandos, who 
at this stage held a number of strategic advantages. Not only did 
they have possession of a strong defensive position, but they had 
been there for more than two months, allowing them ample time to 
become intimately familiar with the terrain and to build 
extensive fortifications in all the best places. It must have 
been perfectly clear that there were only three routes by which 
the British forces could feasibly advance in the Helpmekaar area 
onto the Biggarsberg. These were via Britte's Pass immediately 
south of Helpmekaar, or through the Uithoek valley, or from the 
south via Pomeroy. Any manoeuvre carried out by Buller, would be 
in full view of the burghers, positioned on the Biggarsberg, from 
Van Tender's Nek to the south of Helpmekaar. From these positions 
one has an uninterrupted view of the rolling countryside 
stretching for many kilometres to the south, a topography giving 
Buller little opportunity to launch a surprise attack, but 
providing the defenders with excellent cover by way of a crest 
line littered with stones and boulders. The potential for a 
vigorous resistance was thus considerable. 
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From Van Tonder's Nek to Helpmekaar the Biggarsberg ran on a 
south-easterly line. At Helpmekaar it turned directly due south 
culminating in the shape of the letter "J". At the tip of this 
"J" lay Uithoek (Ngcongwana) hill, connected to the Biggarsberg 
by a narrow nek. It commanded the plateau leading to Helpmekaar 
and towered over the valleys to the south and north of it, and 
was therefore a strategically key feature. Through the valley to 
the south of Uithoek - the Uithoek valley - passed the Ladysmith-
Helpmekaar road. To the south of Uithoek lay further high ground. 
Before the day's activities even began, Lucas Meyer committed a 
fatal error of judgement. He believed the British would not 
continue their advance on that day, 13 May, as it was a Sunday. 1 
Buller, however, now that he was on the move, appeared determined 
to maintain his momentum. Consequently, preparations commenced 
in the early hours of that morning to ensure the advance would 
continue as soon as it became light. 2 Meyer's miscalculation was 
to cost him dearly. This was not the only error he made. As 
mentioned above, it is difficult to establish precisely where the 
Boer reinforcements were positioned in the Helpmekaar area. There 
are numerous references to their being sent to Helpmekaar, yet 
the events of 13 May make it quite clear that they were not at 
the village. Amery suggests the reinforcements were at Beith. 3 
This is quite probable, for late on 12 May, Meyer in a telegram 
T.A. 
1 Leyds 724(b), Tel. no. 19, Meyer to Kruger, 13 May 1900, 
2 Trooper Bizley Diary, 13 May 1900. 
3 Amery, IV, p. 172. 
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sent to Fourie from Van Tonder' s Nek stated, 11 Het is heel 
waarschynlyk dat zy tusschen hier en Helpmekaar de berg op 2 of 
meer plekken zullen aanvallen. 114 With this uncertainty in his 
mind it is likely that he deliberately held the reinforcements 
in reserve, thereby allowing the flexibility to deploy them where 
necessary, once the British attack or attacks began. Yet, both 
Ben Viljoen, Commandant of the Johannesburg commando and Chris 
Botha, Commandant of the Swazilanders had warned that they 
believed the British attack would be made near Helpmekaar. The 
reserves at Beith would then be too far north and west. This 
advice was ignored, prompting Viljoen to comment sarcastically, 
11 a commandant's opinion did not weigh much just then. 115 Their 
warnings were based on the observation of scouting parties moving 
east of Vermaak's Kraal during 12 May. 
With the stars still twinkling that Sunday morning, the leading 
elements of the British force departed from camp in the cold, 
crisp air. As on the previous two days, Dundonald' s Mounted 
Brigade led the way, acting as a screen and also as a probing 
force. They made off in a south-easterly direction, heading for 
the Uithoek valley. The rest of the column soon formed up and 
followed in the cavalry's wake. 6 Any doubts the Boers still had 
about British intentions must have been swiftly swept aside, as 
4 Leyds 724 (a), Tel. no. 123, Meyer to Fourie, 12 May 1900, 
T.A .. 
5 Viljoen, pp. 80-81. 
6 Lord Dundonald, My Army Life, p. 157; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 
32/855, S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 13 May 1900 and S.D. 2nd 
Brigade, 13 May 1900 and S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900. 
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they noted the direction the column was taking. 
Despite this, it was only at 08:00 that a Boer gun, placed in 
position the previous afternoon, on a spur overlooking the 
British encampment, opened fire. By that stage the tail end of 
the column was falling in, ready to move off. The 4.7" guns, 
specifically prepared for this eventuality, soon replied and by 
the fifth round silenced the gun on the Biggarsberg, but not 
before two Durhams were slightly wounded. It was later reported 
that this gun was badly damaged by the naval shells. 7 There is 
no intimation in the Boer sources, apart from Meyer's 
misjudgment, as to why the burghers were so tardy in responding 
to the British movements that morning. 
Dundonald' s Mounted Infantry, proceeding towards the Ui thoek 
valley, initially advanced across the open veld rather than along 
the road. This was to avoid passing too closely to the crest of 
the Biggarsberg, along which burghers could be observed riding 
on either side of Helpmekaar. The colonial unit raised at the 
beginning of the war, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry (T.M.I.) 
under command of an Imperial Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel A. 
Thorneycroft, led the way. Another colonial unit, the Volunteer 
Composite Regiment (V.C.R.), covered the rear and flanks. 8 For 
some distance the cavalry proceeded unopposed. Buller' s force was 
7 FK 1792 T.A., W.O. 32/861, Buller to Sec of State for War, 
24 May 1900 and S.D. 4th Brigade, 13 May 1900; E.B. Knox, 
Buller's Campaign, p. 247. 
B FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900 and S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 
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at its most vulnerable at this stage. It was moving over open 
countryside and heading towards a valley, whose high ground on 
either side could easily be occupied by the Boers. Furthermore, 
the area they were approaching was confined, not allowing for 
effective deployment. 
On arrival at the foot of Uithoek, a squadron of the T.M.I. swung 
slightly left and rode up the steep feature. When about two-
thirds way up and unable to proceed any further on horseback, 
they dismounted and climbed the rest of the way. The last section 
was very steep and rocky. The hill was like a natural fortress, 
an ideal defensive position, but to the T.M.I. 's amazement they 
found this most strategic position unoccupied. Without firing a 
shot the British gained control of this key feature. It was now 
09:00 and becoming ever warmer. 9 Possession of Uithoek was 
essential before Buller could contemplate entering the Uithoek 
valley. 
During the cavalry advance, the infantry and baggage column 
proceeded in a south easterly direction until reaching an area 
approximately four kilometres from their camping ground, where 
they struck the Ladysmith-Helpmekaar road. Here they halted and 
baggage animals were outspanned, watered and allowed to graze 
where possible. 10 
9 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for war, 24 May 1900, p. 82; 
FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 13 May 1900; 
Maurice and Grant, 111, p. 261. 
10 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900, 
pp. 70-71 . 
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With the T.M.I. squadron in occupation of Uithoek, Buller issued 
orders for Major-General E.O.F. Hamilton's 2nd Brigade also to 
ascend the hill. The 2nd East Surrey Regiment remained behind to 
escort the guns. This order was issued at about the time 
Thorneycroft's men arrived on the summit, but only an hour later 
were Hamilton's men ready to proceed. 11 There is no explanation 
why an hour elapsed before Hamilton's men were ready. The 
infantry advance was led by the 2nd Royal West Surrey Regiment 
(Queens), following at a distance of about 750 metres by the 2nd 
Devonshire Regiment and 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment respectively. 
The going was hard and steep, but knowing the summit was already 
in British hands must have been a major consolation. The other 
battalions soon joined them. 12 The British toehold on the 
Biggarsberg was becoming stronger. 
It is puzzling that the Boers failed to challenge the relatively 
small group of cavalry holding Uithoek, especially as it was a 
long time before the infantry joined them. This tends to confirm 
Amery's statement, already noted above, that the Boer 
reinforcements were at Beith, or at least not at Helpmekaar, 
which was only six kilometres from Ui thoek. One begins to 
question the quality of Boer leadership in the area and their 
. 11 . FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900; 
Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 82; H.W. 
Pearse, History of the East Surrey Regiment, I, p. 414. 
12 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 
261. According to the Natal Staff Diary, Hamilton's men were only 
despatched at 11 : 00, to ascend Ui thoek. It appears highly 
improbable that Thorneycroft' s men would have been left in 
possession of a precarious position for two hours before 
additional troops were ordered to follow up. 
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resolve to hold their defence line, especially as the British 
were unable to conceal their movements. 
With Uithoek in British hands and the infantry surging up to 
support the single squadron of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry 
holding the summit, the rest of the cavalry followed by the 4th 
Brigade, the East Surreys and artillery entered the narrow 
Uithoek valley. The remainder of the Thorneycroft Mounted 
Infantry and the South African Light Horse reconnoitred the hills 
east of the road, while the Volunteers were similarly engaged on 
those west of the road. Succeeding hilltops were seized and all 
commanding positions picketed. Initially the advance followed a 
south-easterly direction, curving gently to the left until it 
veered directly due east. The ridge to the south of the road had 
been held by the Boers, to block an advance from Pomeroy, but 
fortunately for Dundonald's men it was now deserted. 13 All was 
running so smoothly that the advance must have seemed like a 
successful training exercise to Buller. 
Meanwhile, Bethune' s force was also playing its role in the 
advance on the Biggarsberg. It was encamped some six kilometres 
south of Pomeroy. During that night however, some of Bethune's 
men proceeded beyond Pomeroy, gaining control of some of the 
hills "which commanded the southern sides of the Pass up which 
13 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 13 May 1900; Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller 
to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 82; Amery, IV, p. 173. 
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we (Buller' s force) had to approach." 14 This would probably 
account for Dundonald's men finding the ridge south of Uithoek 
valley unoccupied. As Buller's force moved off towards Uithoek 
in the early morning, the rest of Bethune's men advanced from the 
south. Pomeroy was reported to be occupied by Boers, but on 
entering the village they found it deserted and as they passed 
through, noticed that a number of homes had been ransacked. 15 
Once through Pomeroy, Bethune's column pushed on toward 
Helpmekaar Pass, another five kilometres away. As Buller' s column 
passed along the Ui thoek valley, they suddenly spied riders 
descending a hill lying south-east of them - they were Bethune's 
advance scouts. 16 
This meant that the British advances, executed in difficult 
terrain, were perfectly synchronized. All the pieces were coming 
together at the correct place and time. On the other hand, Boer 
problems were steadily mounting. Not only had Uithoek been left 
undefended, but Bethune's column was closing in via the 
Helpmekaar Pass, without meeting vigorous opposition. The British 
were thus converging with three forces toward the southern end 
of the Helpmekaar plateau. There was Hamilton's brigade on 
Uithoek, Buller's column marching up the Uithoek valley towards 
14 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 
82. When Buller refers to "we" and "Pass" in his report, it is 
not absolutely clear whether he is referring to the force 
approaching from the Ladysmith side and the pass up the Uithoek 
valley. It is highly probable that this is the case though, as 
Bethune's men tend at this stage of his report to be referred to 
as a separate force from that approaching from Ladysmith. 
15 Boscawen-Wright, p. 70. 
16 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900. 
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Ui thoek pass and Bethune approaching from the south. 17 With 
every passing moment their position was becoming stronger and 
more menacing. It is striking how much time and space Buller's 
forces were granted in which to manoeuvre. 
Once Hamilton's men were on Uithoek, orders were issued for the 
Queens to proceed across a narrow nek in an easterly direction 
towards the next ridge, some 2 000 metres away. The main advance 
was made by four companies, while one company was pushed out to 
occupy a ridge on the left front and another four companies 
covered the right. The ridge directly ahead was not entrenched 
and appeared unoccupied. Simultaneously, three companies of 
Devons were ordered to the top of Uithoek, to cover the advance 
on the ridge. Another four companies of Devons supported the 
Queens. The Queens occupied the ridge unopposed and from there 
moved to a further crest commanding the Pomeroy-Helpmekaar road, 
arriving there at 13: 30. 18 What had been a toehold on the 
Biggarsberg, was now a foothold. 
Buller's column made steady progress and at 11:20 began 
proceeding up the Ui thoek Pass. Simultaneously, Bethune was 
closing in on the high ground from the south. 19 Ahead of 
Buller, Dundonald' s men swept onto the high ground and swung left 
in the vicinity where the Ladysmi th-Helpmekaar and Pomeroy-
17 Knox, p. 248. 
18 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900. 
19 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 
82. 
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Helpmekaar roads met. Near there Bethune's column linked up with 
them, at approximately 13:0o. 20 The timing could not have been 
better. 
Shortly before the two forces linked up, Bethune encountered the 
first resistance that day. It came from Boers in deep trenches 
and a clump of bush on the edge of the escarpment, looking south 
towards Pomeroy. Bethune's naval guns were brought into action, 
while the mounted men pressed on up the last part of the pass. 
As Bethune's men approached the small wood, the party of Boers, 
whose exact size it has not been possible to establish, broke 
from cover and galloped off along the road towards Helpmekaar. 
At that moment the Queens reached the crest overlooking the route 
the retreating Boers followed. The Queens promptly opened up with 
their maxim and also fired some long range volleys at the hastily 
retiring horsemen. One or two were knocked over. 21 The Boers 
had left it far too late to offer effective opposition, as 
Buller' s forces had been allowed to gain far too strong a 
foothold on the Biggarsberg. 
Once the British reached elevated positions on the Biggarsberg, 
they noticed a number of burghers on the very open plateau, south 
of Helpmekaar. With forces converging from three directions, 
these Boers hastily retired. A major concern from the Boers 
facing the advancing mounted men, must have been the possibility 
20 Ibid., p. 82; Dundonald, p. 157; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 
32/855, S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 13 May 1900. 
21 FK 1776 T.A., W.0. 32/855, S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900. 
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of having their retreat route cut off by Hamilton's infantry. 
The British success thus far, was gained at the expense of merely 
one man wounded. This single British casualty, more than 
everything else, illustrates clearly the lack of Boer resolve at 
Helpmekaar. This lack of resistance is also borne out by the fact 
that the leading infantry battalions, the Queens and Devens, only 
fired a total of 840 rounds during the entire day - less than one 
round per man. Nor did they suffer a single casualty. 22 A 
striking feature of the British movements is their co-ordination. 
In the records there is no evidence of how this was achieved, 
that is, whether it depended upon signals, preplanned strategy 
or both. It can hardly have been the product of coincidence. 
Earlier during the morning, once Lucas Meyer had realized the 
true British intentions, he hastily despatched C. Botha and his 
Swazilanders to reinforce the Boers at Helpmekaar. On the arrival 
at Helpmekaar between 10:00 and 11:00, it was already too late 
for Botha to occupy positions to defend the passes. The British 
three-pronged attack was too advanced and the Helpmekaar Pass had 
not been properly occupied by Commandant Engelbrecht and his Piet 
Retiefers, or the small German Corps, also in the area. Key 
positions had clearly been vacated or never occupied. It is 
therefore probable that Botha and his reinforcements had to 
satisfy themselves by merely occupying the stony koppies just 
south of the Helpmekaar village. Even with Botha's Swazilanders 
22 Ibid., 13 May 1900; Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for 
War, 24 May 1900, p. 82; Knox, p. 248; Maurice and Grant, III, 
p. 261. 
65 
as reinforcements, the total Boer force at Helpmekaar probably 
consisted of no more than 600 to 700 men, and may even have been 
fewer. Advancing on them were approximately 10 000 British. 23 
Once Dundonald and Bethune's forces linked up, they rapidly and 
confidently advanced northward towards Helpmekaar, following the 
retreating Boers. They proceeded over flat and very open ground. 
Before long they ran into sudden and spirited resistance. This 
must have come as something of a surprise, after difficult 
positions had been captured with such ease earlier in the day. 
At the northern end of the plateau along which they galloped, 
were the two stony koppies, held in some strength by the Boers. 
At this point the nek narrows down to a width of only about 200 
metres across, with steep slopes on either side. The narrowing 
of the plateau aided the defenders by forcing the British to 
shorten their firing line, and consequently preventing Buller 
from exploiting his numerical superiority. Furthermore, the 
koppies had been strengthened by extensive fortifications and gun 
emplacements. Tucker, a private with the Rifle Brigade, was most 
impressed by the system of fortifications, describing them in his 
diary as follows. 
Their position was first class, commanding every inch of 
the road ... we had never seen such long walls and trenches 
23 Penning, II, p. 735; Leyds 771(b), P.A. Nierstrasz, 'Der 
Siid-Afrikanische Krieg 1899-1902', p. 910, T.A.; Amery suggests 
it was Ben Viljoen who hastened to Helpmekaar with 
reinforcements. This is probably an error. It is the only source 
claiming it was Viljoen, rather than Botha, going to 
Engelbrecht's aid. Not even Viljoen in his memoirs makes mention 
of going to Helpmekaar. Amery, IV, p. 174; Viljoen, p. 82. 
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before. They had built some beautiful emplacements for 
their guns, especially their porn-porns. They were ... well 
built, with neat trenches either side for the gunners to 
dodge into ... The walls were sometimes a mile in length and 
strongly built, every gun position was placed well and in 
commanding positions, well protected by walls. 24 
From these positions the Boers blazed away with rifles, two porn-
porns and a heavier gun - probably a 75mm Creusot or Krupp. The 
advancing British horsemen were checked. In an effort to smash 
his way through the sudden resistance, Dundonald, at 
approximately 14:00, brought his Royal Horse Artillery - R.H.A. 
Battery "A" - into action. But even his artillery failed to 
dislodge the Boers, and the intensity of the fire coming from the 
koppies forced the battery to retire. 25 The Boers finally 
displayed the resolve that should have been evident earlier in 
the day, when they could possibly have prevented the British from 
reaching the summit. 
Later in the afternoon the two twelve pounders with Bethune's 
column came to the R.H.A.'s assistance and shelled the Boer 
position from a range of approximately 3 700m. 26 At 
approximately 16:00 British firepower was further strengthened 
24 Todd and Fordham, pp. 103-104. 
25 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 
82; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900; 
Dundonald, p. 157; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 262; Lord Birdwood, 
Khaki and Gown, p. 110. 
26 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900; 
Maurice and Grant, III, p. 262. 
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by the addition of another two twelve pound naval guns, three 
Vickers-Maxim guns, the 4th Mountain Battery and 64th and 67th 
Batteries R.F.A. The Vickers-Maxim guns were the equivalent of 
the Boer Maxim-Nordenveldt. 27 Despite the intensity of this 
fire, the Boers obstinately clung to their Helpmekaar position. 
It was reported that two of the Boer guns were damaged by the 
British artillery barrage, but it has been impossible to confirm 
this from any Boer source. 28 With the sun rapidly sinking in 
the west, the firing died down at approximately 17:00. Having 
succeeded in turning the Boer position and gaining a major 
foothold on the Biggarsberg range, Buller had made the entire 
Boer defence line vulnerable to an enveloping movement, once he 
had driven off the burghers at Helpmekaar. 29 
Boer resolve and resistance had clearly stiffened during the 
afternoon, due no doubt, to the arrival of reinforcements and 
also to the presence of Chris Botha. He did not possess the 
leadership qualities of his brother, Louis, but was none the less 
more energetic and determined than some of the other officers. 
During the morning the British had proceeded, practically 
unhindered, and even when the first Boers were encountered on the 
plateau they had offered only token resistance. It was only 
later, with C. Botha's drive, that real resistance was offered. 
27 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900; Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec 
for War, 24 May 1900, p. 82; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 262; 
Birdwood, p. 90. 
28 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900 p. 82. 
29 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900. 
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But one must bear in mind that it was the Piet Retief commando, 
one of the less efficient Boer units, that defended the 
Helpmekaar area. They were assisted by a small contingent of the 
German Corps. The Piet Retiefers' poor performance prompted Ben 
Viljoen to refer to them, somewhat derisively, as the "Piet 
Retreaters 11 • 30 
It is quite possible that had Botha not arrived with 
reinforcements when he did, the Boer position would have been 
overrun, permitting the British at least to reach Helpmekaar that 
day. Although Botha may have been too late to prevent the British 
from gaining a foothold on the summit, he did win time to make 
the retreat from the Biggarsberg, that was about to commence, 
more orderly. Also important was that more supplies were saved 
than would otherwise have been possible. What is certain, is that 
those responsible for holding the Helpmekaar position, were 
grossly negligent. Neither were the positions occupied, nor was 
there evidence of effective leadership and they failed to 
confront the British when they were at their most vulnerable. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of Meyer's making any effort 
that day to acquaint himself personally of developments at 
Helpmekaar. It is not surprising therefore that, soon after this 
battle, strong and open opposition to his leadership 
developed. 31 This opposition, which is to be dealt with more 
30 Viljoen, p. 82. 
31 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 79, Viljoen to Kruger, 15 May 
1900; Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 11, Uys to Kruger, 20 May 1900; 
Leyds 725(e), Tel. no. 60, Lombard to Kruger, 22 May 1900; Leyds 
725(d), Tel. no. 39, Badenhorst to L. Botha, 21 May 1900, T.A .. 
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fully below, eventually resulted in his removal from the Natal 
front. 
Failure by the Boer forces earlier in the day against Buller's 
men is probably due to a combination of factors. War weariness 
and poor morale may have been partially responsible, but then 
they had also been factors along the Thukela River and were 
overcome. It is therefore necessary to delve further and deeper 
for some other causes. Ineffective leadership at several levels 
appears to have played a role and it would appear that Lucas 
Meyer was part of that problem. Commandant L.E. Krause, in the 
context of the Boer defeat on the Thukela on 27 February 1900, 
described Meyer as a clear thinker, but lacking the power to 
carry out his ideas. He was a man of thought, rather than action, 
waiting for the enemy to make the first move. 32 Meyer failed to 
supervise affairs adequately at Helpmekaar. This failure was 
compounded by the fact that one of the less efficient Boer units, 
the Piet Retief commando, bore the brunt of the British attack. 
Once before, at the battle of Pieter's Hill (27 February 1900), 
it had failed to resolutely resist a British attack. 33 Meyer 
must have realized the inadequacies of the Piet Retief commando 
and therefore, when it became abundantly clear that the British 
were heading in their direction, should have ensured that 
reinforcements were timeously sent to them, and actually arrived 
there. He failed to attend to this detail and in consequence the 
32 C.M. Bakkes, Die Britse Deurbraak aan die Benede-Tugela 
op Majubadag 1900, p. 7 5. Krause at the time of the Thukela 
battle, was a mere burgher. 
33 Bakkes, p. 75. 
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key defensive positions, such as Uithoek and the high ground to 
its south were not occupied. In partial mitigation, however, it 
must be borne in mind that the British force held a very long 
line, with a numerically vastly superior force. By holding such 
a long line and because of their numerical preponderance, the 
British forces were in a position to attack at one of several 
points along the Biggarsberg. Or they could even launch more than 
one attack at the same time. 
As evening set in and the firing died down, only Hamilton's three 
battalions, that had advanced via Uithoek, and a detachment of 
Dundonald's men remained on the summit. The rest of Dundonald's 
men, as well as Bethune's force, were obliged to retire form the 
plateau, owing to a shortage of water on the high ground. 34 
Buller was undoubtedly well pleased with the day's outcome. At 
very little loss he had achieved the first and possibly the most 
difficult part of his objective, having dislodged the Boer left 
flank from its positions. His delight is evident from the 
unstinting praise he heaped on his commanding officers. In a 
message to Roberts, Buller wrote: "Our small loss is, I think, 
certainly due to the excellent troop-leading of General Hamilton, 
General Lord Dundonald and Colonel Bethune". 35 
Unfortunately no copy of the general orders for the attack on 
Helpmekaar was located, making it impossible to determine whether 
34 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 13 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 13 May 1900; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 
262; Todd and Fordham, p. 103. 
35 Principal Events, IV. p. 20. 
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events went according to plan; what improvisations, if any, were 
necessary and to what extent personal initiative was used. 
Therefore the strategy and tactics employed can only be analysed 
and judged in terms of what occurred, rather than of what was 
planned. Nonetheless, Buller's message to Roberts, quoted above, 
does at least hint at some personal initiative by Hamilton, 
Dundonald and Bethune. 
The tactics Buller employed in this battle were somewhat 
different from those he used along the Thukela. For the first 
time the cavalry played the leading and major role during the 
entire engagement - and most effective this was, as it increased 
the British mobility. As in the final battle on the Thukela, 
Buller held a long front - from Jonono in the west to Helpmekaar 
in the east, thereby stretching the limited Boer resources and 
keeping his true intentions hidden until the final thrust was 
made. None the less, it needs to be borne in mind that a 
relatively small Boer force, in suitable terrain, had checked him 
short of Helpmekaar. The occupation of Uithoek and the other 
strategic high ground to the south and north, with an adequate 
force, may well have checked or at least, made Buller's progress 
onto the high ground a costly one. 
Despite considerable activity in trying terrain, neither side 
suffered heavy losses. It is extremely difficult to ascertain 
exactly what these losses were. Meyer reported to the President 
that Boer casualties were only one gunner killed and a member of 
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the Pi et Retief commando seriously wounded. 36 British 
casualties were also limited - seven wounded - prompting Buller 
to describe the encounter as an "almost bloodless victory. 1137 
Dundonald however, refers to twelve casualties in his brigade 
alone. 38 Whichever is the more accurate figure, the price 
Buller paid was infinitely smaller than during any of the Thukela 
River campaign battles. This too must have pleased him 
considerably, especially as he was loath to suffer losses. 39 
Ironically, the Boer defenders of the Biggarsberg did not realise 
that their efforts to hold their line were in vain. That morning 
as reinforcements scurried to Helpmekaar, Louis Botha was 
persuading his government that, due to the worsening situation 
in the Orange Free State, the Biggarsberg line should be 
relinquished and a new defence line taken up on the Drakensberg. 
Once Botha's view was accepted, Kruger informed Meyer during mid-
afternoon that he was to relinquish the Biggarsberg line, but 
stressed that the withdrawal should be orderly - all supplies 
brought out and the communication system and coal mines be laid 
waste. He explained that, due to the build-up of pressure on all 
fronts, it was necessary to concentrate the Boer forces to a 
greater degree and the western front had already been drawn 
36 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 29, Meyer to Kruger, 15 May 1900, 
T.A. 
37 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 
83. 
38 Dundonald, p. 158. 
39 Pakenham, pp. 235 and 240; J. Symons, Buller's Campaign, 
p. 1 66. 
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closer in. Meyer was ordered to release the Heidelberg and 
Pretoria commandos to join the def enders along the Vaal 
River. 40 
It appears that in ignorance of this order, a hastily convened 
council-of-war at Helpmekaar had discussed whether the positions 
that had been successfully defended south of the village, should 
be held or vacated. Arthur Lynch, commander of the remaining 
Irish on the Biggarsberg, by then also at Helpmekaar, found Chris 
Botha in command there. Lynch recorded that, at the council-of-
war, Botha favoured a desperate counter-attack, but that this 
tactic was overruled by other unspecified officers and it was 
decided to retire from Helpmekaar, thereby permitting the British 
easy access onto the broader plateau, which lay to the north of 
the village. 41 As soon as this decision was taken, the Boers 
retired from the Helpmekaar area, under the cover of darkness. 
This routine of breaking up camp was repeated along the entire 
length of the Biggarsberg. Meyer sent out written instructions 
ordering all the commandants to vacate their positions. 42 
40 Leyds 724(b), Tel. no. 67, Kruger to Meyer, 13 May 1900, 
T.A. At a council-of-war held at Kroonstad, as early as 17 March 
1900, attended by both Kruger and Steyn, and senior Boer 
officers, it was decided that mines should be laid waste before 
the British could take control of them. L. Botha was opposed to 
this policy as he maintained they were private property. In the 
end, the Boers did not follow through with this policy. 
Breytenbach, V, pp. 156-167 and 535. 
41 A. Lynch, My Life Story, pp. 186-187; Penning, II, pp. 
735 and 738. 
42 Leyds 724(c), Tel. no. 77, Meyer to Kruger, 14 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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Before dawn on Monday 14 May, Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, as on 
the previous morning, again formed up. Patrols despatched to 
reconnoitre the Helpmekaar Nek, soon established that the Boers 
had vacated their strong position to the south of the village. 
Acting on this information, Buller ordered Dundonald's men to 
pursue the Boers. The advancing force formed up as follows: 
V.C.R. and South African Light Horse (S.A.L.H.) on the right and 
left fronts re spec ti vely, followed by the R.H. A. and lastly 
T.M.I .. 43 It is significant that this was the first time since 
the commencement of the war that Buller followed up a successful 
engagement fairly rapidly with a pursuit, employing his cavalry 
and more mobile artillery to greater advantage. It might well be 
that this new tactic resulted from greater confidence which the 
recent success in the Thukela valley engendered. 
The pursuit placed considerable pressure on the Boers already 
retiring from the Biggarsberg. With the British gaining access 
to the Biggarsberg plateau, there was now a greater urgency to 
move everyone and everything to safety. Meyer had to act with 
rapidity to ensure that certain commandos, in particular those 
at Van Tonder's Nek and further east, were not cut off and to 
enable him to withdraw his artillery and most of his supplies. 
To assist the withdrawal, he issued orders for the mounted men 
to act as a rearguard to slow the British advance and thus gain 
precious time. 44 News of the British pursuit concerned Kruger, 
43 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 14 
May 1900; Dundonald, pp. 157-158 
44 Leyds 724(c), Tel. no. 77, Meyer to Kruger, 14 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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prompting him to order Meyer to use his mounted men in counter-
attacks and at the same time to urge him not to lose faith. 45 
Apart from the Vryheid, Utrecht and Swaziland commandos under C. 
Botha, making for Doornberg with instructions to hold those 
hills, the other commandos headed for the Drakensberg. C. Botha's 
instructions were, to prevent the British from attacking the 
families in the Utrecht-Vryheid districts. 46 This could only be 
a temporary defensive measure. Having vacated the Biggarsberg 
line, the Vryheid-Utrecht districts were vulnerable to British 
incursion, from a number of points. Therefore instructions were 
issued that the families living in these districts be evacuated 
deeper into the Republic, to beyond Wakkerstroom. The Utrecht and 
Swaziland burghers retired via De Jager's Drift, while the Piet 
Retief and Vryheid commandos crossed at Landman's Drift. It is 
evident that some of the Johannesburgers also took the easterly 
route. For them it was the shortest route out of the British 
colony. On 17 May Chris Botha requested carts to be sent to 
assist them to move their laager. It would appear that the slower 
moving supply wagons may have chosen the shorter route, while the 
mounted men headed north. 47 
45 Ibid., Tel. no. 98, Kruger to Meyer, 14 May 1900, T.A. 
46 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 21, Meyer to L. Botha, 15 May 
1900, T.A. The issue concerning the possible movement of families 
further into the republic was a contentious one, and will be 
explored more fully in Chapter 4. 
47 Leyds 724(c), Tel. no. 51, Meyer to Cmdt Vryheid and Tel. 
no. 76, Meyer to Landdrost and Cmdt Vryheid, 14 May 1900; Leyds 
724(e), Tel. no. 10, C. Botha to Meyer, 16 May 1900; Leyds 
724(f), Tel. no. 111, C. Botha to Meyer, 17 May 1900, T.A. 
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Dundonald's pursuing cavalry surged through the deserted village 
of Helpmekaar and pushed on towards Dundee, over open, flat 
terrain. To slow the pursuit, the Boer rearguard set fire to the 
dry grass. The fire and dense swirling smoke complicated the 
cavalry's task. And then, about five kilometres north of 
Helpmekaar, they were suddenly fired upon from a rocky ridge next 
to the road. In an attempt to manoeuvre around both flanks, they 
spread out while the R.H.A. were brought into action in the 
centre. The flanking movements, combined with the frontal 
artillery barrage soon caused the burghers occupying the koppie 
to melt away, until the last remaining men discharged their 
Mausers as rapidly as possible and then galloped away with all 
possible speed. The action lasted a mere half an hour, but 
nevertheless was precious time gained for the men trying 
desperately to save the guns and supplies. Having broken the 
resistance, Dundonald' s men immediately gave chase once more, but 
were again hampered by the mass of grass fires the Boers had lit 
to cover their retreat. 48 
From Boer sources it is impossible to determine the strength of 
their rearguard force. What is clear is that it comprised a 
variety of uni ts. Members of the Pretoria and Boksburg commandos, 
Lynch and his Irish, as well as Ricchiardi and men under his 
command, were certainly present and it is probable that members 
of other commandos were also involved. The British officers 
48 Dundonald Papers, III, T.M., S.R.O. GD 233/158, Dundonald 
to Buller, 22 May 1900; Lynch, pp. 188-189; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 
32/855, S. D. Natal Army, 14 May 1900 and S. D. 3rd Mounted 
Brigade, 14 May 1900; Dundonald, p. 158. 
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estimated that they were confronted by 1 000 men, while 
Dundonald' s pursuing cavalry consisted of approximately 1 500 men 
and the six guns of the 49 R.H.A. The feebleness of the 
resistance suggests that the Boer force was smaller than 1 000 
men. Approximately three kilometres beyond the first point at 
which the Boers had resisted, they again attempted to check the 
pursuing cavalry. However, Dundonald's brigade, employing the 
same tactics they had previously, soon managed to dislodge the 
Boers and went plunging after them through the thick smoke and 
fire now enveloping the countryside. 50 
This time the retiring Boers covered some distance before making 
a third stand at Blesboklaagte, not far from Dundee at about 
1 6: 00. 51 The position they chose was powerful. They occupied 
the lower slopes of Endumeni hill, overlooking a deep ravine and 
were assisted by two or three high-velocity guns - possibly 
Creusots -which outranged the R.H.A. guns . 52 Dundonald 
despatched a force to work its way around the Boer right flank. 
Simultaneously some Natal Carbineers were instructed to cut the 
railway line just north of Glencoe. The flanking force made 
steady progress through broken terrain. Noticing this advance, 
the Boers withdrew. At about the same time Dundonald received the 
49 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 14 May 1900 
and S.D. 2nd Division, 14 May 1900; Lynch, pp. 188-189. 
SO FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 14 May 1900 
and S.D. 3rd Mounted Brigade, 14 May 1900; Dundonald, p. 158. 
51 Dundonald, p. 158; Amery, IV, p. 176. 
52 Knox, p. 251; 
Dundonald Papers, III, 
Buller, 22 May 1900. 
Maurice and Grant, III, 




following order from Buller: "Lord Dundonald you have done well. 
Scout across Blesboklaagte tomorrow, but do not press any advance 
as I wish to get niy infantry and supply up. . .. All is well. 1153 
Upon receipt of this order, Dundonald recalled his men and 
leaving only a strong picket in the area, retired to Meyer's farm 
some way back, 54 bringing a dramatic, eventful day to a close 
for the cavalry. They had covered 40 kilometres as the crow flies 
and must have been near exhaustion, as well as hungry, thirsty 
and begrimed from the fires they had ridden through. 
For the Boers, darkness brought a welcome respite from their 
pursuers. Under its cover they continued their retreat. Those 
holding the position at Blesboklaagte began to retire as soon as 
they noticed that their right flank was threatened, and headed 
eastwards towards the drifts over the Buffalo River. 55 Hundreds 
of burghers retiring from the Biggarsberg - whether mounted or 
on foot - made for Glencoe with their guns and supplies. Just how 
many there were, is impossible to establish, as it is unknown 
which commandos made for Glencoe. In all probability the Carolina 
and Lydenburg burghers took a more direct route to Newcastle. The 
mounted Carolina and Lydenburg burghers formed a rearguard, 
protecting the slower moving transport and those Natal families 
supporting the Boers, now wishing to withdraw from the colony. 
53 Dundonald, pp. 158-1 59; Dundonald Papers, 
S.R.O. GD 233/158, Lord Birdwood's letter to The 
November 1900 and Dundonald to' Buller, 22 May 1900. 
54 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 264. 
III, T.M., 
Times, 14 
55 Dundonald Papers, III, T.M., S.R.O. GD 233/158, Dundonald 
to Buller, 22 May 1900, Principal Events, IV, p.21. 
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Obviously those commandos ordered to make for Doornberg did not 
pass through Glencoe. None the less, Glencoe was for several 
hours thronged by a teeming, chaotic mass of humanity, horses, 
wagons and artillery. It must have been a time of great anxiety 
for officers and burghers, not knowing whether they would have 
sufficient time to make a successful getaway. Eventually ten 
train loads of unmounted burghers left Glencoe station, along 
with eleven or twelve guns. The mounted men and wagons travelled 
along the road. 56 The last train departed from Glencoe at about 
dawn on 15 May. 57 By swift action and because the pursuit was 
not pressed, they managed to extricate almost all their men, 
equipment and supplies from a difficult situation. 
This was achieved despite the chaos, disorder and considerable 
lack of discipline. But Lucas Meyer was a dispirited, concerned, 
angry man on 14 May. In a telegram to L. Botha he described how 
the Boers tried to check their pursuers, but lamented that when 
the first gun was fired the burghers fled. Such was the lack of 
discipline that the officers did not have the least control. 
Meyer feared the worst after the events he witnessed the previous 
day, and felt his men to be quite untrustworthy. 58 The Boers' 
lack of formal training and discipline became clearly evident 
under these circumstances, as they came under increasing 
56 Principal Events, IV, pp. 25. 
57 Amery, IV, p. 177; Roberts Papers XVIII, T.A., W.O. 
105/13, Buller to Roberts, 16 May 1900, p. 97; A 850 C.H.K., 
Diary of J.H. Janson, 25 May 1900, T.A.; Principal Events, IV, 
pp. 21 and 25; Penning, II, p. 740. 
58 Leyds, 724(d), Tel. no. 21, Meyer to L. Botha, 15 May 
1900, T.A.; Viljoen, p. 83; Lynch, p. 189. 
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pressure. Individual burghers did not know whether their 
colleagues would stand and fight and it is therefore not 
surprising that the rearguard failed to take a firm stand. Such 
an action required discipline and trust. 
While the pursuit was in progress on 14 May, Buller's infantry 
and artillery as well as Bethune's column, advanced and encamped 
in the region of Beith. The infantry was not engaged at any stage 
during the day. 59 At he same time Hildyard' s 11th Brigade 
departed from Jonono, heading in an easterly direction, in 
preparation for taking Wessel's Nek Station. 60 
At 06:00 on 15 May the entire British force on the Biggarsberg 
advanced towards Dundee. A Natal Carbineer patrol had entered the 
town during the night and reported that the Boers had vacated it. 
The last Boer train had in fact departed at 17:20 the previous 
afternoon. 61 Thus, at about 1O:00 the mounted men and Buller 
were able to enter the town unopposed. Two squadrons of the 
S.A.L.H. proceeded to Glencoe, where they hoped to link up with 
Hildyard's 5th Division, which was proceeding along the railway 
line and along Newcastle road from the south. The supply column 
59 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 2nd 
Division, 14 May 1900 and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 14 May 1900. 
60 ; FK 1 7 7 7 T . A . , W . 0 . 3 2 8 5 5 , S.D. 11th Brigade, 14 May 
1900, p. 25, T.A. 
61 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 2nd 
Brigade, 15 May 1900; Dundonald Papers, III, T.M., S.R.O. GD 
233/158, Dundonald to Buller, 22 May 1900. 
81 
only arrived on 1 6 May. 62 The British encampment was 
established on the Newcastle side of Dundee and for most men 16 
May was a much needed rest day. The force had been on the move 
continually for five days. During the rest day baggage columns 
stocked up with supplies from the supply column. 63 The 5th 
Division continued making steady progress from the south, 
reaching Wessel's Nek station without encountering any of the 
anticipated resistance. 64 
The British force was now firmly established on the Biggarsberg 
and the Boers, without putting up much of a struggle, had vacated 
very strong positions. However, the burghers were making for a 
formidable barrier, the Drakensberg, where they hoped to make 
their next stand. The orderliness and discipline displayed by the 
British forces at this stage was in sharp contrast to the chaos 
and confusion reigning among the burghers. In mitigation it is 
necessary to bear in mind that retaining order while retiring 
under pressure, especially for a force not noted for discipline, 
would be difficult. 
Buller has been criticised for not continuing his pursuit and 
thereby losing contact with the Boer rearguard. In losing contact 
with the rearguard, he allegedly also afforded the Boers 
62 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 3rd 
Mounted Brigade and S.D. 4th Brigade, 15 May 1900. 
63 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 3rd 
Mounted Brigade and S.D. 2nd Brigade, 15 May 1900. 
64 I d 1 s FK 1777 T.A., W.O. 32 855, S.D. 11th Briga e, May 
1900; Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for War, 24 May 1900, p. 83. 
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opportunity to destroy most culverts and bridges along the 
railway line. 65 It is necessary to evaluate this criticism and 
try to establish whether it would have been feasible to allow 
Dundonald's Mounted Brigade to continue tearing across the 
countryside. They had already outstripped the supply columns and 
if they were to continue their pursuit they would, within a day 
or two, have been forced to return for additional supplies. By 
pressing the pursuit they may of course have saved some of the 
culverts and bridges and may also have caused greater 
consternation among the retiring burghers and forced them to 
leave guns and supplies behind. All this lies in the realm of 
conjecture and does not detract from the fact that at some stage 
a halt had to be called to await supplies. 
During the pursuit and retreat which followed the Helpmekaar 
engagement, neither side suffered heavy losses. This was mainly 
because the burghers never made a determined and prolonged stand 
at any one position and because Dundonald failed to catch up with 
the slower moving elements of the retiring Boer force. Dundonald 
reported only five men wounded. Amery records total British 
casualties for the entire five days, from 11 May, as not having 
exceeded 2 5 . 66 
There are a number of references to Boer casualties, burghers 
taken prisoner and Natal rebels laying down arms. It is, however, 
65 Amery, IV, pp. 177-178. 
6 6 Ibid . , p . 1 7 7 ; FK 1 7 7 6 T . A . , W . 0 . 3 2 / 8 5 5 , S . D . 3rd 
Mounted Brigade, 15 May 1900. 
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impossible to reconcile the various references. Buller, in his 
report to the Secretary of State for War reported taking 4 7 
prisoners, several wagons and that a number of Natal rebels had 
laid down their arms. 67 While Dundonald reported capturing 25 
prisoners, wagons, many horses and oxen, 68 Meyer reported to 
Kruger on 15 May, when the situation was still in turmoil and 
when he was highly unlikely to have had an accurate record of 
events, that on the previous day a few burghers were wounded and 
three Boksburgers taken prisoner. 69 Penning refers to some men 
' being killed and Schikkerling describes numerous burghers being 
wounded. 70 
Clearly the price the Boers paid in terms of casualties was low. 
But they gave up splendid positions and their morale too, took 
a severe beating. To prevent a rout, which would permit the 
British forces easy access onto the highveld, was going to 
require some effective leadership from Meyer, to instill the 
necessary resolve in his burghers to make a new stand against 
Buller's massive force. Only time would tell whether this could 
be achieved. 
67 Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for war, 24 May 1900, p. 
83. 
68 Dundonald Papers, III, T.M., S.R.0. GD 233/158, Dundonald 
to Buller, 22 May 1900. 
69 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 29, Meyer to Kruger, 15 May 1900, 
T.A .. 
70 Penning, II, p. 740; R.W. Schikkerling, Commando 
Courageous, p. 15. 
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Chapter 4. 'JUST SPARRING' 
The Boer retreat from the Biggarsberg continued unabated on 15 
May, although the British pursuit was effectively broken off the 
previous evening. The retreat, as previously noted, took two 
general directions, namely northwards to Newcastle and beyond and 
eastwards to the drifts over the Buffalo River. 1 Apart from the 
Vryheid, Utrecht, Swaziland and Piet Retief burghers who headed 
east, the rest moved northwards. 
The burghers who retreated north, generally travelled either by 
train or on horseback. Many of their supplies were brought out 
on ox wagons. The men heading east, were mostly mounted. An 
unspecified number of Natalians fighting with the Boer forces and 
still remaining with them at this stage, decided to take their 
families, livestock and whatever goods they could, with them. 
Long rows of carts and wagons carrying the women and children 
were to be seen heading towards Lang's Nek. 2 It was a sad time 
for these families. 
The chaos and disorder that set in among the Boers on 14 May, and 
continuing on the following day, caused Lucas Meyer and his 
officers considerable anxiety. Meyer in fact feared that the 
retreat would turn into a complete rout, 3 prompting him to 
report dejectedly on 16 May to his President, "Ik jaag rond om 
See Chapter 3. 
2 Viljoen, p. 83; Leyds 724(e), Tel. no. 62, Meyer to Cmdt-
Gen, 16 May 1900, T.A .. 
3 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 21, Meyer to L. Botha and Tel. no. 
79, Viljoen to Kruger, 15 May 1900, T.A .. 
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de menschen te keeren. Het is byna onmogelyk. Zy ryden in alle 
richtingen, waarschynlyk huistoe. Geliewe al le Landdrosten kennis 
te geven hen dadelyk terug te zenden. 114 Clearly, with the 
decision to vacate the Biggarsberg and the coinciding British 
success at Helpmekaar, Boer difficulties were compounded. The 
tone and content of Meyer's telegram suggest a loss of control 
and even panic. This may explain Ben Viljoen's apparent lack of 
confidence in his commanding officer when, on arrival at 
Charlestown it was Kruger rather than Meyer whom he contacted to 
describe the prevailing great disorder and to request guidance 
from the President on what to do next. 5 
Kruger had made his views quite clear as to the strategy to be 
employed in Natal, having already implored Meyer to urge the 
burghers to stand and fight, if they wished to retain their 
independence. At the same time Kruger had alleged that it was not 
so much the burghers but the officers who were responsible for 
resistance melting away in the face of the pursuit, pointing out 
that in the Free State, despite poor Boer positions and their 
numbers being so small by comparison, they had none the less 
managed to resist the British. 6 Erasmus refuted Kruger's 
allegation, maintaining he was unaware of any burgher having 
complained about an officer. Significantly, on that same day 
Field-Cornet Dercksen reported to Kruger that the Boers could 
T.A. 
T.A. 
4 Leyds 724(e), Tel. no. 31, Meyer to Kruger, 16 May 1900, 
5 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 79, Viljoen to Kruger, 15 May 1900, 
6 Ibid., Tel. no. 57, Kruger to Meyer, 15 May 1900, T.A. 
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have struck a telling blow against the British force, had the 
officers not fled with the burghers. He believed it would be 
necessary for Kruger to address the men personally, to lift their 
morale. 7 As errors were committed under pressure, fingers were 
pointed to find suitable scapegoats. Before according any blame 
however, it is necessary to take the whole Boer method of 
fighting, or lack thereof, into consideration. Did the Boers have 
the necessary inbuilt discipline and order which these difficult 
and extraordinary times demanded? 
It is evident that during 16 May the immediate Boer panic and 
attendant disarray began abating. Erasmus and Meyer had reported 
that burghers were beginning to take up positions in the Lang's 
Nek area. At the same time some mounted men had formed a 
rearguard, to cover slow moving transport, some of which 
comprised wagons of the Carolina and Lydenburg commandos. 8 
Once most of the commandos had reached the Lang's Nek area on 17 
May, a council-of-war was held at which it was decided to hold 
the Drakensberg line. 9 The Boers now occupied the same positions 
they had held and defended with such success during the First 
Anglo-Boer War of 1880-1881 . Their positions were extremely 
powerful, but at the same time there were certain disadvantages 
7 Leyds 724(e). Tel. no. 83, Erasmus to Kruger and Tel. no. 
93, Dercksen to Kruger, 16 May 1900, T.A. 
8 Ibid., Tel. no. 62, Meyer to Cmdt-Gen and Tel. no. 83, 
Erasmus to Kruger, 16 May 1900, T.A. 
9 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 67, Cooper to H.T.D., 17 May 1900, 
T.A.; Viljoen, p. 84. 
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they would have had to contend with, one of which was the 
tremendous length of the line. The Drakensberg positions they 
held in this north-western corner of Natal, towered high above 
the colony and could only be crossed at a few points. The 
Drakensberg stretches from south to north. At Volksrust a range 
of hills emerges from the Drakensberg, stretching in an east 
south-easterly direction to just beyond Vryheid. Similar to the 
Biggarsberg, this range has a limited number of crossing points. 
The situation that now confronted Buller was very similar, in 
many respects, to the one when the Boers held the Biggarsberg. 
One advantage Buller had however, concerning the Boer positions, 
was hindsight - gained by the misfortunes of General Colley in 
1881 and other British reverses suffered in the area at that 
time. Once the Boers had decided to hold that portion of the 
Drakensberg in north-western Natal, as well as the hills 
stretching easterly towards Vryheid, commandos were allocated 
various positions. The heaviest concentrations of men were again 
in and around the passes. 
The extreme right flank, comprising the Carolina and Lydenburg 
commandos commanded by Assistant General J.C. Fourie, was to 
occupy positions from Botha's Pass to Langkrans, 10 but shortly 
after their arrival there, they were ordered to hold Muller's 
Pass as well. Fourie was thus responsible for a line encompassing 
three passes, some 45 kilometres long as the crow flies, which 
10 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 99, Meyer to L. Botha, 17 May 
1900; A 850 C.H.K., Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 5 (no date) 
and Diary of J.H. Janson, 2 June 1900, T.A. 
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would take a good four and a half hours to span on horseback. 
With his mere 600 mounted men and another 300 on foot, 11 it is 
not surprising that he soon requested reinforcements from Meyer 
whom, he had been led to believe, had a surplus of burghers in 
the Lang's Nek area. By 25 May no reinforcements had arrived, so 
a token force of only 25 burghers was ordered to hold Muller's 
Pass. There, this force apparently made contact with the Orange 
Free State burghers, who held positions mainly further south. 12 
The central sector was under the command of Assistant General 
Erasmus. It stretched from Langkrans to the Buffalo River and was 
occupied form Langkrans to the tunnel at Lang's Nek, by Dercksen 
and the Boksburg commando; and from the tunnel to the Buffalo 
River by the Johannesburg and Soutpansberg commandos. The portion 
further east to Moolman' s Nek was guarded by the Middelburg 
commando, while a small force comprising the Irish No.2 Brigade, 
German and Italian Corps, was fitted in where required. Erasmus 
also reported the presence of Pretoria and Krugersdorp burghers 
at Lang's Nek. 13 
It is extremely difficult to determine the exact strength of the 
Boer force in the central sector. On 17 May the Krugersdorp and 
11 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 99, Meyer to L. Botha, 17 May 
1900; Leyds 725(b), Tel. no. 74, Steyn to Kruger and Tel. no. 80, 
Meyer to Kruger, 19 May 1900; Leyds 726(a), Tel. no. 9, Fourie 
to L. Botha, 25 May 1900, T.A. 
12 Leyds 726(a). Tel. no. 9, Fourie to Botha, 25 May 1900; 
A 850, C.H.K., Diary of J.H. Janson, 2 June 1900, T.A. 
13 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 99, Meyer to L. Botha and Tel. no. 
107, Erasmus to Kruger, 17 May 1900, T.A.; Viljoen, pp. 84-85; 
C.H. Muller, Oorlogsherinneringe, p. 65. 
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Soutpansberg commandos together totalled 700 men, while Meyer 
maintained there were approximately 2 000 burghers at Lang's 
Nek. 14 Precisely which area he meant by the Lang's Nek position 
is not clear, but it appears not to have included Botha's Pass 
or Moolman' Nek. Even then that figure would appear to be 
somewhat low. In early June the Pretoria commando alone 
reportedly consisted of 1 000 burghers, and that after about 500 
of them had deserted. 15 It is therefore probable that this 
central sector was held by between 3 500 and 4 000 men by 20 May, 
or soon thereafter. Once positions were allocated, entrenching 
commenced. 16 Erasmus's men were generally holding very powerful 
positions, but the long defensive line was a serious handicap and 
would give the British a number of feasible options by which to 
pierce it. 
Although conditions along the Drakensberg and just east towards 
Wakkerstroom stabilised, there still existed a crisis in the 
Utrecht and Vryheid districts. Once the Boers vacated the 
Biggarsberg, these districts became extremely vulnerable to 
British invasion. Chris Botha, in command of the Vryheid, 
Swaziland, Utrecht and Piet Retief burghers, reported having 
14 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 107, Erasmus to Kruger, 17 May 
1900; Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 20, Meyer to Kruger, 20 May 1900, 
T.A. 
15 Leyds 726(e), Tel. no. 7, C. Botha to Kruger, 5 June 
1900, T.A. It is improbable that Meyer's undefined position of 
Lang's Nek included Botha's Pass and Moolman's Nek, as the former 
was held by approximately 1 200 Lydenburgers and Carolina men and 
Moolman's Nek by approximately 500 Middelburg burghers. If these 
positions were included, it would leave him with only about 300 
men at Lang's Nek itself. 
16 Schikkerling, p. 16. 
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between 300 and 400 men to guard all the drifts from Rorke's 
Drift to Wool's Drift and beyond. This was an impossible task. 
Quite evidently, a large number of burghers of his four commandos 
were no longer on duty. He made it clear that were the British 
to advance on Vryheid and Utrecht, he would be unable to repulse 
them and therefore requested reinforcements. 17 At the same time 
he ordered his officers to call up all men liable for duty. 
Another problem hampering Botha's men was the weakness of their 
horses. Recent long rides led to their emaciation and this was 
compounded by the fact that the nutritional value of the veld had 
rapidly diminished during the cooler months. Many Piet Retiefers 
went home, because of their horses' poor condition. 18 
Numerous burghers no longer with their commandos in the Vryheid-
Utrecht districts, had in fact gone to the assistance of their 
women and children who were packing up, with the intention of 
withdrawing deeper into the Republic, away from the advancing 
British menace. The whole issue of what to do with the civilians 
in these districts caused considerable disagreement within the 
Boer leadership. 19 Kruger initially made it clear that he 
17 Leyds 724(e), Tel. nos. 10 and 117, C. Botha to Meyer, 16 
May 1900, T.A. 
18 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 111, C. Botha to Meyer, 17 May 
1900, T.A. Botha did not specify how many Piet Retiefers were 
absent. 
19 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 6, C. Botha to Meyer, 17 May 1900, 
T.A. Again, Botha did not specify what percentage or number of 
burghers was absent. He was probably in no position to do so. The 
situation had become very fluid and circumstances were changing 
daily. 
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wished to see the civilians moving deeper into the Republic. 20 
To begin with no action was taken. It would appear that this was 
due to the British offensive coming to a halt in March and also 
because of the logistical difficulties experienced. Sometime 
later, in May, Louis Botha opposed his government on this issue, 
urging the Landdrosts of Utrecht and Vryheid to persuade the 
families to stay on their farms, as fleeing only caused 
misery. 21 Despite this, Chris Botha was adamant the families 
should move, maintaining that if they remained, the burghers 
would refuse to remain with their commandos, preferring to 
protect their families instead. 22 But Meyer correctly pointed 
out the futility of men remaining behind, as they would be taken 
prisoner as soon as the British arrived. 23 It was also pointed 
out, that those families who had remained behind in the Orange 
Free State, were not being ill treated. Logic therefore dictated 
that the men should remain with their commandos. When personal 
property and one's families are at stake, cold logic however 
seldom holds sway, as evidenced in this case, with the majority 
of men going to the aid of their women and children. A further 
complication was a shortage of black labour to assist with moving 
20 Leyds 724(c), Tel. no. 51, Meyer to Cmdt Vryheid, 14 May 
1900, T.A.; Spies, p. 38. 
21 Leyds 725(b), Tel. no. 48, L. Botha to Landdrosts Utrecht 
and Vryheid, 19 May 1900, T.A. 
22 Leyds 725 ( c), Tel. no. 10, C. Botha to Meyer, 20 May 
1900, T.A. 
23 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 28, Meyer to C. Botha, 20 May 
1900, T.A. 
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and a lack of transport for the poorer families. 24 Despite all 
this, some families did move, but at the same time confusion 
continued over what would happen because of the government's and 
Louis Botha's conflicting instructions. Furthermore, people were 
unsure of the safest route to follow. 25 Kruger did eventually 
concur with Louis Botha on the issue of families. The government 
consequently issued a special bulletin on 21 May, stating that, 
where families remained on their farms which fell into British 
hands, they would not be molested by the enemy. Where, however, 
the women folk fled, their property was destroyed. None the less, 
cattle, horses and forage were taken by the troops and persons 
capable of military service were made prisoners of war. 26 By 
implication therefore, families were now being encouraged to 
remain on their property. 
One way or another the Boers were extremely busy, as the British 
had been in the days succeeding the battle of Helpmekaar. Once 
Buller established himself beyond the Biggarsberg, he set about 
consolidating his position by pressing ahead, bringing north more 
of his force and repairing the badly damaged railway line - all 
necessary preparations for launching his next concerted 
offensive. 
24 Leyds 724(f), Tel. nos. 6 and 111, C. Botha to Meyer, 17 
May 1900, T.A. 
25 Leyds 726(a), Tel. no. 60, Cmdt Vryheid to C. Botha, 26 
May 1900; Leyds 726 ( b), Tel. no. 50, Asst-Gen Grabler to C. 
Botha, 27 May 1900, T.A. 
26 Spies, p. 40. 
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The advance column, which spent a day replenishing provisions in 
Dundee, continued apace on 1 7 May, the main body reaching 
Dannhauser and some of the mounted men entering Newcastle. 27 
The following day Buller, with the rest of Dundonald's men and 
Clery' s infantry, entered a virtually deserted Newcastle, as 
there were only about 80 adults left. 28 That afternoon he 
reported optimistically to Roberts that the Boers were utterly 
demoralised and were not likely to make a stand this side of 
Heidelberg. Indeed so hopeful was Buller, that he promised to 
have men in Standerton on 30 May, provided he could repair the 
railway line in time. 29 
Consequently, the next morning Dundonald's 3rd Brigade, followed 
by infantry and artillery, were despatched towards Lang's Nek 
with instructions to reconnoitre the area. 30 The Ngogo River 
was crossed without incident. Advancing just west of Mount 
Prospect, they headed for Lang' s Nek. On the way, some Boer 
stragglers were taken prisoner and wagons and rifles 
captured. 31 The leading scouts advanced to within about 2, 5 
kilometres of Lang's Nek. It became clear that the position was 
in fact strongly held and therefore two guns of the R.H.A. 
battery were brought into action at the extreme range of 4 
27 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 265. 
28 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 18 May 1900. 
29 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Report by Buller 
to Roberts, 24 May 1900. 
30 / d 19 1900 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32 855, S.D. 3 Cav. Be., May . 
31 Birdwood, p. 111; Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 
105/13, Tel. no. 255, Buller to Roberts, 18 May 1900. 
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kilometres. 32 
Once Buller realized that the Nek was so well held, he ordered 
Dundonald to retire. 33 Apart from his usual caution which 
probably prompted this command, the fact that he was in no 
position to support Dundonald adequately should he manage to 
cross the Drakensberg, no doubt also influenced him in reaching 
his decision. The commencement of the retreat was the moment for 
which Erasmus had waited. He had had an uninterrupted view of the 
entire movement from his lofty eyrie somewhere in the mountains. 
As the British withdrawal began, he launched 400 burghers, held 
in readiness behind Majuba, at the retiring force, in an effort 
to cut off part of Dundonald's men and possibly their guns. Half 
the Boers went around the west of the hill and the others around 
the east of it. But Dundonald, anticipating the possibility of 
such a manoeuvre, successfully held off the Boer counter-attack 
with reserves, previously held out of view on either flank. 
Consequently, he managed to withdraw successfully to the Ngogo 
River, where the cavalry along with the 4th Brigade encamped. 34 
The cavalry and infantry, supported by two 4. 7" and two 12 
pounder naval guns, were to remain in this area until early June. 
The cavalry held a line of outposts from Coetzee's Drift, to the 
32 I FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32 855, S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 19 May 1900. 
33 ; Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105 13, Tel. no. 611, 
Buller to Roberts, 19 May 1900. 
34 Leyds 7 25 ( b), Tel. no. 88, Erasmus to Kruger, 19 May 
1900, T.A.; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal Army and S.D. 
3 Cav. Bde., 19 May 1900; Dundonald Papers, V, T.M., S.R.O. GD 
233/128, Report by a Military Correspondent. 
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southern spurs of Majuba, near O'Neil's Cottage. Manning of this 
outpost line alternated between the S.A.L.H., Volunteer Composite 
Regiment (V.C.R.) and T.M.I. from 20 to 26 May. On 27 May the 
S.A.L.H. was ordered to Newcastle, where they were to join a 
force to advance on Utrecht. That left the T.M.I. and V.C.R. to 
share manning the outpost line. Occasional fire was exchanged 
with Boers approaching the outposts. On 24 May about 150 burghers 
advanced against the western-most picket, with the apparent 
intention of trying to cut it off. They were however driven off, 
with the aid of reinforcements hurried out to assist. On 28 May 
the 4th Brigade, with its four naval guns, moved further north 
to occupy a position from Nkwelo on its left to the Newcastle-
Lang' s Nek road on its right. 35 The infantry and cavalry in 
this area acted as a shield, behind which Buller was able to 
prepare himself for the next offensive. 
The presence of this British force concerned Meyer and led him 
to believe that an attack was imminent. His lines were long and 
thinly held, prompting him to request reinforcements from C. 
Botha on the left flank. 36 This request was made despite 
Botha's earlier plea for assistance. There were simply no longer 
enough burghers to fulfil all the needs. 
Meyer need not have concerned himself about a possible attack, 
for Buller had decided to consolidate his position before pushing 
35 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 3 Cav. Bde., 20-31 May 
1900 and S.D. 4th Bde., 20-31 May 1900. 
36 Leyds 725 (c), Tel. no. 20, Meyer to Kruger and Tel. no. 
22, Meyer to C. Botha, 20 May 1900, T.A. 
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on. In the knowledge that considerable effort would be required 
to advance beyond the Drakensberg, Buller halted for a while in 
order to repair the railway line, build up supplies and bring all 
his forces to Newcastle and beyond. 37 This would permit the 
Boers more time to select their positions carefully and entrench 
more effectively. Buller had little choice but to follow the 
course he did, logistics dictating what was feasible at this 
stage. 
Buller' s 5th Di vision, which had held a pivotal position on 
Jonono's Kop and KwaSondoda while the advance on Helpmekaar was 
in progress, also headed northwards from 15 May. They proceeded 
via Wessel' s Nek to Glencoe and Hattingh Spruit. From these 
encampments they assisted with the repairs to the railway line, 
which the Boers had extensively damaged every bridge and 
culvert having been blown up. Between Wasbank station and Glencoe 
Junction alone, 26 bridges and culverts were destroyed and 
similar damage was caused all along the way. From 18 to 25 May 
elements of the 5th Division laboured long and hard to make the 
line operational again. 38 On 28 May the line was fully restored 
to Newcastle, by which time the 5th Division had arrived in the 
town. The Division advanced from Hattingh Spruit via Dannhauser 
and Ngagane. 39 While the 5th Division repaired the rail line 
37 Amery, IV, p. 180; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 265. 
38 Burne, p. 61; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 265; Roberts 
Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 256, Buller to Roberts, 
20 May 1900. 
39 Roberts Papers, T.A. VII, W.O. 105/8, Buller to Sec for 
War, 19 May 1900; FK 1777 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. 10th Bde., 19 
to 27 May 1900. 
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their transport assisted in building up supplies in 
Newcastle. 40 
Lyttelton's 4th Division, encamped near the Sunday's River by 22 
May, was ordered to advance north via Mkupe Pass. This Division, 
comprising soldiers who had defended Ladysmith, was still 
recovering from the rigours of the siege and had thus far been 
spared any arduous work. 41 
In contrast to the slow but steady and smooth consolidation of 
the British position in and around Newcastle, a reverse was 
suffered on the right flank. There Bethune's column, operating 
as a detached force, crossed the Buffalo River at Vant's Drift 
on 17 May, making a reassuring show of force, prior to the re-
establishment of a magistracy at the isolated little town Nqutu 
in Zululand. Two days later Bethune was ordered to return from 
Nqutu to Newcastle.42 
The following day, Bethune, heading a column of 356 men and two 
Hotchkiss guns, and assisted by Zulu guides, left Nqutu for 
Newcastle. Other Zulus reported Vryheid to be virtually deserted 
but full of stores. This seemed too good an opportunity to be 
missed and appears to have persuaded Bethune to make a detour via 
the town. The supply column however, was ordered to head for 
40 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 265. 
41 Lyttelton, p. 234; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. Natal 
Army, 22 May 1900. 




Newcastle via Dundee - a shorter route. Bethune decided they 
would take on a day's supply at Vryheid. This was an indication 
that he anticipated success. By 14:15 the Blood River was 
reached. 43 
There Bethune was informed that a Boer commando had the previous 
day moved from De Jager's Drift to about nine kilometres south 
of Vryheid, at Scheeper's Nek, where they were then laagered. 44 
They therefore blocked his direct route into Vryheid. Undeterred, 
he decided to attack. In subsequent reports he gave different 
reasons for this decision. In his first report he wrote: "As they 
were chiefly Natal rebels I made up my mind to attack them; they 
had no guns." 45 In a later report he wrote: "Decided to attack 
them as they had wagons. 1146 Bethune gives no indication of why 
he believed the force before him consisted only of Natal rebels. 
Leading Bethune' s column was Captain Goff's squadron with a 
Hotchkiss gun, followed by that of Captain Ford. Bringing up the 
rear was Bethune with three squadrons and the other Hotchkiss 
gun. Goff made off at a great pace and was twice ordered to slow 
down as the rest were having difficulty in keeping up with his 
43 Roberts Papers, T.A. v, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900 and T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. 
no. 0628, Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
44 Roberts Papers, T.A. v, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900, p. 57 and T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, 
Tel. no. 0628, Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
45 Roberts Papers, T.A. V, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900. 
46 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 0628, 
Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
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squadron. As they approached a koppie at Scheepers' Nek just 
south of Vryheid, Lieutenant Lanham warned Goff that it was 
occupied by Boers, but he continued undeterred and actually rode 
past the first line of burghers.47 
The Boers encamped south of Vryheid, at Scheepers' Nek, were in 
fact not Natal rebels but approximately 80 members of the 
Swaziland commando under leadership of Acting Commandant 
Blignaut. 48 That afternoon the Swazi landers gathered near a 
spring to attend a church service conducted by Dominee E.C. 
Anderssen. During the service burghers positioned on a nearby 
koppie suddenly shouted a warning, having noticed the advancing 
Goff and his men. This brought a prompt end to the service, with 
the burghers rushing off to take up their positions. 49 
As the impetuous Goff entered a nek, he was suddenly fired upon 
at short range from the stony koppies to the east and the two 
farm houses to the west. Goff's men, who did not have their 
horses shot from beneath them, quickly dismounted and tried to 
seek shelter in a donga. At the same time a maxim gun was brought 
into action. From their good positions the Swazilanders made life 
extremely difficult for these men. 50 
47 Roberts Papers, T.A. V, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900. 
48 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 48, Landdrost Vryheid to L. Botha, 
20 May 1900, T.A.; Penning, II, p.745. 
49 E.C. Anderssen, Die Verlede Herleef, p. 33. 
so Amery, IV, pp. 1 80-1 81 ; Roberts Papers, T. A. V, W. 0. 
105/8, Bethune to Chief of Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900. 
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Ford's squadron gallantly went to the assistance of the reckless 
Goff, having to endure a galling fire and finding a fence which 
impeded them from extending properly. The fire from the koppies 
on the east caused Ford's squadron to wheel right and form up at 
right angles to the original route of advance. This was the 
dismal scene that greeted Bethune on his arrival. With darkness 
approaching, he realized that the only option was to attempt to 
withdraw the engaged squadrons. Additional squadrons were 
employed on either flank to cover Ford's withdrawal, while the 
Hotchkiss guns were brought into action against the koppies to 
the east. Less than an hour after the action commenced it was 
over. Bethune, despite Goff's impetuosity and the difficult 
circumstances, managed to extricate most of his men. 51 
That evening the Boers noticed the British retiring towards 
Doornberg. They had successfully repulsed Bethune's force at very 
little cost to themselves, casualties amounting to only one 
killed and one wounded. 52 These were also the figures given to 
the British soldiers by Boer doctors. Bethune maintained he 
personally knew of ten Boers killed. This was probably an 
exaggeration in an effort to detract from what was an unfortunate 
and costly experience. 53 British casualties on the other hand, 
51 Roberts Papers, T.A. v, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900 and T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. 
no. 0628, Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
52 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 63, Landdrost Vryheid to Kruger, 
20 May 1900, T.A. 
53 Ibid., Tel. no. 63, Landdrost Vryheid to Kruger, 20 May 
1900; Roberts Papers, T.A. V, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900. 
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were significantly higher. In Bethune' s report to Buller he 
listed these as 18 killed, 23 wounded and 18 prisoners, along 
with the loss of Goff's maxim gun.s 4 Amery, by contrast, lists 
the casualties as 30 killed, 30 wounded and six prisoners, as 
well as the loss of Goff's maxim gun. Casualty figures supplied 
by C. Botha were 27 killed, 25 wounded and 11 prisoners, while 
Blignaut reported 105 killed and wounded and 13 prisoners.SS It 
is impossible to establish which, if any, are the correct 
figures. It is probable that Bethune's figures are on the low 
side, for he reported that only nine of Goff's squadron returned. 
It is probable that some of Ford's men were killed and wounded, 
therefore making for a figure of slightly more than the 59 men 
listed by Bethune.S6 What is significant, is the high 
proportion of killed to wounded, suggesting that Goff was in very 
close contact with the Boers. 
Although the Boers had repulsed the British force and inflicted 
significant losses, they fully expected them to renew their 
attack the following morning.s 7 The next day, buoyed by 
success, the Boers turned out in significant numbers and high 
spirits, riding out to Scheepers' Nek. But no British were to be 
s 4 Roberts Papers, T.A. V, W.O. 105/8, Bethune to Chief of 
Staff Newcastle, 21 May 1900. 
SS Amery, IV, p. 181; Leyds 725(e), Tel. no. 61, C. Botha to 
Meyer, 22 May 1900; Leyds 725(f), Tel. no. 22, Act Cmdt Blignaut 
to Kruger, 23 May 1900, T.A. 
S6 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 0628, 
Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
s 7 Leyds 725 (c), Tel. no. 63, Landdrost Vryheid to Kruger, 
20 May 1900, T.A. 
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seen. 58 Bethune, having cut himself off from his supply train, 
anticipating being able to stock up in Vryheid, was forced to 
fall back on Nqutu to obtain supplies. From there he returned to 
Newcastle via Dundee.59 
Bethune' s otherwise excellent record was now blemished. In a 
telegram to Roberts, the considerate Buller, although of 
necessity critical of Bethune, acknowledged the positive 
contribution he had made stating: " ... but it is due to him to say 
that he has always done his work remarkably well. 1160 In partial 
mitigation of Bethune for this setback, it needs to be considered 
that it was Goff's rash action which led to the column's 
misfortune. Therefore the greatest direct responsibility for this 
reverse surely lies with Goff. Nonetheless, with reports of Boers 
in the neighbourhood being received, one would have expected 
Bethune to keep his column on a tighter rein and not have it 
extended as it was. After all, the column numbered less than 400 
men and had no baggage train to hold it back, making it easier 
for everyone to move at much the same pace. The Boers obviously 
kept cool heads and for once allowed a larger force than 
themselves to ride right into an ambush. By holding their fire 
they were able to reap the success they did. 
It was now quite evident to Buller that he needed to take 
58 Leyds 725(d), Tel. no. 34, Landdrost Vryheid to L. Botha, 
21 May 1900, T.A. 
59 Amery, IV, p. 181. 
60 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 0620, 
Buller to Roberts, 22 May 1900. 
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positive, successful action in order to secure his right flank. 
In addition he had to decide on the strategy and route to be 
followed once sufficient supplies were built up, the railroad 
repaired and his force in position in and around Newcastle. 
This latter issue was the subject of regular and protracted 
communication between Buller and Roberts during the later part 
of May. Roberts was making steady progress towards the Transvaal 
and, in consequence, urged Buller on 15 May to make his way over 
the Drakensberg passes west of Newcastle towards Vrede, as this 
would assist his right flank. 61 Two days later Roberts informed 
Buller that once he was in the Transvaal he intended making Natal 
his base, thus gaining control of the entire railway line and the 
Lang's Nek tunnel would be especially important. 62 On 23 May 
Roberts reiterated his plea for the occupation of Vrede, 
especially as the only Orange Free State opposition at that stage 
was emanating from the north-east corner of the country. 63 
Typically, Buller was reluctant to commit himself and take 
decisions, oscillating between various plans of action. 
Initially, as noted above, he attempted to force his way over 
Lang's Nek but found it strongly held. Once he knew this, as well 
as the fact that Botha's Pass and Moll's Nek were held, it was 
obvious to him that either route would be difficult. 64 On 24 
61 Ibid. I Tel. no. 1 61 5 I Roberts to Buller, 1 5 May 1900. 
62 Ibid., Tel. no. 1 660' Roberts to Buller, 1 7 May 1900. 
63 Ibid. I Tel. no. 1772, Roberts to Buller, 23 May 1900. 
64 Ibid., Tel. no. 258, Buller to Roberts, 23 May 1900. 
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May he made it clear to Roberts that he considered it risky to 
despatch a division to Vrede, especially as his communications 
were threatened from both flanks and he claimed that Roberts's 
Orange Free State advance increased rather than reduced the 
pressure on him. 65 Two days later Buller informed Roberts that 
he was confronted by 10 000 men in very strong positions and 
consequently requested that a division be sent to the head of 
Muller's Pass to assist him. 66 On the same day Roberts informed 
Buller there was no need to take undue risks, as he was in the 
process of crossing the Vaal River and would, with the 8th 
Division, occupy all principal centres in the north-eastern 
Orange Free State, including Vrede. 67 
On 27 May Buller suddenly swung into action. Orders were issued 
for a total force of between 8 000 and 9 000 men consisting of 
cavalry, infantry and supported by artillery, to make for Utrecht 
and the Doornberg, where Buller believed he would have to contend 
with about 1 500 burghers. The 11th Brigade (Hildyard's 
Division), supported by between 400 and 500 of the 3rd Mounted 
Brigade, 2 field batteries and four 12 pounders, was to advance 
on Utrecht via Wool's Drift and clear the country of any Boers 
south of the town. Simultaneously, the 8th Brigade (Lyttelton's 
Di vision), in which the Gordon Highlanders replaced the King 
Royal Rifles, with the 18th Hussars, two field gun batteries, one 
howitzer battery, two 12 pounders and one Vickers Maxim gun, was 
65 Ibid., Tel. no. 259, Buller to Roberts, 24 May 1900. 
66 Ibid., Tel. no. 260, Buller to Roberts, 26 May 1900. 
67 Ibid. , Tel. no. 1807, Roberts to Buller, 26 May 1900. 
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to clear the Doornberg area by advancing via Cattle Drift. 68 By 
mobilizing such a large force, Buller was obviously not leaving 
anything to chance after one bad experience on the right flank. 
This action was aimed at securing the right flank, ascertaining 
the feelings of the Utrecht inhabitants and misleading the 
defenders at Lang's Nek.69 
On 28 May the two columns advanced on their designated 
objectives. As the British approached Utrecht, most of the 
burghers withdrew from the town, heading north-east onto the 
Balelasberg. There is no evidence as to how many burghers 
withdrew. After negotiations, the Utrecht landdrost, Scheffer, 
formally surrendered the town to Hildyard on 31 May. Major D. 
Henderson then entered the town and read out a proclamation which 
stated that, if South African Republic citizens gave up their 
arms and ammunition and agreed not to commit hostile acts against 
the British forces, they would be permitted to go free. After 
hearing this proclamation 40 burghers surrendered their arms. 
Lyttelton too encountered no resistance, and on 31 May reported 
the Doornberg clear of Boers. 70 
On 2 June both columns began returning to Natal and the Boers re-
68 Ibid., Tel. no. 263, Buller to Roberts, 27 May 1900; FK 
1777 T.A., Orders for attack by Lyttelton and Hildyard, 27 and 
28 May 1900; Amery, IV, p. 183; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 267. 
69 Cd. 1 791, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal 
Commission on the War in South Africa, p. 185. 
7° FK 1776 T.A., S.D. Natal Army, 28-31 May 1900; Maurice 
and Grant, III, p. 267; A.H.C. Kearsey, War Record of the York 
and Lancaster Regiment, p. 69. 
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occupied Utrecht. Other than possibly undermining Boer morale and 
casting some doubt as to future British strategy, the exercise 
was futile, because the right flank remained as exposed as 
ever. 71 But even so, Buller's task of reaching the highveld was 
made easier with each passing day by Roberts's steady successes 
to the west. 
71 Amery, IV, p. 183; Burne, p. 65; Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 
31, C. Botha to L. Botha and Tel. no. 43 Gen Steenkamp to C. 
Botha, 2 June 1900, T.A. 
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Chapter 5. 'LULL BEFORE THE STORM' 
Growing threats to Boer independence and ever increasing British 
military pressures, had a variety of repercussions in the latter 
part of May and early June 1900. One of these saw Kruger becoming 
more directly and intimately involved in military matters on the 
Natal front. 
Kruger intervened regarding Meyer's intended occupation of 
Majuba. He wanted a gun placed on the hill. Meyer, however, 
pointed out that unless one had a great deal of time first of all 
to build a road, this would be impossible. The President was so 
upset by Meyer's reply that he requested him immediately to place 
two Nordenfeldt's and if possible, another gun on the hill as 
well. He maintained that as there were so many burghers, the guns 
could be dismantled and carried up. He regarded this matter as 
urgent, for he believed the loss of Majuba would also result in 
the loss of Lang's Nek. Simultaneously, Kruger wondered whether 
a large gun should not be placed on Moll's Kop (Phokweni). 1 
Meyer however remained unconvinced, insisting that it was 
impossible to place guns on Majuba or a Long Torn (155rnrn Creusot) 
on Phokweni, as the latter would take four or five days to get 
there and the British were not likely to grant them that much 
tirne. 2 Despite Meyer's firm resistance to his President's 
proposals, the disagreement between himself and Kruger continued. 
Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 20, Meyer to Kruger and Tel. nos. 
38 and 40, Kruger to Meyer, 20 May 1900, T.A. 
2 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 42, Meyer to Kruger, 20 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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Kruger then ordered a Nordenf eldt to be dismantled and placed on 
Majuba, which in any case was to be occupied, as the rail line 
passed so close to it. Furthermore, he informed Meyer that a Long 
Tom was already en route to Volksrust, for emplacement on 
Phokweni. 3 
Despite continued pressure from Kruger, Meyer insisted that no 
Nordenfeldt would be placed on Majuba, explaining it was already 
occupied by riflemen, as well as covered by numerous guns from 
various angles. He also correctly pointed out that a gun on 
Majuba would be useless against infantry advancing up the steep 
slopes. On being informed that a Long Tom was on its way, he 
surrendered on this issue, promising to give all necessary 
assistance to have it emplaced. 4 What Meyer failed to mention in 
this altercation with Kruger, was that even if the British gained 
control of Majuba, the length and steepness of its slopes would 
have prevented them from placing artillery on the hill with a 
sufficient range to threaten Lang's Nek. Was it perhaps the 
historical significance of this site, rather than strategic 
considerations that prompted Kruger to order artillery to be 
placed on it? The loss of Majuba may have been perceived as 
cancelling out the Boer victory there on 27 February 1881. This 
victory was to a degree already cancelled though, by the 
surrender of General P.A. Cronje with 4 000 burghers at 
Paardeberg, and Buller's success in finally piercing the Boer 
3 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 50, Kruger to Meyer, 20 May 1900, 
T.A. 
4 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 57, Meyer to Kruger, 20 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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defence line on the Thukela River. Both these events occurred on 
27 February 1900 - Majuba day. 
The Long Tom arrived in Volksrust on 21 May and the next day the 
tremendous task of placing it on Phokweni, a hill that towers 
over northern Natal, began. The future safety of this gun was a 
major concern to Meyer. During a retreat it was hardly likely 
there would be either oxen or burghers to assist in bringing it 
down from the hill. Past experience had taught Meyer that his men 
could not be relied on in a time of crisis. It is interesting and 
possibly significant that when Meyer communicated his fears about 
the safety of the Long Tom to Louis Botha, he referred to an 
eventual retreat. 5 The situation in Natal, as well as in the 
Orange Free State, may have made it self-evident that a retreat 
from the positions held by Meyer was inevitable. Some may have 
construed this as a defeatist attitude, but was he not being 
realistic? The odds against the Boers had lengthened since the 
victorious days along the Thukela and everywhere else the 
Republican forces were either in retreat or under pressure. 
Fears for the safety of the Long Tom were shared by Lieutenant 
F. von Wichmann, a member of the German Corps and commander of 
the artillery in Natal. This heavy gun would be in a somewhat 
isolated spot on the defence line, from which it would be 
difficult to remove. He therefore requested a case of dynamite, 
with which to destroy it, should its loss appear likely. 
5 Leyds 7 2 5 ( d) , Tel . no. 11 4, Meyer to L. Botha, 21 May 
1900, T.A. 
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Furthermore, he wanted three large ox-wagons and teams of oxen, 
and an additional 20 oxen hired on a daily basis. These were to 
be kept at the gun, until required. These steps for the gun's 
safety were eventually taken, but kept a secret lest they 
undermine Boer morale. 6 On 28 May, the Long Tom from its superb 
position, but at very long range, opened fire on the British 
encampment near Nkwelo, seriously wounding one of the King's 
Royal Rifles. On subsequent days, the gun was fired for short 
periods and the British gunners occasionally replied with 4.7" 
guns. Apart from its initial success, the Long Tom caused no 
further casualties during May. However, its presence was a factor 
Buller had to take into consideration, when deciding on the 
options open to him. 7 
It was not only Kruger that was dissatisfied with Meyer. A number 
of men under his command had lost faith in him. Ben Viljoen 
reported to Kruger on 16 May: "Ik en ik geloof alle burgers is 
nu zonder vertrouwen in de generaals die over ons is en ik geloof 
ook niet dat zy eenige reorganisatie zal verkrygen." He urged 
Kruger to appoint a new commanding officer, suggesting that Chris 
Botha would be a good choice. Later the same day he tempered his 
criticism, naming Erasmus as still doing his best. 8 The 
6 Leyds 726(c), Tel. no. 1, Von Wichmann to RVR Charlestown, 
Tel. no. 21, Eloff to Uys, 30 May 1900 and Leyds 723(d), Tel. no 
90, Wolmarans to Von Wichmann, 7 May 1900, T.A. 
7 FK 1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. 4th Bde., 28 May 1900; 
Amery, IV, p. 183; K.G. 815, Uys to Erasmus, pp. 125-126, 29 May 
1900, T.A. 
8 Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 79, Viljoen to Kruger, 15 May 1900; 
Leyds 724 (e), Tel. nos. 77 and 99, Viljoen to Kruger, 16 May 
1900, T.A. 
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situation was obviously very serious, for here was a commandant 
requesting that his commanding officer be relieved. 
Kruger responded promptly. The same day he promoted C. Botha to 
Acting General, a rank he incidentally already held, and ordered 
him to Lang's Nek, where he was to motivate the men, have all 
deserters shot, as well as their horses. 9 This obvious lack of 
confidence and intervention in his affairs, stung Meyer into 
replying sharply and sarcastically to his President: 
Den Heer C. Botha is reeds daar benoemd in plaats als Wd. 
op 3 dezer en wordt steeds als zoodanig door my bekend ... 
Het spyt my dus dat de Regering zulke aanstellingen doen 
zonder vooraf met hoofd officieren te raad plegen. In deze 
geval is het toevallig recht maar de Regerin~ kon net 
zoowel een verkeerde persoon aangesteld hebben. 1 
Kruger's apparent lack of knowledge concerning the rank of Chris 
Botha is not entirely surprising. There is no clarity concerning 
Botha's rank at this stage. Meyer did make it known on the Natal 
front that Chris Botha held the rank of Acting Assistant 
Commandant General while he, Meyer, was away in Pretoria as from 
3 May. Botha was therefore not an Acting General as from that 
day. Meyer returned to Natal on 10 May and it would appear that 
Botha held the rank of Assistant General from then on. This is 
suggested by the fact that Viljoen addressed a telegram, on 10 
9 Leyds 724(e), Tel. no. 113, Kruger to C. Botha, 16 May 
1900, T.A. 
10 Leyds 724(f), Tel. no. 13, Meyer to Kruger, 17 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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May, to Assistant General C. Botha. No documentary evidence could 
be located which specified whether he was an Acting or Assistant 
General. 11 
Criticism against Meyer continued to mount. Field-Cornet Uys of 
Utrecht also requested the President to replace him, 12 while 
E.S. Badenhorst in a telegram on 21 May to Louis Botha quite 
bluntly requested: "Ik een der Voortrekkers van het land versoek 
U. Ed. hierby beleefd maar dringend Genl Meyer te willen 
ontslaan. " 13 Clearly the burghers' dissatisfaction with Meyer 
was so strong that they were prepared to communicate directly 
with their President or Commandant-General about the matter. The 
situation must have caused Kruger and especially the much younger 
Louis Botha much pain. After all Meyer was a person of standing, 
if by now a little past his prime. For Louis Botha the pain was 
probably greater. They came from the same area and had known one 
another for at least 16 years. It was Meyer who in an earlier 
campaign in 1884 against the Zulu leader Usibhebhu, had 
recognised the 21 year old Louis Botha' s tactical skills and 
therefore permitted him to attend councils-of-war. From that 
campaign developed a friendship between the two men, which later 
11 Leyds 723(a), Tel. no. 38, Meyer to Cmdts on Natal front, 
3 May 1900; Leyds 723(f), Tel. no. 99, Meyer to C. Botha, 9 May 
1900; Leyds 723(g), Tel. no. 17, Viljoen to C. Botha, 10 May 1900 
and Leyds 724(d), Tel. no. 21, Meyer to L. Botha, 15 May 1900, 
T.A. 
12 Leyds 725(c), Tel. no. 11, Uys to Kruger, 20 May 1900; 
Leyds 725(e) Tel. no. 60, Lombard to Kruger, 22 May 1900, T.A. 
13 Leyds 725(d), Tel. no. 39, Badenhorst to L. Botha, 21 May 
1900, T.A. There is no indication which commando Badenhorst was 
a member of and whether he held any rank. 
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also grew into a business relationship. From 1897 they 
represented the Vryheid district in the Volksraad and at the 
outbreak of war Botha acted as second-in-command to Meyer, who 
commanded the commandos from the south-eastern Transvaal. When 
Meyer took ill in October 1899 near Ladysmith, Botha took over 
as acting-general and his military career blossomed. Now he was 
expected to take action against his friend and former 
commander. 1 4 
Despite the personal circumstances, the situation could no longer 
be ignored. In consequence Kruger transferred Meyer to the 
Gatsrand-Pretoria area to take command there, while Chris Botha 
replaced him at Lang's Nek with rank of Assistant Commandant-
General. That evening, 23 May, Meyer departed from the Natal 
front. 15 Just how much the altercation Kruger had with Meyer 
over Majuba influenced his decision to remove the latter from the 
Natal front, will never be known. 
Circumstances were such that this was not the ideal time to gain 
promotion. The situation was so critical and the problems 
requiring attention so grave, that Chris Botha could resort to 
little more than crisis management. 
More serious than the dissension in the burgher ranks, was a 
shortage of various supplies and a partial collapse of the supply 
1 4 Barnard, pp. 2-5, 13, 21, 24, 28 and 29. 
15 Leyds 725(f), Tel. no. 14, Kruger to Meyer and Tel. no. 
68, Meyer to Kruger, 23 May 1900, T.A. 
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system. Indeed on 30 and 31 May most alarming reports about the 
supply situation were received. The commissariat at Charlestown 
had closed as there were no more provisions to distribute. From 
Standerton it was reported that sufficient supplies of meat, meal 
and rice to feed 5 000 men existed for a mere three days. The 
entire commissariat staff at Volksrust had fled, as well as a 
number of the Standerton staff. It is not clear why they had 
left, but news of the British advance on Johannesburg was a 
possible factor. 16 This advance threatened their retreat route 
and, eventually, probably their homes and families also. At 
Volksrust 500 bags of meal lay unattended and there was no one 
to receive the bread that arrived there and so it was reported 
there would be no food for some commandos the following day. On 
the same day too, the Wakkerstroom commandant reported having run 
out of food. These dire circumstances prompted Kruger to act 
quickly and decisively. He ordered the Standerton commissariat 
to make the necessary provision and at the same time he 
despatched a 'reliable' person with £1 000 to the Natal front, 
to purchase stock and other supplies. 17 What Kruger meant by 
'the necessary provision' is not clear, but presumably it was to 
ensure that supplies sent would be so handled as to ensure that 
the commandos received the supplies they needed. 
Kruger's prompt intervention resolved the crisis temporarily, and 
16 Leyds 726(c), Tel. no. 21, Eloff to Uys, 30 May 1900 and 
Tel. no. 19, Wd. HCC Standerton to Uys and Tel. no. 20, Spec. 
Cmdt to Uys, 31 May 1900, T.A.; Breytenbach, V, p. 538. 
17 Leyds 726(c), Tel. no. 20, Spec Cmdt to Uys and Tel. no. 
35, Kruger to Van Broekhuizen and Tel. no. 44, Lombard to C. 
Botha, 31 May 1900, T.A. 
11 5 
for a while there was no report of supply shortages. However, on 
7 June there was a further request for supplies and money to be 
sent to Lang's Nek.18 
The protracted conflict was also taking its toll on the burghers' 
horses. Long and repeated rides caused their condition to 
decline. This was further exacerbated by the reduced nutritional 
value of the veld in the cooler months. In consequence, more and 
more men were forced to walk. On 22 May, Chris Botha requested 
100 horses from Meyer to try to make up the shortfall among his 
ranks. Horse fodder too, was in short supply. 19 
As this succession of crises was being dealt with, another major 
menace was moving inexorably north, west of the Drakensberg. 
Roberts' s forces were making steady headway. On 26 May they 
crossed the Vaal River and on 31 May marched into Johannesburg. 
Five days later Roberts's troops triumphantly entered Kruger's 
capital, Pretoria. 20 News of the rapid advance into their 
country and the capture of its two major centres, left many a 
burgher on the Natal front wondering what he was defending. The 
safety of these men's loved ones and property was also of 
concern. Roberts's advances also cut off the retreat route for 
many burghers on the Natal front. Those men relying on trains for 
18 Leyds 726(d), tel. no. 25, C. Botha to L. Botha, 3 June 
1900; Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 21, Act. Landdrost (?) to K.G., 7 
June 1900, T.A. 
19 Leyds 725(e), Tel. nos. 48a and b, C. Botha to Meyer, 22 
May 1900, T.A. 
20 Amery, IV, pp. 135-159. 
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transport, and their numbers were steadily increasing, felt 
threatened as the rail line east of Johannesburg fell into 
British hands. By cutting off the retreat route, Roberts' s 
victories only exacerbated the generally low morale and poor 
discipline already in existence since the retreat from the 
Biggarsberg. 21 Rumours, usually rife in such situations, also 
played their part in undermining the Boers' willingness to remain 
on the Natal front. In contrast, there were certain individuals 
or groups of men, who remained determined to continue their 
resistance, come what may. 
Rumours circulating at the front were that all women had to leave 
Johannesburg. This rumour persisted for about two weeks before 
Roberts reached Johannesburg. Approximately ten days after 
rumours began circulating about Roberts, the Soutpansberg 
commando requested a transfer home on hearing that the British 
were allegedly just two days from its districts. Kruger refused 
this request, reassuring them that the rumour was untrue and 
that, in any case, the government would make the necessary 
arrangements, if required to do so. 22 
The combination of Roberts's successes in cutting off the retreat 
routes, persistent rumours and a desire to protect their families 
and property, as they were threatened, led to large scale 
21 Schikkerling, p. 17; K.G. 815, Uys to Erasmus, 29 May 
1900, pp. 125-126, T.A. 
22 Leyds 725(a), Tel. no. 56, Van der Byl to Louw, 18 May 
1900; Leyds 726(b), Tel. no. 84, c. Botha to Kruger and Meyer, 
27 May 1900 and Tel. no. 3, Kruger to C. Botha, 28 May 1900, T.A. 
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desertions from the Natal front, during the latter part of May 
and early June. The Soutpansbergers were not pacified by Kruger's 
re-assurances. On 30 May it was reported that a large number of 
them had deserted. One source mentioned 60 men and another as 
many as 200. It is not possible to determine which is the more 
accurate figure, but clearly desertion on a large scale had 
occurred. At the same time it was reported that all the 
Johannesburg Police, along with various other burghers, had 
deserted. 23 The deepening crisis, coupled with an absence of 
ingrained and strong conventional military traditions, was taking 
a heavy toll on the Boer forces. 
By 2 June it was reported that a mere 130 Soutpansbergers 
remained in their positions. Of 1 600 Pretorians only 1 000 
remained, the rest having deserted. There was also a partial 
desertion by the Middelburgers from Moll's Nek. These desertions 
were serious enough in themselves, but they had the added effect 
of undermining the resolve of those burghers still in their 
positions. Chris Botha himself became quite pessimistic, 
believing that even addressing the burghers was now of no further 
value. 24 None the less, the next day Botha went out to the 
Pretoria and Soutpansberg commandos and addressed them in an 
effort to encourage and motivate them. Later that day he informed 
Meyer that their morale was much improved and that he believed 
23 Leyds 726(c), Tel. no. 22, Von Wichmann to C. Botha and 
Tel. no. 26, Spec Cmdt to Uys and Tel. no. 28, Uys to C. Botha, 
30 May 1900, T.A. 
24 Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 15, C. Botha to Kruger and Tel. 
no. 31, C. Botha to L. Botha, 2 June 1900, T.A. 
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they would fight to the end. 25 
In contrast to the generally low morale and poor discipline among 
commandos around Lang's Nek and east thereof, the Carolina and 
Lydenburg commandos at Botha's Pass, were still in position and 
determined to resist. However, news of the desertions by the 
Pretoria and Soutpansberg commandos caused unease, for if the 
British broke through at Lang's Nek, the force at Botha's Pass 
would probably be cut off . 26 
Apart from creating a crisis in Boer morale and discipline, 
Roberts's advance was the cause of a number of commandos being 
shifted from one front to another. There were two main reasons 
for transferring commandos. One was Louis Botha' s need for 
reinforcements and the other was a psychological one. As 
commandos on any front found their respective home areas 
threatened, so quite naturally they wished to be there to defend 
them. This psychological influence was highlighted by the 
Soutpansberg burghers' response to the rumours they heard of 
British forces threatening their area. 
The first unit to leave the Drakensberg line to go to Louis 
Botha' s assistance, was Lynch's Irish Brigade. There is no 
evidence of the exact strength of this unit, but it almost 
25 Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 25, C. Botha to L. Botha and Tel. 
no. 30, C. Botha to Meyer, 3 June 1900, T.A. 
26 Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to L. Botha, 2 June 
1900, T.A. 
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certainly was not large. 27 The Irish were followed by the 
Johannesburg commando on 2 3 May. 28 The Johannesburgers were 
exchanged for the Wakkerstroom commando. 29 It made good sense 
to exchange these commandos, for they would both be nearer home 
and therefore more likely to be motivated to resist the British. 
On 27 May Chris Botha gave his men the alarming news that the 
British had crossed the Vaal River. This prompted Field-Cornet 
Chris Muller of the Boksburg commando to ask forlornly: "Wat help 
dit om hier posisies vas te hou; die vyand is deur die Vaalrivier 
en trek na die Rand en ons kan ons nie daar verdedig?" Botha 
acceded to this request and that same night, Dercksen left with 
a portion of the commando. The station master at Volksrust was 
alerted to prepare himself to transport the commando and their 
supplies at short notice. 30 The rest of the commando soon 
followed. 
It was very soon after these transfers that the Soutpansbergers 
and the Johannesburg Police deserted in large numbers, critically 
27 Lynch, p. 193; Leyds 725(b), Tel. no. 91, Meyer to L. 
Botha, 19 May 1900, T.A. 
28 Viljoen, p. 86; Schikkerling, p. 18; Leyds 725(f), Tel. 
no. 55, Viljoen to Act Spec Cmdt Johannesburg, 23 May 1900, T.A. 
Viljoen gives 15 May as the commando's day of departure and 
Schikkerling mentions 26 May. It is probable that the telegram 
date is the correct one. 
29 Leyds 725(b), Tel. no. 112, L. Botha to Landdrost 
Wakkerstroom, 19 May 1900; Leyds 725(e), Tel. no. 110, Meyer to 
L. Botha, 22 May 1900, T.A. 
30 Leyds 726(b), Tel. no. 46, C. Botha to L. Botha and Tel. 
no. 84, C. Botha to Meyer and Kruger, 27 May 1900, T.A.; Muller, 
pp. 65-66. 
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weakening the central section of the defence line. This 
development, along with the poor morale, supply shortages, in 
addition to the menace that lay before them and was moving in 
behind them, must have caused Chris Botha and those fellow 
officers who still had the will to resist, great concern. 
Compounding Chris Botha's problems, was a message received from 
Kruger on 27 May that the Boers would try to hold Johannesburg 
and Pretoria. Should they fail, the eastern and northern 
districts were to be held, with Machadadorp becoming the seat of 
government, and Vrede becoming the capital of the Orange Free 
State. In order to protect communications in the eastern 
districts of the Republics, it would thus be imperative that the 
Drakensberg be held. 31 With both Johannesburg and Pretoria 
falling soon after Kruger's message was received, Botha indeed 
had a crucial and responsible role to play. Should he give way, 
both Machacadorp and Vrede would be open to attacks from two 
fronts. 
Fortunately for the Boers, it appears that Buller was unaware of 
the majority of their problems. At least his messages and reports 
do not reveal any knowledge of such information. In fact, he 
still anticipated considerable difficulty in trying to force his 
way on to the highveld. 32 So, when Buller received news that 
Elandsfontein had fallen into British hands, thus severing the 
31 Leyds 726(b), Tel. no. 58, Kruger to C. Botha, 27 May 
1900, T.A. 
32 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 4 June 1900, p. 84 and 
Buller to Roberts, 2 June 1900, p. 87. 
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rail link between the Natal front and Johannesburg-Pretoria, he 
decided to exploit the situation. He tried to achieve his first 
objective, that of a passage onto the highveld by negotiation. 
Under a flag of truce he sent a message to Chris Botha, 
questioning whether it was still worth his while to continue the 
struggle, as his rail communications were cut. Botha replied that 
he would have to ref er the question to the Commandant-
General. 33 Upon receipt of this reply, Buller issued orders to 
his force facing Lang's Nek to fire in self-defence only. The 
Boer guns too became silent.34 
When Kruger came to hear of Buller's message, he let Chris Botha 
know in no uncertain terms that he was not to negotiate with the 
British commander. He maintained that the burghers had fought the 
British forces with great success in the Transvaal and ordered 
that the struggle should continue. Furthermore, he claimed that 
Buller would only be satisfied with unconditional surrender. 35 
Despite Kruger's orders, a conference did take place between 
Buller, C. Botha and their respective staffs. They met in the 
open, between the historic Majuba and Mount Prospect. Buller 
pointed out to Botha that not only was his rail link severed, but 
he was confronted by a large army with guns and that by 
continuing to fight he would only be throwing away lives to no 
avail. This was probably the strongest reason for Buller' s 
33 Ibid., p. 84; Breytenbach, V, pp. 533-534. 
34 FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 32/855, S.D. 2nd Div., 30 May 1900 and 
S.D. 4th Bde., 31 May 1900. 
35 Leyds 726(c), Tel. no. 23, Kruger to Uys, 30 May 1900, 
T.A. 
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initiating these talks, since he disliked seeing men suffer - he 
went so far as to state that he hated war. Did the thought of 
failure also influence this approach? 
Buller offered the following terms to Botha: the burghers, while 
retaining their small arms, were to disperse to their farms, but 
were to leave their artillery behind; the issue of the ultimate 
surrender, however, of the small arms would be subject to an 
agreement between Kruger and Roberts. Buller was, of course, not 
in a position to make peace but he promised to telegraph Roberts 
to enquire about peace terms. Botha made it clear that he could 
neither offer or accept peace terms, but in the meantime he would 
communicate Buller's proposal to his government. While answers 
were awaited, a truce prevailed until 5 June, with the British 
promising not to advance beyond their present positions. 36 
In the light of Kruger's earlier orders to Botha, he was highly 
unlikely to agree to any terms - even the generous ones Buller 
was offering. Like Kruger, Roberts took a much harder line on the 
surrender issue. In reply to Buller, Roberts declared that the 
Transvaal Government would have to surrender unconditionally and 
the burghers turn in their firearms, horses and sign a pledge not 
to fight again in the war before being allowed to go home. 
Roberts had none the less already made it possible for burghers, 
under certain circumstances, to surrender and return to their 
farms. In terms of Proclamation III issued on 15 March 1900, 
36 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 4 June 1900, pp. 84-86; 
Boscawen-Wright, p. 76. 
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burghers who had not taken a prominent part in the policy which 
led to the war, commanded forces in the Orange Free State, 
commandeered or used violence against any British subjects and 
were willing to lay down their arms at once, and bind themselves 
by an oath to abstain from further participation in the war, 
would be given free passes to allow them to return to their homes 
and would not be made prisoners of war, nor would their property 
be taken from them. In a later proclamation (Proclamation XIII) 
issued on 31 May 1900 in Johannesburg, applicable to the South 
African Republic, he made a similar offer. He did omit the 
undertaking 'nor would their property be taken from them'. Spies 
argues that this change was made because military exigencies did 
not always permit it to be honoured. 37 Chris Botha rejected 
Roberts' s terms, conveyed to him by Buller on 5 June, as 
expected. 38 This was the same day on which Roberts entered 
Pretoria. Clearly the Boers' desire for freedom and independence 
was greater than the allure of generous peace terms. 
Undoubtedly Kruger would have been angered by Botha' s · 
negotiations, having from the outset made his attitude very 
clear. Indeed his brother Louis too was displeased with the fact 
that his brother had negotiated with the British. Undaunted by 
the criticism, Chris Botha explained that he had done so to gain 
time, in order to speak to his men and also to re-organise some 
of his commandos. In fact in a telegram to Meyer he maintained 
37 Cd. 458, Roberts to Buller, 3 June 1900, p. 87; Spies, 
pp. 34-50. 
38 Amery, IV, p. 184. 
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that, without the respite the positions would have been lost 
without a shot being fired. The Boers also took the opportunity 
to improve their trenches during this respite. The British saw 
them openly moving about and entrenching. 39 The truce was like 
manna from heaven for Chris Botha. It came just when large-scale 
desertions were occurring, when the commissariat was collapsing 
and when morale had reached new depths. 
If this truce was of significant value to Chris Botha and his 
burghers, it was most decidedly appreciated by some of the 
British soldiers who had been very busy for a lengthy period of 
time. From 2 to 5 June most of these soldiers enjoyed a well-
earned rest and the silence of the big guns was in itself 
refreshing. Some soldiers took the opportunity to get their kit 
in order, having been reduced to marching with just putties bound 
around their feet. 40 
Negotiations having failed, Buller was now left with four 
options. He could force his way past the Boers via Botha's Pass, 
via Lang's Nek or via Moll's Nek, or he could wait until 
Roberts' s continued successes forced the Boers before him to 
retire into their republic to defend it. For a proud person like 
Buller the last option was hardly viable. He therefore had to 
choose between the three passes. Lang's Nek was obviously a very 
39 Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 85, C. Botha to Kruger, 2 June 
1900 and Tel. no. 25, C. Botha to L. Botha, 3 June 1900; Leyds 
726(e), Tel. no. 28, C. Botha to Meyer, 4 June 1900, T.A.; FK 
1776 T.A., w.o. 32/855, S.D. 4th Bde., 31 May 1900. 
40 Kearsey, P. 71. 
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strong position from a purely topographical point of view alone, 
while Moll's Nek lay in hilly, dangerous terrain. In effect, he 
therefore had no choice. 
Even while the negotiations with the Boers had been in progress, 
Buller had anticipated their failure and had prepared for his 
next move - an attack on the Boer line at Botha' s Pass. In 
planning an attack in this north-western corner of Natal, Buller 
had a distinct advantage. Having been there in 1881 immediately 
after hostilities had ceased, the area was well known to him. On 
4 June he had informed Roberts that he intended to launch a 
turning movement to his left, to carry him over the Drakensberg 
and in behind Lang's Nek. He explained that he anticipated 
considerable opposition as he believed that some 4 000 Boers 
faced him. Undoubtedly he realized by now that the Boers had a 
morale problem, and so expected only half of them to fight. 41 
Roberts cautioned that it was scarcely necessary to force himself 
onto the highveld at great cost, as Pretoria was already in 
British hands. None the less, Roberts did not prohibit Buller 
from attempting the turning movement. Buller was himself to judge 
whether, depending on the opposition encountered, action should 
be continued. 42 Roberts was not making it easy for Buller. The 
decision whether to attack or wait for the Boers to melt away was 
left with Buller, and the outcome would therefore be his ultimate 
41 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 269; Melville, I, p. 146; 
Roberts Papers T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 030, Roberts to 
Buller, 5 June 1900. 
42 Roberts Papers T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 030, 
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responsibility. 
During the negotiations with Chris Botha and the truce, Hildyard 
and Lyttelton had withdrawn from Utrecht and the Doornberg. By 
5 June part of Buller' s force was concentrated as follows: 
Newcastle was guarded by the 8th Brigade, while the right flank, 
comprising Coetzee's and Ingogo Drifts, was secured by 
Lyttelton's 7th Brigade, assisted by two 12 pounder naval guns 
and two batteries of field guns. The centre, facing Lang's Nek, 
was held by Clery's 4th Brigade, supported by two 5", two 4.7" 
guns, four naval twelve pounder guns and the 63th R.F.A. and 86th 
Howitzer batteries. Clery held a line from Nkwelo to the 
Newcastle-Lang's Nek road. On the left flank, close to De wet's 
Farm, Hildyard's 5th Division was assisted by the 2nd Brigade and 
four 4. 7" guns, four naval twelve pounder guns, the 13th and 69th 
R.F.A. batteries and the six R.H.A. guns. It is not certain where 
the cavalry was at this time, but it seems that the 3rd Mounted 
Brigade was near Nkwelo. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was probably 
still patrolling the Buffalo River drifts from Vant's Drift to 
Stale's Drift, as they had been ordered to do on 25 May. Buller 
personally moved from Newcastle to Skuinshoogte on 5 June. 43 
His was a truly impressive force, consisting of approximately 35 
000 men, 96 guns and 41 machine guns. Facing approximately 4 000 
burghers, with 2 guns under Fourie, 5 guns in the Lang's Nek area 
and the Long Tom on Phokweni . The Boer numbers can only be 
43 Amery, IV, pp. 184-185; Cd. 458, No. 6, Buller to Sec for 
War, p. 88; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 271; FK 1776 T.A., W.O. 
32/855, S.D. Natal Army, 28 May 1900 and S.D. 1 Cav. Bde., 28-31 
May 1900. 
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approximations, for by this stage many burghers had deserted and 
there is no accurate record of the numbers still in position. 
Furthermore, no precise figure reflecting Boer artillery strength 
was ever located. One has to rely on evidence such as Erasmus's 
request for rail trucks to transport 5 guns from the Lang's Nek 
area, in trying to piece together the full picture. 44 
Buller had placed his forces with care to ensure he was protected 
on all sides. The greatest concentration of men and guns lay on 
his left flank where he intended launching a turning movement. 
There were however, so many men and guns placed at his centre as 
well as on his right, that the Boers were forced to occupy their 
entire line. They could not be certain where an attack would be 
made. Strategically, Buller was at considerable advantage, as his 
forces were relatively close together, holding the inner curve 
of a line in contrast to the Boers, having to defend the much 
longer outer curve of the line. 
By now 21 days' supplies lay stockpiled in Newcastle. Thus from 
a British point of view the scene was perfectly set for their 
attempt to pierce the Boer defence line. 45 However, in the 
process of securing his right flank, repairing the damaged 
railway line, attempting to resolve his military obstacles by 
means of negotiations and of building up substantial supplies, 
Buller had allowed the Boers ample time once again to choose 
44 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 30, Erasmus to Chef Charlestown, 
8 June 1900, T.A.; Grabler, p. 95. 
45 Cd. 458, Buller for Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 88. 
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sound positions and properly entrench themselves. At Lang's Nek 
the Boers made a naturally powerful position even more daunting 
with rows of entrenchments and numerous gun emplacements. 46 As 
mentioned above, it is necessary to bear in mind that Buller 
could only safely launch a sustainable attack once the rail line 
was repaired and he had a sufficient stockpile of supplies -
which was on about 28 May. It was thus only the negotiations and 
the truce that had provided the Boers with additional time to 
prepare themselves. 
Considering the state of Boer morale and disarray of their 
commissariat on 28 May, a British attack at that time may have 
been successful. Buller was of course unlikely to have been aware 
of these circumstances immediately and could therefore not 
exploit them. However, his negotiations may be an indication that 
he suspected such a situation to exist and he tried to exploit 
it in a non-military way. 
At this stage Buller had clear-cut numerical and psychological 
advantages. Even strategically, he had certain advantages. The 
time for decisive action was at hand. 
46 Knox, pp. 269-270. 
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Chapter 6. BOTHA'S PASS 
By 5 June the British force had made all possible preparations 
for launching their next attack against the Boers, who were 
securely entrenched in their mountain fastnesses. The peace 
negotiations failed to provide the desired results and Buller was 
again obliged to resort to a military solution. Therefore, soon 
after receiving the negative response to his peace terms, he left 
Newcastle, making for his left flank at Skuinshoogte. There he 
ordered 
Wykskop 
Hildyard, encamped at De Wet' s Farm, 
the following morning. 1 This command 
to occupy Van 
was to set in 
motion a movement which would hopefully carry the British force 
via Botha's Pass over the Drakensberg onto the highveld. Once 
there, they would be able to threaten Erasmus and Chris Botha 
from the rear at Lang's Nek. 
The topographic features at Botha's Pass under Boer control gave 
them significant strategic advantages. The slopes up the 
Drakensberg to the Boer positions were long, between 300 and 500 
metres in altitude, and mostly very steep - in places, unscalably 
so. Generally the Drakensberg runs along a line from south to 
north, but at the pass the line makes a bulge to the west. Within 
the curve, lying east of the mountains, there is a large, 
relatively flat basin. The eastern entrance to the basin is 
dominated by Van Wykskop, a hill which in turn is attached to a 
spur stretching southwards, linking up with the Drakensberg where 
the southern part of the curve begins. This spur and Van Wykskop 
block off easy access to the basin from the east and south-east. 
1 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 88. 
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North-west of Van Wykskop is the free-standing, conical Spi tskop. 
Spitskop and Van Wykskop, overlooking the north-eastern entrance 
to the basin as they do, were of strategic value to anyone 
wishing to gain access to the Drakensberg in the Botha's Pass 
area. 
In pursuance of his instructions, Hildyard ordered Major-General 
Talbot Coke to reconnoitre Van Wykskop to find suitable naval gun 
positions on it. Early the following morning the S.A.L.H. 
Middlesex Regiment and 13th R.F.A. battery accompanied by Coke, 
departed from De Wet' s Farm, making for Van Wykskop. 2 This 
action was the first indication of where the next attack was 
likely to be made. Buller, to the last moment, kept the place of 
this intended attack a closely guarded secret. Both the British 
soldiers and burghers were expecting an attack to be made. 
However, with the large British forces spread over a vast area, 
neither the soldiers nor burghers knew where it would be made. 3 
The Boers on the right flank, at Botha's Pass, had anticipated 
an attack immediately on expiry of the truce, but nothing 
transpired. 4 
The key position of Van Wykskop was held by a mere 25 burghers. 
When these men noted the size of the force headed in their 
2 Amery, IV, p. 186; T.T. Jeans, (ed.), Naval Brigades in 
the South African War, p. 285; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 
19 June 1900, p. 88. 
3 Trooper H.G. Bizley Diary, 5 June 1900; Jeans, p. 285; 
Leyds 726(e), Tel. no. 21, Erasmus to Kruger, 5 June 1900, T.A. 
4 A 850 C.H.K., Diary of J.H. Janson, 6 June 1900, T.A. 
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direction, they offered a mere token resistance before retiring, 
thus permitting the S.A.L.H., numbering between 400 and 500, to 
take possession of this strategic position with ease. 5 Their 
failure to occupy Van Wykskop with an effective force enabled the 
British force to take a major step towards threatening the Boer 
position at Botha's Pass. 
The Boers, realising the consequences of their error, launched 
a spirited counter-attack. Their only sizeable piece of artillery 
in the area, a 75mm Creusot, was brought into position and opened 
fire. From a northerly direction both Carolina and Lydenburg 
burghers opened fire at long range, with their rifles, while from 
the south-west, Carolina men advanced on Van Wykskop. To create 
cover for themselves, the Boers set fire to the tinder dry veld 
and advanced under cover of the smoke. However, the 
reconnaissance party under Lieutenant-Colonel G.J.H. Byng, 
commander of the S.A.L.H., stood fast against the spirited, but 
not particularly resolute, counter-attack. When the counter-
attack began, the Middlesex Regiment were some distance east of 
Van Wykskop, as were the 13th R.F.A. guns. 6 During the afternoon 
only after the S.A.L.H. had been under fire for several hours, 
did the Middlesex Regiment reinforce them. The intensity of the 
Boer counter-attack alerted Hildyard to the fact that, to vacate 
Van Wykskop and recapture it sometime in the future, might well 
5 Ibid. , pp. 12 and 1 4, T. A. ; Amery, IV, p. 186; Leyds 
726(f), Tel. no. 2, C. Botha to Kruger, 7 June 1900, T.A. 
6 A 850 C.H.K., Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A.; 
Amery, IV, p. 186; Jeans, p. 286; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 
19 June 1900, p. 89; Grobler, p. 91. 
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be a costly exercise. Wisely, he decided to turn his 
reconnaissance force into one of occupation. When darkness fell 
the Boers retired, leaving Van Wykskop securely in British 
hands. 7 The Boer counter-attack was never really threatening, 
for the S.A.L.H. suffered only four wounded and the infantry one 
killed and five wounded. The Boers reported one burgher, Nicolaas 
van Loggerenberg, killed. 8 
Undoubtedly, Buller realised that it was important to consolidate 
his gain rapidly and then to exploit it, before the Boers could 
shift too many reinforcements onto their right flank. 
Consequently there was considerable activity during the night of 
6 to 7 June, the remainder of the 1 Oth Brigade, the 2nd 
Dorsetshires and 1st Dublin Fusiliers moving from De Wet's Farm 
closer to Van Wykskop. 9 During the afternoon Captain E.P. Jones, 
commander of the Naval Brigade, located suitable sites on Van 
Wykskop for 12 pounder naval guns. As he returned to his guns at 
or near De Wet's Farm, he encountered Lieutenant A. Halsey with 
two 1 2 pounders, already ordered forward, proceeding towards 
Geelboom Farm, a position just east of Van Wykskop. At 19:00 
Jones received orders to position Lieutenant C.R.N. Burne's two 
twelve pounders on Van Wykskop by daylight,and two 4.7" guns just 
7 Amery, IV, p. 186. There is no record of how long the 
S.A.L.H. were under fire, prior to being joined by the Middlesex 
Regiment. 
8 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 89; A 850 
C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, 8 June 1900, p. 5, T.A. 
Van Rensburg's diary is not subdivided into dates and therefore 
only the page number will be provided for reference purposes. 
9 Knox. p. 258. 
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east of that hill, but hidden from the enemy view. 
They soon set off with these guns, but the numerous drifts made 
the going very slow and fatiguing. As they approached Van Wykskop 
they encountered veld fires, still blazing from the previous day. 
They proved both a blessing and a curse, providing some light, 
but at the same time distressing the oxen, making them difficult 
to control. At 04:00 the final gully before the ascent up Van 
Wykskop was reached, but here Jones was confronted with a new 
problem. Where he descended the hill the previous day, all the 
grass had been burnt, causing the disappearance of the landmarks 
he had mentally noted. However, Colonel Sim, Royal Engineers, 
having earlier prepared a rudimentary track to the s~mmit, joined 
Burne and assisted him to find his way. Each gun was drawn by 32 
oxen. In the biting cold, the gunners, not having had a scrap of 
food or rest since departing, laboured on. As the final, but 
particularly steep section was tackled in the early dawn, the 
wheel of one gun gave way and it had to be abandoned. The other 
gun reached its destination exactly at daylight, by which time 
there was sniping at the north-west crest and slope of Van 
Wykskop. The gun was immediately set up in an emplacement by the 
Royal Engineers and it opened fire on a Boer encampment visible 
on the Drakensberg some six kilometres away. As the camp appeared 
deserted, firing ceased after a while and the gunners lay down 
for a short, but well earned rest in the freezing wind sweeping 
the hill. 1 o 
1° Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 88; Cd. 
142, Naval Brigade in South Africa, 14 June 1900, p. 36; Jeans, 
pp. 286-287; Burne, pp. 66-67. 
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In addition to the units and artillery already mentioned, there 
were other large scale movements on the left flank, all in 
preparation for a massive assault on the Boer right flank on 
Friday 8 June. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, the 11th Brigade without 
the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, the 13th and 69th R.F.A. 
batteries congregated at Geelboom Farm, and Hildyard established 
his headquarters there. The S. A. L. H. , on retiring from Van 
Wykskop, joined this force. Van Wykskop was further reinforced 
by the arrival of two 4.7 11 guns and a 12 pounder naval gun. The 
latter was the gun that broke a wheel during its initial ascent. 
Hard work ensured its speedy return to action. During the course 
of the day the trail of the first 12 pounder to reach Van Wykskop 
broke, but his gun too, was repaired before the day was up. A 
little further east of Van Wykskop, on Skuinshoogte were two 5 11 
guns, two 4. 7 11 and two 1 2 pounders guns. The naval guns were 
guarded by the York and Lancaster Regiment. These six guns were 
positioned so as to fire at the Boers on or near Nkweloane, as 
were two 5 11 guns, placed on a southern spur of Nkwelo. Dundonald, 
with his R.H.A., the T.M.I. and Composite Regiment, took up a 
position near these guns, from where he looked south over the 
Harte River and towards Geelboom Farm. Near the junction of the 
Botha' s Pass road and Newcastle-Charlestown road was the 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade, with the 7th, 64th and 61st (howitzers) 
batteries R.F.A. two maxims (porn-porns) and Hamilton's 2nd 
Brigade. 11 
11 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 89; Cd. 
142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, p. 36; Maurice and Grant, 
III, pp. 270-271; Amery, IV, pp. 186-187; C. Burnett, The 18th 
Hussars in South Africa, p. 87; Kearsey, p. 71; Burne, pp. 66-68; 
Jeans, pp. 287-288; Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. GD 
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Buller played an active role in the preparations. At 
approximately 09:00 he arrived on Van Wykskop, intent on studying 
the area where the next attack was to be made, undaunted by the 
bitter cold which turned his lips blue. With the aid of the 
gunners' telescope he scanned the Drakensberg, from Botha's Pass 
in the west to the north-west and north of Van Wykskop. The 
slopes he saw included many folds and numerous spurs jutted into 
the basin that separated him from the Drakensberg. All was quiet 
in the basin and along the Boer positions. Having gained a 
satisfactory picture of what awaited his men during the next 
attack, Buller departed. At that instant the Boers launched an 
audacious attack from the spurs, advancing in skirmishing order, 
followed by ambulances and a gun mounted on a wagon. The fire-
power they faced was overwhelming. The British naval guns 
immediately responded to this sudden threat and after knocking 
over some horsemen caused the Boers to retire. Within minutes all 
trace of the Boer attack had disappeared. Buller congratulated 
his gunners on their accurate and effective fire. 12 It is 
likely that prior to launching their attack, the Boers were 
unaware that the British had managed to place long range 
artillery on Van Wykskop during the night. They would therefore 
have been taken by surprise by the fire, and that would explain 
why they so quickly broke off their attack. Under the 
circumstances they had no option but to retire. Even though the 
gun mounted on the wagon was an effective 7 Smm Creusot, the 
British naval guns had a significantly longer range. 
233/124/2, 'Operation 3rd Mtd. Bde. 6-13 June 1900.' 
12 Burne, pp. 67-68. 
136 
Understandably the Boers failed to mount another attack that day. 
The gunners with the 12 pounders on Van Wykskop still had much 
work to do that day, as their ammunition wagons could only be 
brought halfway up the slope. From there everything had to be 
carried to the summit. Both guns had one hundred shells, each 
weighing 5, 7 kilograms carried to it, along with the powder 
required to launch the projectiles. During the course of the 
morning the long-range guns on Van Wykskop, as well as those near 
Geelboom Farm shelled the dongas near the Drakensberg and the 
ridge near Botha' s Pass. 13 The artillery does not appear to 
have been aimed at specific targets. It was more of a speculative 
barrage and one to discourage the Boers from mounting any further 
counter-attacks. The rapid consolidation of the successful 
capture of Van Wykskop ensured that the Boers were unable to 
reverse their loss. 
While these preparations were under way on the British left 
flank, Clery kept up a desultory long range artillery barrage 
along the British centre, firing on Majuba, Lang's Nek and 
Phokweni. The Boers replied to this fire, especially with their 
Long Tom. Trooper H.G. Bizley, with the Volunteer Composite 
Regiment, described the Long Tom operating at long range: ''Long 
Tom firing - first puff of smoke from gun then report, then puff 
of smoke in air (shrapnel bursting) then sound of shell 
travelling and final sound of shrapnel bursting. Forty one 
13 Burne, p. 68; D.D. Hall, "The Naval Guns in Natal 1899-
1900". Military History Journal, IV, 3 June 1978, p. 81; Cd. 142, 
Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900. 
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seconds from puff of smoke from Long Tom till puff of smoke in 
air when shell burst." Although generally ineffective, the long 
range Long Tom fire seriously wounded one officer that day. 14 
The mere presence of Clery's and Lyttelton's forces ensured that 
the Boers remained in their positions, in and around Lang's Nek, 
to prevent a British breakthrough there. By maintaining a long 
line of positions, Buller kept the Boers guessing as to the next 
point of attack, thereby forcing the Boers to stretch their 
limited resources very thinly. 
A paucity of sources makes it extremely difficult to establish 
a precise picture of the Boers' activities on the right flank and 
what their morale was like on 7 June. From their elevated 
positions they must have been painfully aware of most of Buller's 
preparations. The sheer weight of British troops and artillery 
massing close to them was surely daunting, if not frightening. 
That, taken together with the knowledge of British successes in 
the Transvaal and mass desertions from the Lang's Nek area, must 
have stretched to the limit the will to resist in this isolated 
corner of the defence line. Chris Botha, in a telegram to his 
brother Louis on 2 June, had already mentioned that the Carolina 
and Lydenburg burghers had felt aggrieved by the mass desertions 
from the other commandos. 15 
With British infantry, cavalry and artillery already or almost 
14 Trooper H.G. Bizley Diary, 7 June 1900; Amery, IV, p. 
189. 
15 Leyds 726(d), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to L. Botha, 2 June 
1900, T.A. 
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in position, ready for an attack on Botha' s Pass and Buller 
having already viewed the terrain over which the assault was to 
be made, he began issuing the necessary orders for an assault on 
Boer positions. Hildyard was to command the main attack to be 
made by the 11th Brigade led by Major-General A.S. Wynne, with 
the 13th and 69th batteries supporting. Wynne was to be supported 
by E.O.F. Hamilton's 2nd Brigade, aided by the 7th and 64th 
R.F.A. batteries and the 61st howitzer battery. While they were 
attacking, Major-General Talbot Coke with the 10th Brigade and 
the four naval guns, would hold Van Wykskop. The big guns on Van 
Wykskop, as well as the 5" guns on the spurs of Nkwelo were to 
sweep the Boer-held crest line along the Drakensberg. Buller 
anticipated that this fire would contain any artillery which the 
burghers might try to bring into action against his forces. 16 
In support of the main attack Dundonald was to advance along the 
De Wet's Farm-Spitskop-Botha's Pass road. He was to take the 
R.H.A. with him and his purpose should be "to cover the right 
flank of the force, consisting of General Hildyard's Division and 
the Second Brigade which will be attacking Botha's Pass by the 
main road." 17 On the left flank the infantry would be covered 
by a squadron of the S.A.L.H., while another squadron was to 
seize Spitskop. 18 In instructions from Buller to Clery, 
ordering the transfer of certain units of infantry, cavalry and 
16 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. GD 233/124/2, Buller 
to Clery, 7 June 1900; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 270-271. 
Regrettably no complete instructions from Buller to Hildyard were 
found. 
17 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. GD 233/124/2, Buller 
to Dundonald, 7 June 1900. 
18 Amery, IV, p. 187. 
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artillery to the left flank, Buller gave no express orders on how 
the British centre and right were to act during the planned 
attack. By the same token no restriction was placed on either 
Lyttelton's or Clery's forces. One assumes therefore that if they 
could support Hildyard's force, be it with artillery fire or 
feints, they were at liberty to do so. Earlier in the war, during 
the battle of Spioenkop, Clery had under similar circumstances 
failed to take aggressive and adventurous action at 
Ntabamnyama. 19 Buller must therefore have realised that he was 
unlikely to attempt anything beyond the necessary, now. By late 
on 7 June Buller had made all the necessary arrangements for the 
attack to commence on the Boer right flank the next morning. 
The main Boer positions ran along a north-easterly line, the 
extreme right of which began at Botha's Pass. The pass lay almost 
directly west of Van Wykskop, about 7 1/2 kilometres away. At a 
point directly north of Van Wykskop, and about four kilometres 
distant, the Drakensberg and therefore also the Boer positions, 
swung directly north, towards Nkweloane. 2° For the British 
artillery, infantry and cavalry to advance beyond Van Wykskop in 
order to deploy before commencing their assault on the Boers' 
Drakensberg position, they would to have to contend with 
topographical difficulties. The gap between Van Wykskop and the 
Drakensberg was so narrow that the British would have to pass 
19 Amery, III, pp. 260 and 297-298. 
20 Nkweloane is referred to as Spioenkop on the 1:50 000 
topographical maps. In all the Anglo-Boer literature this feature 
is however called Nkweloane and will therefore also be known by 
that name in this dissertation. 
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within 3 1/2 kilometres of the Boer line and, at most times, 
would be exposed. If the Boers held Spitskop, they would only be 
just over two kilometres from the advancing British. Under these 
circumstances one imagines Buller would rely heavily on his 
strategically placed long range artillery, to create an efficient 
protective screen. 
Mid winter was rapidly approaching and especially the night 
temperatures steadily declined. As the war zone shifted up to the 
higher altitudes of the Drakensberg and its foothills, the biting 
night chill became ever more acute and eventually warmer clothes 
were released from their respective stores for the burghers and 
British soldiers alike. Private Tucker was of the opinion that 
they should have received them a month before they did, bitterly 
commenting that it was their colonel who delayed their issue 
because he "liked us to wear our khaki as we could wash it and 
so appear clean he had no regard for our health and 
comfort. " 21 So cold was it on Van Wykskop that some soldiers 
covered themselves with either grass or soil in an effort to keep 
warm, not everyone having been issued with blankets. 22 No 
doubt, the Boers at a higher altitude were having to endure even 
lower temperatures. 
Early on 8 June the Carolina and Lydenburg burghers noted the 
British forces pressing ahead with their preparations for the 
21 Todd and Fordham (eds.) p. 109; Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 
26, Von Wichmann to Lt. Malan, 7 June 1900, T.A. 
22 C.T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment, II, p. 77. 
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launching of an attack on their positions on the Drakensberg. 23 
Being outnumbered and outgunned there was nothing they could do 
about it. As the final preparations were made, Hildyard, at 
daylight gathered his senior cavalry, infantry and artillery 
officers on Van Wykskop, from where they had an uninterrupted 
view of the battlefield, and pointed out the lines along which 
they were to advance. 24 Hildyard ordered Spitskop to be 
captured by the S. A. L. H. to clear the way for the advancing 
infantry, in particular those units making for the more level 
ground west of it. Due west of Spitskop was a clearly visible 
track leading to the escarpment. This was to be the dividing line 
between the attacking infantry uni ts with the 11th Brigade 
remaining to the left of it and the 2nd Brigade to the right. 25 
Viewing the battleground in such detail before the attack's 
commencement, enabled the officers to plan and discuss tactics 
and strategy in detail. Each senior officer would go into battle 
with a clear picture of the battlefield in his mind, and knowing 
precisely what was expected of him and also the roles the other 
uni ts would play. Regrettably no detailed record survives of 
decisions taken early that morning on Van Wykskop, to establish 
whether or not the attack went "according to plan". 
23 A 850 C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 5 (no 
date) and VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A .. 
24 It is uncertain who these senior officers were, but it is 
quite possible that Major-Generals E.O.F. Hamilton, A.S, Wynne, 
Talbot Coke, J.F. Brocklehurst and Lord Dundonald were among 
them. 
25 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 89. 
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The situation existing just prior to this attack had numerous 
similarities to that just before the British forces made their 
final assault in the Thukela Heights. On that occasion too there 
was a great numerical imbalance, the Boers and British had their 
artillery in elevated positions, the Boers were entrenched on 
high ground and the British forces were planning to attack from 
below. The major differences were the absence of Louis Botha's 
energetic and effective leadership, and the fact that on this 
occasion Buller intended using cavalry in an active role. Boer 
morale too may have been lower, although it too was a problem at 
the Thukela Heights. 
The British attack commenced at 10:00 with an artillery 
bombardment. Shells bursting in or over one of the Carolina 
encampments forced them to strike their tents, and take them to 
a safer place, somewhat further back. 26 The Boers also withdrew 
their guns further back to safer positions once the bombardment 
commenced. While the burghers were still busy transferring their 
tents and guns, they received reports that a large British force 
was advancing on their positions. This prompted the Carolina men 
to hasten to their trenches. They held the right flank, with a 
considerable concentration of men near Botha's Pass itself, most 
of these men belonged to Wards two and three of the commando, 
while the Lydenburgers held the left flank. Precisely where the 
commandos met is not known. The Lydenburgers' positions stretched 
to Nkweloane. Soon after shelling commenced, the squadron of 
26 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 89; A 
850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A.; Jeans, 
p. 289. 
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S. A. L. H. detailed to capture Spi tskop, took possession of it 
without opposition. They managed to drag a Vickers-Maxim with 
them onto the summit. The Boers did not reply to the British 
bombardment as initially the long range precluded them from doing 
so. 27 Thus the "door" into the basin was now open. 
At about 11 :00 Wynne's 11th (Lancashire) Brigade, advancing from 
Geelboom Farm, along the Ngogo - Botha' s Pass road, passed 
through the deep cutting between Van Wykskop and Spitskop and 
emerged in the broad basin to the west of it, where it rapidly 
deployed. On the extreme left flank of this Brigade was the 
squadron of the S.A.L.H. The 11th Brigade were able to deploy in 
the shelter created for them by the intensely heavy shellfire 
coming from the guns on Van Wykskop, those on its reverse slopes, 
the 5" guns on Nkwelo and the 13th and 69th R.F.A. batteries in 
position immediately behind Wynne's men. 28 
As the 11th Brigade advanced from Geelboom farm, so did 
Hamilton's 2nd Brigade, from Skuinshoogte. They took up their 
position immediately east of Wynne's men. The British infantry 
line had a front of about 6 1/2 kilometres facing towards the 
Drakensberg in a north-westerly direction. No exact details 
regarding the distances between the lines is available, but a 
27 A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900 and 
II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 5, T.A.; Cd. 458, Buller to 
Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 89; Burnett, p. 87; Maurice and 
Grant, III, ~· 271. 
28 Cd. 142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, pp. 36-37; Cd. 
458, Buller to Sec for war, 19 June 1900, p. 89; Amery, IV, p. 
187. 
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photograph of the troops deploying, suggests it varied between 
approximately 20 and 40 metres. 29 Every effort was therefore 
made to limit casualties, should strong resistance be 
encountered. The close order tactics employed by Major-General 
A.F. Hart in the battle of Colenso were certainly a thing of the 
past and the costly lessons learnt, had been remembered. The left 
flank headed for Botha's Pass. On the right flank Hamilton was 
joined by Dundonald with the T.M.I., Composite Regiment, six colt 
guns and the battery of R.H.A. Dundonald found that the De Wet's 
Farm-Spi tskop-Botha' s Pass road he originally intended following, 
passed too close to the occupied Drakensberg and therefore 
decided to take a slightly more southerly route. As Dundonald 
linked up with the 2nd Brigade whose right flank he was to cover, 
he found himself facing a spur coming from the Drakensberg in a 
south-easterly direction. It is at this point that the mountain 
range makes a sharp turn from its north-easterly line to one 
heading directly due north, towards Nkweloane. 30 
At approximately 13:00 the British attack commenced, with the 
11th Brigade passing west of Spitskop and the 2nd Brigade east 
of it. 31 For between one and three kilometres, depending on 
which unit one was with, the advance was over easy terrain. Once 
the Drakensberg was reached the climb became extremely steep and 
progress was slow. Fortunately for the advancing soldiers the 
29 With the Flag to Pretoria, XXIX, p. 682. 
30 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 271; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec 
for War, 19 June 1900, pp. 89-90; Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, 
S.R.O. GD 233/124/2, 'Operation 3rd Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'. 
31 Kearsey, p. 72; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 271. 
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continual artillery barrage kept the burghers off the forward 
crest line, thereby permitting them to advance in safety. 
It was on the right flank that progress was most rapid. Here 
Dundonald sent the T.M.I. up the spur where the Drakensberg took 
a sharply northerly turn. Arriving on the summit they encountered 
a few Boers, but with little difficulty drove them off. As soon 
as the T.M.I. had secured their position, Dundonald followed with 
the rest of his brigade. The brigade was 700 strong at that 
stage. Once there, he noted that Nkweloane, lying directly due 
north, was extensively entrenched and strongly held. However, the 
trenches faced east, into the Harte River valley and by shifting 
slightly to his left, Dundonald would be able to enfilade them. 
He rapidly had six colt guns which had been brought to the 
summit, shifted to his left, and opened fire on the Boers there, 
some 2,3 kilometres away. The range was extreme, but the 
concentrated fire of the six colt guns caused the Boers to vacate 
their positions and head north in 'large numbers' . 32 
Regrettably, Dundonald has left no precise record of what he 
meant by 'large numbers'. 
There were no Boers on Dundonald's immediate left to threaten 
him. Any there may have been, had already retired, possibly to 
escape the shelling or when they saw the infantry advancing on 
them. The absence of Boers in this particular area, the ease with 
which the T.M.I. were allowed to gain a foothold on the 
32 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, GD 233/124/2, 'Operation 3rd 
Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, p. 90; 
Dundonald, p. 161. 
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Drakensberg and the failure of the burghers on or near Nkweloane 
to launch a timeous counter-attack, allowed the 3rd Mounted 
Brigade to take up a position from where they could move to 
either right or left, and enfilade Boer positions in either 
direction. It is somewhat puzzling that the Boers on or near 
Nkweloane, probably members of the Lydenburg commando, did not 
launch a counter-attack against the T.M.I. or even against 
Dundonald's entire force before the colt guns were brought to the 
summit. The T.M.I. were certainly vulnerable for a time, and it 
must have been clear to every burgher that if the British were 
allowed to gain a grip on the summit, their trenches would be of 
no use, as they would be enfiladed. Again, as at Helpmekaar, 
there was a lack of courageous and resilient leadership. 
The Mounted Brigade's swift, effective action secured the 2nd 
Brigade's right flank, and soon after the Boers retired from 
Nkweloane the infantrymen arrived on Dundonald's left. It would 
appear that the entire forward infantry line, from where 
Dundonald was, to near Botha's Pass, breasted the summit at much 
the same time approximately 15: 00. 33 Apparently the only 
person killed during the ascent of the Drakensberg was a black 
man who appeared to be signalling to the Boers. When he noted how 
close the British forces were to his homestead, from which flew 
a white flag, he ran down the mountain towards his home. He was, 
however, shot at and killed.34 
33 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, GD 233/124/2, 'Operation 3rd 
Mtd Bde 6-13 June'; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, 
p. 90; Amery, IV, p. 187. 
34 Kearsey, p. 73. 
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The appearance of the British troops over the crest line was the 
moment some burghers had waited for. With the soldiers slightly 
out of breath after the steep, long climb and therefore for a 
while unable to deliver a steady, accurate fire, the Boers opened 
fire on them with rifles, two porn-porns and a 75mm Creusot gun. 
Initially, only an occasional soldier was visible to them, but 
the numbers steadily increased. The Boers fired from the natural 
folds in the ground, or trenches they occupied, situated a little 
distance from the crest line. The Boers were between 500 and 1 
500 metres from where the British came into view. 35 Hamilton's 
men appear to have encountered the sharpest resistance and were 
initially checked. However, the Boers offering resistance to the 
2nd Brigade, soon found their position untenable. On their right 
the South Lancashires of the 11th Brigade managed to drive the 
Boers before them back, and therefore threatened to outflank and 
cut off the burghers resisting the 2nd Brigade. To create cover 
these Boers set the veld alight, forcing the South Lancashires 
to retire and enabling them to re-occupy their trenches partially 
for a while, so that they could cover the withdrawal of their 
guns and wagons. 
Meanwhile on the left flank of the Boer resisters a new threat 
appeared. Dundonald's men came into action with two R.H.A. guns 
which, with double teams of horses, they had managed to drag to 
the summit. These guns focused their attention on the porn-porns 
35 A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, 
T.A.; Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. GD 233/124/2, 'Operation 
3rd Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'; Amery, IV, pp. 187-188; Cd. 458, 
Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 90. 
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in the area, and soon silenced them. By 16:00 Boer resistance 
against the 2nd Brigade had ceased, the British having brought 
pressure to bear on both the Boer front and flanks. As had become 
the custom, these burghers made good their retreat under cover 
of smoke swirling up from the mass of grassfires they lit along 
the crest of the Drakensberg.36 
Simultaneously to the Boer left flank coming under infantry 
attack, so did their right flank. Here the Carolina burghers 
hurried back to their trenches on hearing the British were 
advancing. Hardly had the burghers reached their trenches, when 
the first soldiers of the 11th Brigade came into view. All the 
time shells were continuously bursting. Added to this noise, was 
the firing from Lee-Metford and Mauser rifles. The crescendo of 
noise prompted J.H.Janson to describe it as "'t Werd waarlyk een 
helsch lawaai ! ". 37 In this sector too, the Boers for a while 
offered considerable resistance, but they were outgunned by the 
artillery and numerically overwhelmed. Ward two and three 
burghers of the Carolina commando massed together in and around 
Botha's Pass, saw a section of the British infantry line make 
directly for them. It was between 300 and 500 metres from them 
when it came into view in relatively open terrain. Despite the 
concentration of Boers in this area, the British advance 
continued relentlessly, forcing the Boers to retire. A little 
36 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. GD 233/124/2, 
'Operation 3rd Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900', Cd. 458, Buller to Sec 
for War, 19 June 1900, p. 90; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 271-
272; Amery, IV, pp. 187-188. 
37 A 850 C.H.K. VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, 
T.A. 
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further right, the York and Lancasters advanced, and were also 
subjected to fairly heavy fire - Mauser bullets, porn-porn and 
field-gun shells. Despite the fire, they maintained an unbroken 
line and a steady pace. Here too the Boers were forced to retire 
- again under cover of veld fires and smoke. 38 By 1 6: 00 the 
British forces had taken possession of a section of the 
Drakensberg, some nine kilometres long. The Carolina and 
Lydenburg commandos were now in full retreat, heading either 
north, north-west or westward, and always setting the veld alight 
behind them to impede any pursuers. 39 
The 2nd Cavalry Brigade and 13th and 69th R.F .A. batteries 
followed slowly in the wake of the left flank of the 11th 
Brigade, making their way towards Botha's Pass. As soon as the 
Pass was in British hands, the cavalry and artillery were ordered 
up the steep and winding road to the summit. The last stretch of 
road was exceptionally steep and stony, hampering progress. When 
the head of the pass was reached, they found their view onto the 
plains beyond severely impeded by undispersed smoke. 
Nevertheless, the first four guns to arrive at the top opened 
fire at the Boer artillery just visible in the distance, the 
Boers soon withdrawing with their guns. Efforts to catch up to 
and close with the fleeing Boers, made by the S.A.L.H., which had 
crossed the mountains just south of the Pass in their initial 
attack, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, over a distance of some 6 
38 Kearsey, pp. 73-75; A 850 C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van 
Rensburg, p. 5 and VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A. 
39 Maurice, III, p. 272; Kearsey, p. 75; Burnett, p. 88. 
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kilometres, were unsuccessful. 40 The British forces had 
dislodged the Boer right flank with ease, and were now in a 
position to advance into the Orange River Colony. 41 Here the 
going would be far easier over a gentle rolling countryside and 
only now would many a British soldier understand why Roberts had 
been able to cover such exceptional distances. Nature had not 
impeded him and exhausted his men and their animals. 
Hildyard's force of approximately 10 000 men and 45 pieces of 
artillery had gained easy success in an area well suited to 
fighting a defensive action. 42 His success can be ascribed to 
a number of factors. Numerically, in both artillery and men, he 
possessed a massive superiority and he took full advantage of 
this by attacking on a broad front - thus increasing the chances 
of finding a weakness somewhere in the Boer defensive line. By 
attacking on a broad rather than a narrow front, he prevented the 
Boers from pooling their resources to defend with strength a 
small area. Furthermore, by spacing his men well apart, he 
reduced his losses to a minimum - a tactic which Janson of the 
Carolina commando saw fit to comment on. The artillery was put 
to effective use, providing covering fire as the attack developed 
and by being dragged up the steep mountain very rapidly in two 
4° Kearsey, p. 75; Burnett pp. 87-88; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec 
for War, 19 June 1900, p. 90; A 850 C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van 
Rensburg, p. 5, T.A. 
41 Breytenbach, V, p. 519. On 24 May 1900 Roberts issued a 
proclamation annexing the Orange Free State and renamed it the 
Orange River Colony. This proclamation was only made known on 28 
May 1900. Spies, p. 60. 
42 The 10 000 men does not include those on Van Wykskop. 
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places to assist the infantry. On the right flank this assistance 
was of material consequence just when required. The R.H.A. came 
into action as the infantry became pinned down. To ensure that 
no Boer reinforcements were sent from Lang's Nek, Clery's guns 
kept up a steady bombardment throughout the day. 43 In a 
telegram to Roberts that evening Buller was full of praise, 
stating: 
General Hildyard to-day assaulted all the spurs of the berg 
between Botha's Pass and (Nkweloane), the attack which was 
well planned by General Hildyard and carried out with 
immense dash by the troops for whom no mountains were too 
steep outflanked the enemy who were forced to retire from 
their very strong positions. . . I hope I have obtained a 
position (from) which I can render Laing' s Nek 
untenable. 1144 
Buller was clearly a happy man and an optimistic one too. 
That the Boers, with only about 1 000 men and three guns, stood 
their ground at all is surprising, though it is evident that 
tactical errors were made. The most serious one was allowing 
Dundonald's T.M.I. to gain a foothold almost uncontested. This 
lapse was compounded by the burghers on or near Nkweloane. 
Conscious that no force lay directly before or east of them, and 
noting that the T.M.I., by taking up positions to the south, 
would be able to enfilade their trenches, they made very little 
or no effort to take any action against this threatening 
development. Once the colt guns were there, it was too late. 
Elsewhere along the firing line it would appear that little could 
43 Burne, pp. 68-69. 
44 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, No Tel. no., 
Buller to Roberts, 8 June 1900. 
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be done to check the advance of an overwhelmingly superior 
British force. 
The British pursuers, unable to close in anywhere on the fleeing 
Boers, returned to a position near the crest line. The 3rd 
Mounted Brigade and most of the infantry settled down to rest on 
the escarpment. Sleep was very unlikely, as it was bitterly cold, 
with dense, moist mist about and most men were without greatcoats 
or blankets. The 2nd Brigade returned to a homestead at the foot 
of the pass. 45 The Boers continued to make good their retreat 
under the cover of darkness. They too spent a miserable and cold 
night. 
Boer casualties were only five wounded and all or most of these 
were eventually taken to Volksrust in a Swiss ambulance, there 
to be cared for kindly by a Hollander, Van Gelden. During the 
battle of Botha's Pass British soldiers captured an ambulance 
serving the Carolina commando. This ambulance was manned by Drs 
Neethling and Luther, both Cape Afrikaners. 46 There is no 
mention of their capture in British sources. British casualties 
too were very slight - two killed and fourteen wounded. These 
casualties consisted of five West Lancashiremen, four York and 
Lancasters, one T.M.I. and one South Lancashireman. 47 Limited 
casualties on both sides underlines the lack of significant Boer 
45 Burnett, p. 88; Kearsey, pp. 75-76. 
46 Penning, p. 751; A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J .H. 
Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A. 
47 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 0983, 
Buller to Roberts, 10 June 1900. 
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resistance. 
That night between 19:30 and 20:00 orders were received on Van 
Wykskop for the 10th Brigade and four naval guns to come off the 
summit. The gunners sprang into action, loading the guns, 
ammunition and all other equipment onto wagons, inspanned the 
oxen and moved to a gully where they were to be assisted by the 
Dublin Fusiliers. Being pitch dark however, the Dublins lost 
their way and spent the rest of the night stumbling about, trying 
to find the guns. The gunners waited patiently for some time but, 
with the help of two companies of Dorsets, who acted as escorts 
to the guns, eventually set about bringing the artillery down. 
The operation was exhausting. The oxen had to be outspanned at 
the crest, and then, with every available man hanging onto drag 
ropes or chains, the wagons were slowly let down the initial 
steep decline for about a kilometre. Where the slope began 
levelling out, the oxen could again be inspanned as the journey 
continued into the valley. Eleven times the men had to lower a 
wagon down the steep slope. On one descent control was lost of 
a wagon, which smashed into two oxen, which had to be put down. 
By 04:00 the task was completed and the exhausted men rested for 
two hours. 
Buller was delighted with the stupendous efforts of these men, 
reporting: " ... hard and well as Captain Jones and the men of the 
Naval Brigade have worked during the war, I do not believe they 
ever had harder work to do or did it more willingly than getting 
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their guns up and down Van Wyk. 1148 The tired and famished 
Dublins finally found the guns too late to be of any 
assistance, but in time to make short work of the unfortunate 
oxen that had been put down. 49 
Saturday, 9 June was spent by the British force essentially 
consolidating their position around Botha's Pass. Guns, the 10th 
Brigade and an endless stream of supply wagons wended their way 
up the pass. It was hard, laborious work, but essential if Buller 
was to consolidate his gains effectively and place himself in 
position to pursue the retreating Boers. Only by evening had 
everyone reached the top of Botha's Pass. During the afternoon 
the 11th Brigade moved about eight kilometres in a north-westerly 
direction, across the Orange River Colony plains, there to 
bivouac near a fine double story stone house. Here they 
encountered Boer doctors tending their wounded, but except for 
a few other burghers found in homes near the pass, no further 
contact with their adversaries was made that day. The burghers 
discovered in the homes near the pass were taken prisoner. 50 
The Boers holding Lang's Nek were soon informed - on 8 June - of 
the British attack and Erasmus promptly ordered Chris Botha with 
48 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 90; Cd. 
142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, p. 37; Jeans, pp. 289-290; 
Burne, p. 69. 
49 Jeans, p. 290. 
so Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 90; 
Kearsey, p. 76; Burnett, p. 88. 
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100 men to hasten to Fourie's assistance. 51 This order is 
puzzling, for it was Chris Botha who, having been instructed 
during May to replace Meyer, was presumably in overall command. 
Indeed the tone of some of his telegrams to Kruger convey this 
impression. Suddenly however, Erasmus was giving instructions. 
So who in fact was in command? Did Erasmus, having previously 
held a more senior rank than Chris Botha, feel piqued when this 
man was suddenly promoted above him, and therefore refused to 
accept his authority? Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain 
answers to these questions, source material being limited because 
of the rapidity of British movements at this time. One wonders 
though, whether there was dissension among the Boer senior 
officers and, if so, to what extent. rt also is probable that C. 
Botha failed to reach Botha's Pass to participate in the action, 
as nowhere does he report becoming involved. 52 
With Buller's left wing safely on the highveld, he was again 
confronted with choices of what direction to take next. He could 
either head for Vrede or swing north towards Volksrust. From his 
report to Roberts on 8 June, it would seem that he decided to 
follow the latter option, for he ended his message with the 
statement: "I hope I have obtained a position (from) which I can 
render Laing' s Nek untenable. " 53 Al though he believed they 
51 Leyds, 726(f), Tel. no. 27, Erasmus to Kruger, 8 June 
1900, T.A. 
52 Leyds 726 (f), Tel. no. 2, C. Botha to Erasmus, 9 June 
1900, T.A. 
53 Roberts Papers T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, No Tel. no., 
Buller to Roberts, 8 June 1900. 
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would both have the same effect eventually, namely to force the 
Boers to vacate Lang's Nek, Roberts had other ideas. He urged 
Buller to advance into the north-eastern Orange River Colony, 
where Lieutenant-General Sir L. Rundle was meeting with 
significant opposition. Once Buller reached Standerton, and cut 
the rail link with Lang's Nek, Roberts felt sure the Boers would 
leave the Drakensberg. 54 This telegram was followed by another 
from Roberts on the same day in which he suggested to Buller that 
he head for Vrede, this being the speediest way of making himself 
felt by the active Boers. He tempered this proposal however, by 
stating: " I hardly know enough of the country between Newcastle 
and that place (Vrede) to justify my giving you a direct order 
to go there. 1155 Roberts did, nevertheless, make it patently 
clear that he expected decisive and quick action from Buller by 
ending his telegram with the injunction: "I sincerely trust 
however you will not remain inactive. 1156 In terms of inactivity 
Buller was not going to disappoint his commander, but as to 
strategy, he clearly wanted to gain control of Lang's Nek as soon 
as possible and was therefore not going to co-operate with 
Roberts as regards the north-eastern Orange River Colony. A 
desire to secure his lines of communication and to unify his 
force once again, is likely to have been the motive for the 
course of action he decided upon. The possibility of cutting 
54 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 2018, 
Roberts to Buller, 10 June 1900. 
55 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 2024, 
Roberts to Buller, 10 June 1900. 
56 Roberts Papers, T.A. XVIII, W.O. 105/13, Tel. no. 2024, 
Roberts to Buller, 10 June 1900. 
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Erasmus's retreat route, may also have been a consideration. 
Securing his lines of communication and unifying his force, prior 
to resolving the problems the British had in the north-eastern 
Orange River Colony, was surely the more logical strategy to 
follow. It would provide Buller and the British forces in general 
with a sounder base from which to operate. 
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Chapter 7. ALLEMAN'S NEK 
In a relatively short period of time, from the beginning of May 
to 8 June 1900, the British forces had had several successes. 
These had resulted in the annexation and renaming of the Orange 
Free State, the capture of Johannesburg and Pretoria and the loss 
of the Biggarsberg position and a portion of the defence line 
held in the Drakensberg by the Boers. Burghers under the command 
of Chris Botha and Erasmus were conscious that military 
circumstances had deteriorated radically since the heady days at 
the end of 1899 and beginning of 1900. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that burghers were deserting daily from the Natal 
front. 
Erasmus's greatest problems stemmed from trying to keep burghers 
of the Pretoria and Soutpansberg commandos in their positions. 
By 8 June he was quite exasperated, reporting to his President: 
" ... ik ben op het oogenblik buiten raad met burgers van Pretoria 
en Zoutpansberg om die hier te houden. 111 Day and night the 
field-cornets and officers had to guard against more burghers 
deserting. Despite their vigilance men continued to leave in 
significant numbers. On Friday, 8 June, Erasmus reported that 30 
men had deserted. The following day another 60 burghers had left, 
and approximately the same number on 10 June. 2 On Saturday, 9 
June, he bemoaned the fact that he and his officers were tired 
1 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no 27, Erasmus to Kruger, 8 June 1900, 
T.A. 
2 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 21, Erasmus to Kruger, 8 June 1900 
and Tel. no. 29, Erasmus to Kruger, 9 June 1900; Leyds 749(b), 
No Tel. no., Erasmus to L. Botha, 10 June 1900, T.A. 
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of keeping an eye on their own men, rather than a lookout for the 
enemy! In an effort to stabilise the situation, the remainder of 
the Soutpansberg commando were persuaded on 8 June to remain in 
position until 11 or 12 June, by which time it was hoped to 
replace them with burghers of the Bethal, Standerton or Ermelo 
commandos. 3 
The morale and discipline problems experienced by Erasmus and 
Chris Botha at this stage, were not unique. Similar problems had 
manifested themselves already among the Free Staters when 
Bloemfontein fell and in the South African Republic under the 
Transvalers. So despondent did the senior Transvaal leadership 
become after the fall of Johannesburg and the subsequent 
wholesale desertions, that on 1 June they had considered suing 
for peace. The following day however, it was decided to continue 
with the war. 4 
But was there any further purpose for the Boers on the Natal 
front even to attempt to prevent Buller's forces from uniting on 
the highveld? There were in fact several sound reasons for their 
doing so. Once Buller's whole Natal Field Force was over the 
Drakensberg barrier and united, it would constitute another large 
force for the ever-diminishing Republican forces to have to 
contend with, and then in terrain generally less favourable to 
themselves. Furthermore, the remaining Boer strongholds in the 
T.A. 
3 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 27, Erasmus to Kruger, 9 June 1900, 
4 Breytenbach, V, pp. 535-541 and 550-556. 
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eastern Transvaal, such as Ermelo, Bethal, Carolina, Machadodorp, 
the new capital and Lydenburg, would then become susceptible to 
attacks from the west (Roberts) as well as from the south. 
Lydenburg and Barberton contained large reserves of food and 
arms. Also, for what it was worth, the Boers' rail link with the 
sea at Lourenco Marques (Maputo) ran through the eastern 
Transvaal. Finally, it would be of considerable advantage to the 
British forces if they could control as much of the Durban-
Johannesburg rail link as possible, it being the shortest route 
to the sea from the highveld. A key strategic feature on this 
line was the Lang's Nek tunnel which the Boers had damaged and 
which was still under their control. There was thus much to be 
gained or lost on this front. Louis Botha and his men were 
certainly determined to contest Roberts's entry into the eastern 
Transvaal. They took up positions straddling the railway line on 
a ridge just east of Pretoria, occupying both Donkerhoek and 
Diamond Hill.s 
With Hildyard's force breaking through at Botha's Pass and the 
British force massing there with the obvious intention of 
exploiting their success, it was essential for the Boers to move 
quickly and decisively in an effort to occupy the best positions 
possible to prevent further strategic gains being made. The 
British could either head for Vrede, in the west, or try to sweep 
in behind Erasmus via Alleman' s Nek. While the British moved 
supplies up Botha's Pass and made no major incursion into the 
Orange River Colony, it remained a mystery as to what option they 
5 Amery, IV, pp. 276-277; Breytenbach, V, p. 538. 
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would choose. 6 If they made for Vrede, Chris Botha and Erasmus 
would be powerless to halt them. However, should they try to make 
for Volksrust or Perdekop via Alleman's Nek and Joubert's Nek 
respectively, the topography lent itself to the Boers fighting 
yet another defensive action. 
Jutting out from the Drakensberg in a north-westerly direction, 
opposite Majuba, is a high and very precipitous spur known as 
Langkrans. Langkrans links up with the Versamelberg further west. 
Where Langkrans and the Versamelberg meet, there is a spur 
jutting out at right angles, running in a south-westerly 
direction and culminating in the fairly high Barnardskop, 
towering over the junction of the Gansvlei Spruit and the Klip 
River. These features separated the British forces from 
Volksrust. Langkrans, with its extremely steep sides, could not 
be crossed by a large body of troops. The Versamelberg could be 
crossed at the two above-mentioned neks. Otherwise the 
countryside in the vicinity of Botha's Pass and the Versamelberg 
was relatively flat, other than the occasional low rolling hill. 
Information of Boer movements, positions and numbers for the 
period immediately after the battle at Botha' s Pass, is so 
sketchy and vague that it is not possible to establish a clear, 
cohesive and reliable image of the state of affairs. One has to 
make do with mere snippets of information. This situation is 
probably the result of two factors. Firstly, events occurred in 
6 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 52, Erasmus to Kruger, 9 June 1900, 
T.A. 
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such rapid succession that only a small percentage of them were 
reported and recorded, and secondly, in the area where events 
were unfolding, there was no easy access to a signal line. 
Consequently, when reports were despatched, only the most 
important details were mentioned. Often, too, despatches were 
further pared down to include only those developments likely to 
have a major impact on future events. To complicate matters 
further, details contradict one another from time to time. 
The day the British spent massing at the head of Botha's Pass and 
bringing their supplies and artillery into the Orange River 
Colony, gave the Boers the opportunity to make good their 
retreat. Fourie, with the majority of the members of his two 
commandos, probably retired in the direction of Barnardskop 
before heading north-east towards the Versamelberg and taking up 
positions there. Some of the retiring burghers did not stop at 
the Versamelberg, but continued to retire until ordered to turn 
back and take up positions with the others already there. 7 While 
the Carolina and Lydenburg burghers retired, Chris Botha occupied 
Langkrans, probably with reinforcements ordered earlier to go to 
Botha's Pass. Botha did not meet up with Fourie that day, but 
clearly encountered a field-cornet of the Wakkerstroom commando 
who witnessed or participated in the battle at Botha's Pass, as 
he was able to provide Erasmus with some details of that 
engagement. In the same message Chris Botha gave orders for the 
7 A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900 and 
II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 5 and VII, Diary of I. Stoltz, 
p. 13, T.A. The diary of Stoltz is not subdivided under dates and 
therefore page numbers are given to provide a fuller reference. 
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Swaziland commando to occupy Langkrans and 200 Middelburgers to 
take up positions on a spur of Langkrans. 8 It is probable that 
Botha was near the western extremity of Langkrans, where his 
presence would have been of some value for defensive purposes, 
rather than further east where the very steepness of the slope 
would prevent a force from advancing with heavy equipment and 
supplies. 
Later in the day, Botha reported the British were heading for 
Vrede and that the possibility existed that they would also 
advance along the Klip River towards Standerton. He therefore 
proposed to gather as many Carolina and Lydenburg burghers as 
possible, in an attempt to check them. At the same time he gave 
orders for the Standerton field-cornets to call up their men and 
make for Vrede. The majority of Standerton burghers were at home. 
The Standerton commandant reported that his men would be called 
up and that he would proceed to Vrede with 300 mounted burghers 
on 11 June. 9 Some time later it became evident to Botha that the 
British force was remaining at the pass and were not advancing 
as reported. He therefore ordered Erasmus not to send 
reinforcements, but none the less to hold them in readiness. In 
the meantime he intended to check on the British force's 
movements personally. 10 This suggests Botha initially responded 
8 Leyds 726 (f), Tel. no. 2, C. Botha to Erasmus, 9 June 
1900, T.A. The Veld-Cornet's name regrettably, is illegible. 
9 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 35, C. Botha to Erasmus and Tel. 
no. 38, C. Botha to H.T.D. and Tel. no. 44, Cmdt Standerton to 
C. Botha, 9 June 1900, T.A. 
10 Leyds 726(f), Tel. no. 46, C. Botha to Erasmus, 9 June 
1900, T.A. 
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to misleading information, especially as he personally now 
intended establishing what the situation was. The misleading 
information or at least interpretation thereof, may have been 
based on the initial British pursuit of the Boers across the 
Orange River Colony plains the previous evening. It was not 
unreasonable to conclude that such a move would be continued the 
following morning. This little episode highlights the value of 
detailed and accurate intelligence in warfare. Such information 
provides a commander with significant advantages. 
It appears that at this critical period for the Boers, more than 
half the Standerton, Bethal and Ermelo commandos were at home, 
as well as a significant number of the Wakkerstroom men. Erasmus 
issued orders to the commandants of Bethal and Standerton to call 
up their men. Those from Bethal were all to go to Lang's Nek, 
while 200 of the best Standerton horsemen were to make for 
Alleman's Nek and the rest had to join Botha. 11 Whether these 
burghers were merely to reinforce his positions or to replace the 
Soutpansberg commando, is not clear. In all probability it was 
the latter, as the Soutpansbergers had effectively been promised 
they could leave on 11 or 12 June. 
At 06:30 on Sunday 10 June Hildyard's force, assembled at the 
head of Botha's Pass, set off in cold misty conditions advancing 
in a north-westerly direction towards the junction of the Klip 
River and the Gansvlei Spruit. The mist eventually cleared about 
11 Leyds 725(f), Tel. no. 27, Erasmus to Kruger, 8 June 1900 
and Tel. nos. 56 and 57, Erasmus to Cmdts Bethal and Standerton, 
9 June 1900, T.A. 
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three and a half hours later, allowing a wintry sun to warm the 
chilled soldiers crossing the highveld. It was important for the 
British to make rapid progress through to Volksrust and 
Charlestown in order to link up with the rest of their forces in 
that region, for they had only about three days' supplies with 
them. 12 By moving with such limited supplies Hildyard was 
certainly taking a risk, but this suggests that he expected to 
succeed very quickly. 
Hildyard's front was covered by the S.A.L.H. and his left flank 
by the second Cavalry Brigade. Behind the S.A.L.H. followed the 
10th Brigade, Halsey and his two naval twelve pounders and then 
the rest of the force. Over much easier terrain than that 
experienced in Natal, the British force was able to cover up to 
five kilometres in an hour. They had approximately eighteen to 
twenty kilometres to cover that day. Along the way they passed 
farm houses flying white flags. 13 To provide an effective 
screen the 2nd Cavalry Brigade crossed the Klip River soon after 
the mist had cleared away. It was reported that on their left 
flank, on the Gemsbokberg, a few kilometres away, was the Vrede 
commando. These Boers, however, made no effort to close in on the 
12 Burnett, p. 88; Jeans, p. 292; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for 
War, 19 June 1900, p. 90; Cd. 142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, 
p. 37. 
13 Burne, p. 70; Burnett, pp. 88-89; Maurice and Grant, III, 
p. 272. The raising of white flags had also occurred along the 
route taken by Roberts. Where this was abused and British troops 
were sniped at from such homes, Roberts had them burnt to the 
ground. The situation was not always clear-cut though, as Boers 
operating in the area of a house with a white flag, but in no way 
responsible for its raising, did not consider themselves bound 
by it. This could result in the home of non-combatants being 
burnt down. Spies, pp. 44-45. 
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British left flank. 14 Occasional pockets of burghers were 
encountered en route, but were always driven off with assistance 
of the naval and field guns, during the course of the 
morning. 15 
Chris Botha soon noticed the British advance - presumably after 
the mist had cleared and therefore only from 10:00 onwards. He 
linked up with about 120 Lydenburgers and the Steenkampsberg ward 
of the Carolina commando. These Boers offered what resistance 
they could during the course of the morning. 16 But such a small 
force without artillery could do little to check Hildyard' s 
advance. They did however, complicate it. That their resistance 
was spirited and courageous is doubtless, for at about 13:00 the 
2nd Cavalry Brigade received news that the S.A.L.H. had become 
hotly engaged. Botha and his men had taken up positions just 
north of Gansvlei Spruit, on Barnardskop. From there they refused 
to move despite the close attention of three squadrons of the 
S.A.L.H .. At one stage, a mere 40 metres separated the 
Lydenburgers and the S.A.L.H. "B" Squadron of the 2nd Cavalry 
Brigade hurried to the assistance of the S.A.L.H., attempting to 
approach the Boers from the west. As "B" Squadron advanced 
towards a koppie from which they hoped to engage the Boers,they 
came under hot fire. This forced the squadron to move further 
north, and by making use of a ridge north-west of the Boer 
14 Burnett, p. 88. 
15 Jeans, p. 291; Cd. 142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, p. 
37. 
16 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to Kruger, 10 June 
1900; A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A. 
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position, they were able to proceed to within 500 metres of the 
Boers, from where they provided covering fire for the S.A.L.H., 
enabling them to retire at dusk. Eventually "B" Squadron itself 
helped cover their movements. In a telegram reporting the 
skirmish to his President, Botha was full of praise for the 
courage of his men. 17 
The casualties suffered in this skirmish were high compared to 
most other engagements since Buller's departure from Ladysmith, 
confirming that the Boers had stood their ground with courage. 
There is considerable discrepancy regarding the Boer losses. 
Chris Botha reported 6 killed and 3 wounded, while Janson gives 
a figure of 8 killed and 12 wounded from the Steenkampsberg ward 
(Carolina commando) alone. If the casualties mentioned by Botha 
were all Lydenburgers, the total losses were 14 killed and 15 
wounded. Buller reported that the British buried 10 Boers that 
day and 12 the next, while Maurice and Grant give the losses as 
1 0 burghers killed. There can therefore be no precision as 
regards the losses. British losses appear to have been slightly 
less, with Buller reporting 6 killed and 7 wounded, all of the 
S.A.L.H .. The Official History records 6 killed and 10 wounded. 
Burnett reports four 18th Hussars wounded. It is therefore 
probable that 6 S.A.L.H. were killed, while a total of at least 
twenty five men were wounded. 18 
17 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to Kruger, 10 June 
1900; Burnett, pp. 88-89; Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 
1900, p. 91; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 272. 
18 Leyds (g), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to Kruger, 10 June 1900; 
A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A.; Cd. 
458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91; Maurice and 
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Earlier in the day Chris Botha informed Erasmus of the British 
advance along the Klip River. In response he immediately 
despatched 250 burghers to reinforce the Carolina and Lydenburg 
commandos, jointly numbering between 1 200 to 1 300 in total at 
this stage. The 250 were additional to the 200 Standerton 
burghers already ordered to Alleman's Nek. 19 
The British force on elevated ground beyond Gansvlei Spruit, 
reported seeing a large body of Boer horsemen somewhat further 
north, making for Alleman's Nek. Its estimated size was 3 000. 
These were probably the Carolina and Lydenburg commandos along 
with some reinforcements, and would therefore not have numbered 
anywhere near 3 000. 20 Late in the afternoon the 5th Division, 
2nd Brigade, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 3rd Mounted Brigade, transport 
and artillery arrived at or near the junction of the Klip River 
and Gansvlei Spruit. There they settled down to endure a frosty 
night. Hildyard's force had reached the western most point of its 
advance en route to Volksrust. Chris Botha and his men retired 
to the Versamelberg. Botha himself made for Joubert's Nek, while 
Fourie headed for Alleman's Nek. 21 Hildyard was now poised to 
drive the Boers out of their last possible defensive position, 
before moving behind Erasmus at Lang's Nek. The large number of 
Grant, III, p. 272; Burnett, p. 89. 
19 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 19, Erasmus to Kruger, 10 June 
1900, T.A. 
20 Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 272-273; Cd. 458, Buller to 
Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91. 
21 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 31, C. Botha to Kruger, 10 June 
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Boer horsemen seen riding about was an indication that they had 
not yet securely entrenched themselves. Considerable dividends 
could therefore be reaped by advancing with utmost haste the 
following morning. 
Consequently the next day while it was still dark, the men began 
eating breakfast and preparing for another long day's work. In 
the darkness all the naval guns and field artillery advanced to 
higher ground, due north of the bivouac position. From there some 
rounds were fired in the direction of the intended line of 
advance, that is, north-eastwards. 22 Under cover and supported 
by the artillery, the 11th Brigade (Wynne's) advanced at 07:00 
to a line of low koppies, north and slightly west of the bivouac 
position, which were seized without opposition. Wynne was under 
orders to halt once he held a position on which the rest of the 
force could pivot, in its intended advance on Alleman's Nek. To 
enable him to reach such a position, he swung right and moved 
through a shallow depression, to occupy the next low ridge on the 
route to the objective. He was now next to the Vrede - Volksrust 
road facing Alleman's Nek, a mere seven kilometres away. Directly 
before Wynne lay the Versamelberg. To his left the terrain was 
relatively open for about ten kilometres, but to his right and 
right front a mere five to six kilometres away lay broken, high 
ground. Covering the left flank, as on the previous day, was the 
2nd Cavalry Brigade (Brocklehurst) and on the right was the 3rd 
Mounted Brigade (Dundonald), less the S.A.L.H., which did 
22 Cd. 142, Jones to Buller, 14 June 1900, p. 37; Jeans, p. 
292; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 273. 
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rearguard duty that day, leaving Dundonald with only the T.M.I., 
the Composite regiment and R.H.A. 700 men in all. 23 The 
cavalry and Wynne's Brigade were followed by the transport and 
2nd and 10th Brigades. The transport and 13th and 69th R.F.A. 
batteries eventually parked alongside Wynne's force. 24 
The Boers occupying elevated positions would fairly soon have 
noticed the early British movements. There is no description of 
precisely where the Boer positions began and ended. rt appears 
though, that they stretched from Joubert's Nek in the west to 
Alleman' s Nek and to the high ground east of Wynne's front. 
Alleman's Nek and the immediately surrounding terrain was held 
by the Lydenburgers and Ward Two of the Carolina commando. Wards 
one and three of the Carolina commando held the positions south 
and east of Alleman's Nek, while it is probable that Chris Botha 
was supported by Wakkerstroom burghers at Joubert's Nek. Between 
Alleman' s and Joubert' s Nek the positions were manned by the 
Lydenburg commando and, possibly some Wakkerstroomers as well. 
rt is impossible to establish how many of the 350 burghers sent 
to Alleman's Nek by Erasmus arrived there, but references by C. 
Botha to the Wakkerstroom and Swaziland commandos confirms that 
some burghers of these commandos were present at some stage of 
the battle. Where the Swazilanders took up their position is not 
23 Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 273-274; Cd. 458, Buller to 
Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 96. 
24 Knox. p. 264. 
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recorded. 25 The total Boer strength was probably between 1 200 
and 1 500 men. There is also much uncertainty as to where the 
Boer artillery was positioned and its numbers. Janson mentions 
in his diary that they had one porn-porn gun and one Creusot gun. 
Amery, however, suggests that there were two high velocity 
guns26 and two porn-porn guns, while the Official History 
mentions one long range field piece and two porn-porns. Janson was 
probably only referring to the Carolina's artillery. Whatever the 
case, the Boers were numerically much weaker than the British, 
in men and guns.27 
At 11 :00, with Wynne in position, the heavy artillery advanced, 
flanked by the 2nd and 10th Brigades respectively. 28 Some time 
after the advance commenced Hildyard's two flanks, that is the 
cavalry, came under fire. The engaged flanks were approximately 
eleven kilometres apart. Fire on the left flank was less intense 
than that on the right, where Dundonald's Composite Regiment was 
operating on the extreme right and closest to the hilly, broken 
terrain. This terrain was ideally suited to a defensive action. 
This engagement was to prove an intense and protracted 
25 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 45, C. Botha to Erasmus, 11 June 
1900 and Tel. no. 8, C. Botha to L. Botha, 12 June 1900; A 850 
C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 6, T.A. 
26 By high velocity Amery probably means either a Krupp or 
Creusot 75mm gun. 
27 Amery, IV, p. 191; A 850 C.H.K., VIII, Diary of J.H. 
Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A. 
28 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91. 
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affair. 29 It is possible the left flank was engaged by Chris 
Botha and 50 Wakkerstroomers, for he reported taking the forward 
patrols under fire and repulsing them. Despite this success Botha 
anxiously informed Erasmus: "Zaken zun hier zeer ernstig vyand 
trekt met groote macht in richting de nek over de Rand na 
Paardenkop. 1130 Botha' s anxiety and concern can well be 
understood. As the morning wore on he noted an enormous force of 
cavalry, infantry and artillery advancing remorselessly on his 
position, the three infantry brigades together numbering some 10 
000 men. The cavalry numbered approximately 2 000 and the 
artillery consisted of four field batteries R.F.A., one battery 
R.H.A,. one howitzer battery, four 4.7", six twelve pounder naval 
guns and two Vickers maxims. As the British advance continued, 
Botha decided to join Fourie at Alleman's Nek and ordered all 
ammunition to be placed on wagons in case they were forced to 
retreat suddenly. He did not wish to lose the ammunition and so 
effectively, be disarmed.3 1 
Dundonald, noticing that the front towards Alleman's Nek was not 
being scouted, ordered forward patrols. They soon returned, 
reporting the position to be occupied. This news prompted 
Dundonald to advance with the T.M.I. on to a low rise some three 
and a half kilometres from the Nek, from where he commenced 
29 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91; 
Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. G.D. 233/124/2, 'Operation 3rd 
Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'. 
30 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 45, C. Botha to Erasmus, 11 June 
1900, T.A. 
31 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 45, C. Botha to Erasmus, 11 June 
1900, T.A. 
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shelling it and the terrain to the south-east of it. The R.H.A. 
guns were joined on their left by the howitzer battery. At about 
13:30 these guns came under a sudden and hot bombardment. One of 
the shells decapitated a soldier with the R.H.A. guns, but other 
than that no damage was caused. 32 As the artillery-duel raged, 
the heavy guns moved onto another low rise about three kilometres 
northwest of Dundonald's guns, and from there came into action 
at about 14:00. The 7th and 64th R.F.A. batteries had also come 
into action, in the vicinity of the howitzers and/or naval guns. 
The intensity of the bombardment initially caused a slackening 
in the Boer firing, 
cessation. 33 
and by 14: 30 forced a temporary 
While the artillery duel continued, the British infantry readied 
itself, under cover of the last fold of the ground, for an all 
out assault on the Boer positions at and on either side of 
Alleman' Nek. The task was a daunting one, for there was hardly 
a vestige of cover over the approximately three and a half 
kilometres they would advance. Hopefully however, the artillery 
barrage, which still continued, would weaken the Boer fire power. 
The nek was a sharply defined feature, the ground rising steeply 
on either side. On the right of the nek, at its entrance, was a 
distinctive conical koppie, commanding the defile. It was 
32 Dundonald Papers, T.M. III, S.R.O. G.D. 233/124/2, 
'Operation 3rd Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'; Maurice and Grant, III, 
p. 274; Amery, IV, p. 190; Knox, p. 266. 
33 A 850 C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 6 and 
VIII, Diary of J.H. Janson, 8 July 1900, T.A.; Cd. 458, Buller 
to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 
274; With the Flag to Pretoria, XXIX, pp. 683-684. 
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connected by a saddle to the higher ground behind and right of 
it. To the left of the nek there was no such distinctive feature 
as the koppie. The ground here rose less steeply and ended in a 
hill set slightly left and back from the beginning of the nek. 
All these features were occupied by Boers. 
As the Boer artillery was silenced at 14:30, the 2nd (Hamilton's) 
and 10th (Talbot Coke's) Brigades commenced their advance from 
sheltered positions behind the guns. Initially the advance was 
under cover and had the support of naval and field gun fire. The 
2nd Brigade advanced west of the dusty gravel track leading to 
the nek. This track was the demarcating feature between the two 
brigades. In Hamilton's front line were two companies of the 2nd 
East Surreys with orders to attack the nek and hill immediately 
west of it. On their left were two companies of the Queens, with 
orders to attack the ridge still further west. Two companies from 
each respective battalion followed in immediate support and the 
remaining five companies of each followed as reserves. The 2nd 
West Yorkshires, on the rear left of these two battalions, 
followed as additional support. 34 Hamil ton's 2nd Devonshires 
did not accompany the Brigade. Half were detailed to guard the 
guns and the other half, with a Vickers-Maxim, occupied a koppie 
a little distance west of the naval artillery, to cover the left 
flank. Some Boer scouts were noticed in that vicinity. 35 
Immediately east of the track advanced four companies of the 2nd 
34 Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 274-275; Cd. 458, Buller to 
Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91; "Linesman", Words of an 
Eyewitness, p. 192; Pearse, I, pp. 419 and 421. 
35 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 275. 
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Dorsetshires, followed by the remaining five companies. 
Immediately right of the Dorsets were the 1st Dublin Fusiliers. 
The 2nd Middlesex Regiment followed as supports. The Dorsets were 
ordered to attack and occupy the conical koppie, while the 
Dublins were to assist them by outflanking the hill. 36 On the 
right Dundonald's artillery and men were still heavily engaged. 
The long, wavy lines of khaki-clad soldiers moved up the gentle 
slope, which provided the initial cover, past the guns and into 
full view of the Boers. For a while the advance passed 
uneventfully, with the lines disturbed only here and there, where 
a soldier was forced to avoid bad ground. The British artillery 
barrage continued unabated. So organized was the whole movement 
that it must have looked somewhat like a military exercise at 
home. rt appears that initially the Boers offered no resistance 
to the 7 000 to 8 000 infantry advancing on them. 37 This 
unfolding spectacle accompanied by bursting shells, was viewed 
by one, Izak Stoltz, of the Carolina commando from Alleman's Nek, 
who stood next to Fourie and exchanged jokes with other comrades 
- possibly to relieve some of the nervous tension. 38 
The Boers eventually opened fire with rifles and porn-porns from 
their elevated positions, directing it initially at Hamilton's 
men, the more exposed brigade at the time. To determine the range 
36 8 Amery, IV, p. 191; Atkinson, II, p. 7 . 
37 Linesman, p. 192; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 276; A 850 
C.H.K., VII, Diary of I. Stoltz, p. 14, T.A. 
38 8 14 A 50 C.H.K., Diary of I. Stoltz, p. , T.A. 
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at which the Boers opened fire is difficult, as the conflicting 
figures available vary between approximately 700 and 1 400 
metres. The majority suggest it was approximately 1 400 
metres. 39 M . H W aJor . . Benson, 2nd East Surrey Regiment, 
described events as follows: "On arrival of the firing line at 
about 800 yards from the Nek a heavy rifle and Porn-porn fire was 
opened on it from the hills on both sides of the Nek. The first 
casualty occurred here. The firing line advanced steadily until 
close in front of the Nek where there was a dip affording some 
cover. 1140 It was now 15: 15. At this stage Hamilton's supports 
provided rapid covering fire from approximately 1 100 metres, 
directed chiefly at the conical koppie and saddle behind it, and 
also opened up with a Vickers-Maxim from between the battalion 
supports. This concentrated barrage caused a slackening in the 
Boers' firing, but not sufficient to enable their advance to 
continue. 41 The earlier British artillery barrage had clearly 
failed to break either the Boers' will or ability to defend their 
strong positions in the rocky terrain of the Versamelberg. The 
British force would have to make a concentrated and brave effort 
over the exposed terrain that lay before them, if they were to 
be successful in achieving their objective. 
As a result of the heavier fire directed at Hamilton's men, 
Coke's brigade began to advance more rapidly and was also soon 
39 Ibid. , Diary of I . 
Grant, III, p. 276; Amery, 
Atkinson, II, p. 78. 
Stoltz, 
IV, p. 
p. 14, T.A.; 
1 91 ; Pearse, 
Maurice and 
I, p. 421; 
40 Pearse, I, p. 421; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 276. 
41 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 276. 
177 
engaged. The Dublin Fusiliers on the right flank were subjected 
to an enfilading fire from their right by those Boers also 
engaged against Dundonald's men. This caused the Fusiliers to 
veer to their right to face the direction of fire and themselves 
to open fire on those particular Boer positions. Very soon a 
large gap appeared between the Dorsets and Dublins. Coke vainly 
attempted to recall the Dublins with signals. The brigade-major 
was ordered to recall them to their proper position. So involved 
did they become on the right however, that only one and a half 
companies managed to rejoin the brigade by nightfall. 42 Despite 
the Dublins having been drawn to their right, the Dorsets pressed 
their attack towards the conical koppie. Their front line 
consisted, from left to right, of the A, C, E and B companies. 
The rest followed behind. B company's left and E company's right 
were given the conical koppie as their objective. When they were 
within about 1 400 metres of the koppie, the Boers opened up with 
rifle fire, which at that range was quite harmless. When the 
range was down to about 900 metres, casualties began to occur, 
among them, Captain Mansel. Despite these casualties the Boer 
defenders, to their dismay, saw no faltering in the British 
advance. The Dorsets passed through a donga and then rapidly 
moved ahead until they eventually passed from view, reaching the 
safety of dead ground at the foot of the steep slopes. In this 
shelter the Dorsets halted to fix bayonets and gird themselves 
for the last steep climb to the summit of the conical hill. 43 
42 Ibid., pp. 276-277; Atkinson, II, pp. 78-79. 
43 Atkinson, II, pp. 78-79; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 276; 
A 850 C.H.K., VII, Diary of I. Stoltz, p. 14, T.A. 
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With the British soldiers so close to the Boers, their artillery 
ceased firing lest it cause casualties among their own men. This 
lull was an indication to the Boers that the final charge was 
about to commence. 44 Indeed soon after the cessation, the 
Dorsets began swarming up the steep, rocky conical koppie, with 
Lieutenant Anson leading B company, being the first to arrive on 
the summit. The Boer defenders of the koppie had retired at the 
last possible moment, dashing across the saddle to the next 
ridge. Some burghers retired down to a farmstead on the Dorsets' 
right. A porn-porn, active to the end in the area, was dragged away 
in the nick of time. The Boers now opened a furious fire against 
the Dorsets on the koppie, fire coming from the front and left 
front across the defile, 45 the Boers no doubt being determined 
to prevent the British from making further threatening gains. The 
British were in the process of securing a small foothold, on the 
Boers' last possible defence line. If they lost this line, Lang's 
Nek would also be lost and Buller would be able to consolidate 
his position in the South African Republic. B company was soon 
joined by A, C and E companies. B and E companies were directed 
to reply to the frontal fire, while A and C answered that from 
across the defile. Further assistance came from machine guns and 
supporting companies. However, the Boers were artfully concealed 
in the rocky terrain, thus providing few targets and, at the same 
time, making conditions rather uncomfortable for the Dorsets. 46 
Soon after the infantrymen gained control of the koppie, they 
44 A 850 C.H.K., II, Diary of J.J. van Rensburg, p. 6, T.A. 
45 Atkinson, II, p. 79. 
46 Ibid., p. 79. 
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were joined by the Signalling Officer, who informed headquarters 
of their success. Hildyard promptly ordered forward the 7th and 
64th R.F.A. batteries and two naval twelve pounders. They took 
up positions to the left and rear of the 2nd Brigade. From there 
they were able to see the saddle connecting the conical koppie 
and the hill north of it onto which many of the Boers had 
retired. The gunners were now in a position to re-open their fire 
without jeopardising the Dorsets. They also opened fire on the 
hill north-west of the defile. 47 
Prior to this Lieutenant Utterson, E company, and approximately 
60 men tried to rush across the saddle to drive the Boers off the 
next hill. This section drew a furious fire from the burghers, 
who managed to knock all those in front over and force the 
remainder to seek cover, before they could make much headway. 
Ideally, the Dublins at this stage should have been lending 
support on the Dorsets' right, but they were now too far away to 
be of material assistance. Colonel Law, noting the difficulties 
experienced in trying to cross the saddle, ordered Major Lynch 
and Captain Butler to arrange an advance around the south-eastern 
side of the koppie. Then he ordered Captain Rowley (F company) 
to fix bayonets, go over the top of the koppie and attempt to 
cross the saddle.48 
Under cover on the south-western side of the koppie, Rowley and 
his men prepared themselves. Well led by Rowley, the company went 
47 Ibid., p. 79; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 276. 
48 Atkinson, II, p. 79. 
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over the top, only to be met by a fierce hail of fire as soon as 
the Boers spotted them. A number of men fell, but the charge 
continued down the slope, now well supported by artillery fire 
from those guns brought forward a little earlier. Utterson's men 
joined Rowley's band as they continued. The attack was also 
supported by heavy fire poured in by B company, and the remainder 
of E and the Volunteer companies. Partway across the saddle the 
men encountered a barbed wire fence, but as its top strand was 
already broken, it proved of little hindrance. The advance, 
executed in a series of short rushes and supported by the 
Middlesex Regiment, was so rapid that Rowley had to halt it 
momentarily while the gunners were ordered to raise their sights 
a little. As soon as this was done, the charge continued, with 
F company in the van. The British infantrymen scrabbled up the 
steep stony hill before them and finally captured it with 
relative ease. H company came around the south-eastern side of 
the hill to add their fire to that of Rowley's. On the plains in 
the distance the British soldiers could also see some 200 Boers 
in full flight. Volleys were fired at them to speed them on their 
way. Boer resistance in this area had ceased to exist. It was 
about 1 7: 00. 49 While the first hole had now been punched in 
this Boer defence line, in other areas along it there was, 
however, still heavy fighting. 
Hamil ton's brigade pinned down in a donga earlier by heavy 
frontal and cross fire, found that, once the Dorsets had captured 
the conical koppie and the artillery had been brought forward to 
49 Ibid., pp. 79-80; Maurice and Grant, III, pp. 276-277. 
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support the right front attack, opposition to them virtually 
ceased. This brigade resumed its advance and gained its objective 
at much the same time as the Dorsets captured their second hill. 
Hamilton's men, too, fired at the retiring Boers, who, as usual, 
set the veld alight to provide a smoke screen. With darkness 
setting in, pursuit was no longer possible and therefore both 
Hamilton's and Coke's men settled down to sleep on the high 
ground, astride the nek. But bitter cold permitted little 
sleep. 50 
On Hildyard's right, Dundonald's men had earlier met with stiff 
resistance. While Dundonald was scouting towards Alleman's Nek 
with the T.M.I. and also engaging Boers with the R.H.A., the 
Composite Regiment made for the spur that jutted out in a south-
westerly direction and culminated in Barnardskop. The Composite 
Regiment managed to drive some Boers off two low lying hills onto 
higher ones on the same ridge. There the Boers put up a stubborn 
resistance. Only when Dundonald turned his artillery on to these 
men did they retire, and then only to take up further defensive 
positions on yet another hill, where they congregated in 
considerable numbers and also behind schanzes about 1 300 metres 
away. The Boers' tenacious resistance forced Dundonald to 
reinforce the Composite Regiment with two colt guns, two 
companies T.M.I. and his artillery. This was all to no avail, as 
the Boers managed to retain their position until nightfall, when 
SO Pearse, I, pp. 421-422; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 279; 
Amery, IV, p. 193. 
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they finally withdrew. 51 These burghers on the British right 
flank had no option but to retire, after the success at Alleman's 
Nek. The British centre could very quickly have cut off their 
line of retreat the following morning. Dundonald left strong 
pickets on the hills, but withdrew and bivouacked in a more 
central position with the rest of his men. During that night all 
burghers, both east and west of Alleman's Nek, made good their 
retreat. 
The number of British casualties suggests that Boer resistance 
was significantly more determined than it was at either 
Helpmekaar or Botha's Pass, despite the burghers having had less 
time to prepare themselves, and the Alleman' s Nek position 
offering less of a natural barrier than the former two had 
presented. However, Chris Botha was present from the beginning, 
and it is possible that this was a major factor in the burghers 
and other officers involved being inspired to hold their 
positions. According to Buller's report British casualties were 
19 killed and 123 wounded, of whom four died soon afterwards. 
Casualties were thus higher than those for the combined 
Helpmekaar and Botha's Pass battles. As can be expected, the 
Dorsets paid the highest price for the British success with 64 
casualties. The rest of the 10th Brigade suffered 27 casualties, 
while the 2nd Brigade suffered 46. 52 To determine precise Boer 
casualty figures, is impossible. Chris Botha reported to his 
51 d Dun onald Papers, T.M., III, S.R.O GD 233/124/2, 
'Operation Mtd Bde 6-13 June 1900'. 
52 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91. 
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brother Louis: "Verlies aan onse kant is my onbekend. Sover ik 
weet zyn drie lyken in handen van vyand gevallen andere dooden 
en gewonden werd van tyd tot tyd uit gebracht van Swazieland 
zeven gewonden geen dooden."S3 From diary entries it is evident 
that at least seven Carolina men died, but no figure for wounded 
burghers is mentioned. No casualty figure for the Lydenburg, 
Middelburg and Wakkerstroom burghers are recorded. Given the 
intensity of the British artillery bombardment and the lack of 
adequate trenches, it is probable that there were significantly 
more casualties than those mentioned. Due to the rapidity of the 
British advance and the veld being set ablaze either by shell 
fire or the retiring burghers, at least two Boer corpses were 
burnt. s4 
While Hildyard's force was engaged in getting up Botha's Pass and 
taking possession of Alleman's Nek, Clery's artillery maintained 
a steady barrage on the Boer positions before them. While there 
is no evidence of this action causing casualties, Von Wichmann's 
Long Tom wounded two officers and four men during this time.SS 
Clery's men launched no major offensive during this period. Their 
mere presence none the less, forced the majority of those Boers 
before them, to remain in their positions and thereby made 
Hildyard's task as easy as possible. 
s3 Leyds 726{g), Tel. no. 8, C. Botha to L. Botha, 12 June 
1900, T.A. 
s4 A 850 C.H.K., III, Diary of A.W. Korf, p. 3 and VIII, 
Diary of J.H. Janson, p. 16, T.A. As Korf's diary is not 
subdivided into dates, the page number is given as a reference. 
SS Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 92. 
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The British success at Alleman's Nek can be ascribed mainly to 
their numerical superiority, in both men and artillery. This is 
confirmed in a message Chris Botha sent to his brother Louis, 
stating: "Wy hadden en hard gevecht te Allermansnek van omtrent 
twaalf uur middag tot zonsondergang. Door de groat overmacht en 
wenig kanon waren wy verplicht ons posi ties te verlaten. 1156 
Hildyard fully exploited the advantage of numerical superiority, 
a factor that needs to be considered, as the British commanders 
had not always taken advantage of their strength, especially 
during Buller's relief of Ladysmith campaign. Furthermore, 
Hilyard's tactical deployment of the artillery partway through 
the battle materially assisted Coke's men as they undertook the 
most difficult part of their assault and this no doubt eased the 
burden on the infantry and probably diminished the casualties 
they suffered. 
The British success posed a major threat to the Boers still in 
position at or near Lang's Nek. Realizing this, Chris Botha sent 
a message through to them, ordering that all guns be removed from 
their positions, that everyone retire in proper order and also 
that von Wichmann be informed of developments. 57 Under the 
cover of darkness these Boers retired from their positions, 
either by train or on horseback. 58 The way was now open for 
56 Leyds 726(g), Tel. no. 8, C. Botha to L. Botha, 12 June 
1900, T.A. 
57 Leyds 726(g), Tel no. 48, Militaire Secs to Erasmus, 11 
June 1900, T.A. 
58 Leyds 7 2 6 ( g) , Tel. no. 6, Erasmus to Kruger, 1 2 June 
1900, T.A. 
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both Clery's and Hildyard's forces to take possession of 
Volksrust and so to launch themselves into the South African 
Republic. The Boer reverse at Alleman' Nek undoubtedly had major 
long-term implications for their overall cause. 
186 
Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS 
While the British forces tried to obtain some sleep in the bitter 
cold of the night after the battle, the Boer forces of Chris 
Botha and Erasmus continued to make good their escape from the 
Versamelberg and Drakensberg. The loss of one of their defensive 
positions meant that the remaining one, in the Drakensberg, 
became vulnerable to encirclement, so a speedy escape was 
essential. 
Rest for some British units was short lived. Lieutenant C.R.N. 
Burne reported that their guns were on the move again one hour 
before dawn. 1 Quite clearly the funnelling effect Alleman's Nek 
had on Hildyard's forces resulted in their being slowed down, for 
it was only at 10:00 that the 18th Hussars received orders to 
advance to the Nek and beyond. 2 At this stage Hildyard and 
Buller appeared to be in no great hurry to try and catch up to 
the Boers, or to cut off their retreat, by gaining control of the 
Volksrust-Standerton road or rail links. Atkinson in fact has 
suggested that a more vigorous pursuit, possibly from immediately 
after the battle, might have resulted in the railway being cut 
north-west of Volksrust and have led to guns, stores and 
prisoners falling into British hands. 3 This criticism requires 
some analysis. There were a number of factors to inhibit an 
immediate pursuit. Hildyard's force had covered a fair distance 
on 11 June and by the end of the day, must have been relatively 
Burne, p. 71. 
2 Burnett, p. 90. 
3 Atkinson, II, p. 81. 
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tired. As the battle ended at about sunset, a pursuit over 
unknown terrain would have had to be made in darkness. The 
Versamelberg presented an insurmountable barrier for wagons and 
artillery, except at Joubert's and Alleman's Neks. This 
topographical configuration would, therefore, have caused a 
significant time lapse, before an adequate force could assemble 
to the north of the Versamelberg. The more mobile British forces 
were some distance away from Alleman's Nek, having operated on 
the flanks during the course of the battle. 
As Botha had communicated to Erasmus the loss of the Versamelberg 
soon after it occurred, and taking into account all the above 
drawbacks facing Hildyard's men, it is improbable that his force 
would have reached the rail line before the Boers were able to 
escape along their main retreat route. This, none the less, does 
not detract from the fact that no real effort was made to press 
a pursuit as hard as possible, especially as the gun crews at Van 
Wykskop had shown their ability to work long and hard hours, even 
through the night. 
As Sandspruit station was approached, the last retreating Boer 
horsemen were seen and promptly shelled with 4. 7" guns from a 
range of 9 000 metres. They soon disappeared from view. 4 The 
British advance on Volksrust continued and at nightfall 
Hildyard's force bivouacked approximately 6 kilometres from the 
village. 5 Meanwhile Clery, aware of Buller's success and 
4 Jeans, p. 294. 
5 Cd. 458, Buller to Sec for War, 19 June 1900, p. 91. 
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probably suspecting that the Boers holding positions at Lang's 
Nek had vacated them, confirmed this in a probing action by 
mounted troops under Dartnell's command. Clery therefore ordered 
forward the 4th Brigade, supported by artillery. Dartnell 
meanwhile cautiously pushed on with scouts to Charlestown and 
that very evening was still able to cross the border and occupy 
Volk~rust. 6 During this advance it became abundantly evident 
that the line the Boers had held before Clery, from Phokweni via 
Lang's Nek to Majuba, had been abandoned. 
The following day Buller entered the little village of Volksrust. 
From all the houses and farm establishments his men passed, white 
flags fluttered. The Boer men had all departed, leaving the women 
behind, some weeping for their lost ones. In the village the 
British troops managed to capture wagons and forage, as well as 
some coffins - an uncomfortable reminder of the realities of war. 
Buller's men also pushed on to Charlestown. The force was based 
on these two villages for the next few days, while they attended 
to certain essentials. 7 Firstly it was imperative that the 
railway line be repaired, the most serious damage being at Lang's 
Nek where both ends of the tunnel had been dynamited. By sheer 
hard work, the rubble was cleared and line repaired within a few 
days and on 18 June the first train passed through the tunnel. 8 
With the line intact to Volksrust it was Buller's intention to 
6 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 279; Amery, IV, p. 195. 
7 Burne, p. 72; Maurice and Grant, III, p. 280. 
8 Principal Events, IV, pp. 74 and 84. 
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build up sufficient supplies prior to moving on. 9 
While this process was in progress the telegraph section, Royal 
Engineers, accompanied by two squadrons of the T.M.I. returned 
to Gansvlei to recover telephone lines laid out as the advance 
on Alleman's Nek had been made. The telegraph section was spotted 
and fired upon by mounted burghers, superior in numbers to the 
T.M.I. squadrons. The next day the opposing forces merely kept 
a watchful eye on each other, but eventually the T.M.I. 
considered it prudent to withdraw, leaving the lines lying in the 
veld. 10 
Further east around Wakkerstroom, the Boers for a while proved 
equally resistant. Buller considered it necessary to gain control 
of the town. On 15 June Lyttelton despatched the mounted infantry 
of the 4th Division, 6 companies K.R.R. and 6 companies Liverpool 
Regiment under command of Major-General F. Howard, to carry out 
the task. As this force approached Wakkerstroom from the south, 
large numbers of Boers gathered before the town to resist them. 
This show of force prompted Buller to order the immediate 
withdrawal of Lyttelton's men. Instead Hildyard was to act in co-
operation with Lyttelton's men, and carry out the task. His force 
comprised the 3rd Mounted Brigade, 61st (Howitzer) battery, a 12 
pounder naval gun battery, the 13th and 69th batteries R.F.A. and 
the 11th Brigade. Lyttelton's force was strengthened with the 
9 Roberts Papers, T.A. XXI, Tel. no. 282, Buller to Roberts, 
18 June 1900. No War Office reference number could be located for 
this source. It may however be in W.O. 105/13. 
10 Maurice and Grant, III, p. 280. 
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addition of the 53rd battery R.F.A., one Vickers-Maxim gun, six 
companies Leicester Regiment and six companies K.R.R .. 11 With 
such an immense force, Buller was quite clearly determined to 
crush any resistance and force the capitulation of the town. On 
16 June, Hildyard approached Wakkerstroom along a relatively easy 
route from the north-west. The following day Lyttelton joined in, 
by again approaching from the south. This time the British force 
entered the town without opposition and the landdrost officially 
surrendered the town. In addition, 193 burghers capitulated and 
197 firearms and 80 000 round of ammunition were handed in as 
well as other supplies. 12 Buller's flanks were now relatively 
secure and his main supply line operational. 
Piecing together the movements of the Boer commandos once they 
lost control of the Versamelberg and had given up the Drakensberg 
is exceptionally difficult as records for this particular period 
and area are virtually non-existent. It would appear that 
Roberts's move through the centre of the two republics and the 
loss of the Natal front presented such pressures and threats 
that, to a great extent, the forces under Erasmus and Botha 
disintegrated. Erasmus reported to President Kruger that this 
force initially made for Houtsnek via the rail line, while those 
on foot headed for Paardekop. 13 A day later Commandant Joubert 
telegraphing from Amersfoort reported having a mere 150 men with 
11 Ibid., p. 280. 
12 Ibid., pp. 280-281. 
13 Leyds 7 26 ( g), Tel. no. 6, Erasmus to Kruger, 1 2 June 
1900, T.A. 
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him, that the Carolina, Lydenburg and Pretoria burghers had fled 
and that the Wakkerstroom commando no longer wished to fight. 14 
The final comment is partially supported by the capitulation of 
men to Hildyard at Wakkerstroom a few days later, although it 
should be borne in mind that, in the circumstances, they hardly 
had a choice and, that a little earlier had shown spirited 
resistance to Lyttelton. Meanwhile Chris Botha mentioned having 
400 Wakkerstroomers and 100 Swazilanders with him. 15 There were 
thus some Wakkerstroomers determined to continue the fight. This 
conclusion is also supported by the fact that only 193 burghers 
surrendered to Hildyard. 
After fighting so proudly, valiantly and long in Natal, those 
same Boer forces were now, almost pathetically, disintegrating. 
None the less, being hopelessly outnumbered and seemingly 
defending a lost cause, with the Orange Free State already a 
British colony and the two major South African Republic urban 
centres now under British control, it would be unreasonable to 
have expected the burghers to remain unquestioningly in their 
positions. In some respects, it is, in fact, surprising that some 
of the burghers, such as those from Pretoria, remained there so 
long. The Carolina and Lydenburg commandos were at least still 
serving a purpose by resisting. The British forces had not yet 
invaded their territories. 
14 Leyds 727(g), No tel. no., Cmdt Joubert to Kruger, 13 
June 1900, T.A. 
15 Leyds 727(g), No Tel. no., C. Botha to H.T.D., 13 June 
1900, T.A. 
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To understand why events turned out as they did, it will be 
helpful to review Boer and British strategies briefly, as well 
as factors which had an impact on the northern Natal campaign. 
The Boer strategy during the northern Natal campaign was 
virtually identical to that which they employed in the Thukela 
River valley. They occupied strategic high ground, dug trenches 
or built schanzes and placed their artillery out of view of the 
enemy. However, the northern Natal campaign was not nearly as 
effective as that waged in the Thukela valley. For this there 
were specific reasons. Boer numbers, both in men and artillery, 
were reduced compared to the Thukela campaign, while the British 
had more in both categories. Furthermore, British strategy had 
improved, probably as a result of lessons learnt along the 
Thukela. They made good use of their numerical superiority, 
forcing the Boers to hold their lines only thinly. Where 
possible, the British commanders employed their artillery more 
efficiently. This was particularly evident at Botha's Pass and 
Alleman's Nek. Not only was the artillery used to exsert more 
pressure, but the mobility of the cavalry was more effectively 
utilised, either by being in the vanguard of an attack as at 
Helpmekaar and Botha's Pass or by stretching the Boer flanks as 
at Alleman's Nek. No longer were they, to all intents and 
purposes, almost exclusively infantry attacks, with the cavalry 
bringing up the rear as at Ntabamyama ( 20-21 January 1900), 
Spioenkop (24 January 1900) and Wynne Hill (22 February 1900). 
Al though Buller nowhere expressly stated it, he did seem prepared 
to take more risks. This was well illustrated by the capture of 
Uithoek near Helpmekaar. The capture of this hill enabled the 
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infantry to follow and gain a strategic foothold on the plateau. 
More careful planning by the British officers is also evident. 
The meticulous preparation before the attack at Botha's Pass is 
a case in point, as is the outflanking movement at Helpmekaar 
which, combined with the rest of his force carefully strung out, 
misled the Boers as to his real intentions. By stringing out his 
force over a long front, Buller left it somewhat vulnerable to 
a counter attack, wherever the Boers chose to carry this out. 
However, experience would have taught Buller that Boer counter 
attacking and moving into the open was generally not their style. 
British strategy employed in northern Natal was therefore 
significantly more effective than that employed in the Thukela 
valley. In addition to these improved British tactics, the Boers 
had further drawbacks to overcome. One of the major ones was the 
absence of their charismatic and dynamic leader, Louis Botha. 
Leadership, or the absence thereof, especially while they were 
still active in the Biggarsberg, was a particular weakness. The 
Boers themselves realised this, subsequently rebelling against 
Lucas Meyer and having him replaced. Chris Botha appears to have 
been the only leader able to motivate burghers to hold their 
positions when they were confronted by a concerted British 
attack. Losses suffered by both sides at Alleman' s Nek were 
significantly higher than those at Helpmekaar or Botha's Pass. 
Botha did not arrive at Helpmekaar during the initial attack, but 
only later, by which time he could no longer materially influence 
the outcome. Low morale, brought on in part by the apparent 
futility of holding the Natal front when all else behind them was 
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collapsing, increased the difficulty of officers to mount a 
resilient campaign. 
The departure of the Boers from the Drakensberg meant that, once 
again, the entire colony of Natal was under British control. News 
of this achievement was greeted with delight by the then Governor 
of Natal, Sir W.F. Rely-Hutchinson, who in a telegram announced: 
"Natal clear of the enemy after 242 days. 1116 The Secretary of 
State for War congratulated Buller by telegraphing: "I 
congratulate you heartily on the manner in which you have cleared 
Natal of the enemy, and wish you not less success on the other 
side. 1117 To this Buller replied: "Many thanks for your 
congratulations. The troops it is my honour and pleasure to 
command can go anywhere. 1118 In typical Buller fashion, he gave 
credit to those men who most deserved it. He himself must surely 
also have felt a sense of triumph, having come to South Africa 
as commander-in-chief of the British forces in October 1899 and, 
after a series of reverses, suffering the indignity of being 
replaced by Roberts and reduced to the command of the Natal Field 
Force only. Now in the space of a month, he had inflicted three 
defeats on the Boers and, in the process, driven them out of 
Natal. As yet no significant assessment of Buller's role in the 
war has been undertaken, neither his successes in northern Natal 
nor, for that matter, his positive exploits in the eastern 
Transvaal, have been taken into account in forming any sort of 
1 6 Princi2al Events, IV, p. 74. 
17 Ibid., p. 74. 
18 Ibid. , p. 74. 
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full and balanced judgement of his role in the Second Anglo-Boer 
War. Instead, Buller's defeats in the Thukela valley are the 
focus of attention. Thomas Pakenham has made some effort to re-
assess these criticisms, but as stated earlier, has paid no 
detailed attention to the northern Natal campaign. 19 
In more general terms, Buller's arrival on the highveld with yet 
another large British force to support that of Roberts's army, 
was another blow to the Boer military cause. Furthermore, a 
second supply line, this time a much shorter one than that from 
Cape Town, became available to the British. Formal pitched 
battles would soon become impractical for the Boers if they 
wished to continue the war. Already Christiaan de Wet had opted 
for a more mobile type of warfare in which supply lines and 
smaller garrisons were harassed. In October 1900 this became an 
overall Boer strategy. 20 
19 Pakenham, pp. 368-370 and 453-454. 
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